1	Kevin Walker, sui juris, In Propria Persona.	
2	Donnabelle Mortel, sui juris, În Propria Pers	sona.
	C/o 30650 Rancho California Road #406-2	51
3	Temecula, California [92591]	
4	non-domestic <i>without</i> the <u>U</u> nited <u>S</u> tates	
5	Email: <u>team@walkernovagroup.com</u>	
	Attorney(s)-In-Fact, Executor(s), Authorized	d Representative(s),
6	and <u>Secured Party(ies)</u> for Plaintiff(s)	•
7	TMKEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, TMWG EXP TMKEVIN WALKER©, TMDONNABELLE N	
8	MEVIN WALKER®, MOONNADELLE N	MORTE® ESTATE
	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRIC	T OF CALIFORNIA
10	TMKEVIN WALKER© ESTATE,	Case No.: 5:25-CV-00339
11	TMDONNABELLE MORTEL© ESTATE,	
	™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST, ™ŴG EXPRESS TRUST©,	PLAINTIFFS' <u>VERIFIED</u> <u>DEMAND</u> FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND
12		PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS,
13	Plaintiff(s),	SANCTIONS, AND <u>VERIFIED</u>
14	vs.	DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND
	Jay Promisco, Joseph Moran, Christian	SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR AS <u>A MATTER</u>
15	Gault, Amir Sabet, Amanda Coffrini, John Goulding, Brian Mcginley, Virginia	OF LAW WITHOUT HEARING
16	Erbes, Corey Moore, Drew	
1.7	Fuerstenbergerm, James E. Coffrini, Paul	
17	Gustafson, Devin Ormonde, SIERRA	
18	PACIFIC MORTGAGE COMPANY INC,	
19	GREENHEAD INVESTMENTS INC, PHH MORTGAGE SERVICES, PRIME	
19	RECON LLC, Does 1-100 Inclusive	
20	Defendant(s).	
21		
22	PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED DEMAND	FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND
23	PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT	S, SANCTIONS, AND VERIFIED
24	DEMAND FOR DEFAULT ANI	D SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
25	PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR AS A MATTI	ER OF LAW WITHOUT HEARING
26	COMES NOW, Plaintiffs TMKEVIN WALK	ER© ESTATE, TMDONNABELLE
27	MORTEL© ESTATE, ™KEVIN WALKER©	IRR TRUST, TMWG EXPRESS TRUST©
28	hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and through t	heir Attorney(s)-in-Fact, Kevin: Walker
-~ I	1, 1, 2, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6,	(2) 22 2 20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

-1 of 52
Plaintifes verified demand for criminal referral and prosecution of defendants, sanctions, and verified demand for default and summary judgment in plaintifes favor as a matter of law without hearing

and Donnabelle: Mortel, who are both proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona,
and by Special Limited Appearance. Kevin and Donnabelle are natural freeborn
Sovereigns and state Citizens of California and Washington the republic in its
De'jure capacity as one of the several states of the Union 1789. This incidentally
makes them both a national American Citizen of the republic as per the De'Jure
Constitution for the United States 1777/1789.
Plaintiffs, acting through their Attorney(s)-in-Fact, assert their <i>unalienable</i> right to
contract , as secured by Article I , Section 10 of the Constitution , which states: "No
State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." and thus which
<i>prohibits</i> states from impairing the obligation of contracts . This clause
unequivocally prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts, including
but not limited to, a trust and contract agreement as an 'Attorney-In-Fact,' and any
private contract existing between Plaintiffs and Defendants. A copy of the
'Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact,' is attached hereto as Exhibits H and
incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiffs further rely on their <i>unalienable and</i>
inherent rights under the Constitution and the common law – rights that predate
the formation of the state and remain safeguarded by due process of law.
I. <u>Constitutional Basis:</u>
Plaintiffs assert that their private rights are secured and protected under the
Constitution, common law, and exclusive equity, which govern their ability to
freely contract and protect their property and interests
Plaintiffs respectfully assert and affirm:

• "The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his **private** business in his own way. **His power to contract is** *unlimited*. He owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due

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process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." (*Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 47 [1905]).

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"The claim and exercise of a constitutional **right cannot** be converted into a crime."—Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.

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"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
 making or legislation which would abrogate them." — Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

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• "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional **rights**." —Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945.

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• "A law repugnant to the Constitution is **void**." — *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

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• "It is not the duty of the citizen to surrender his rights, liberties, and immunities under the guise of police power or any other governmental power." — *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).

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• "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." — *Norton v. Shelby County*, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).

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• "No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to enforce it." — 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 177, Late Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 256.

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• "Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." — *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

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II. <u>Supremacy Clause</u>

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Plaintiffs respectfully assert and affirm that:

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• The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the <u>United States</u> (Article VI, Clause 2) establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to

1	it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the	
2	Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws. It provides	
3	that state courts are bound by, and state constitutions subordinate to, the	
4	supreme law. However, federal statutes and treaties must be within the	
5	parameters of the Constitution; that is, they must be pursuant to the federal	
6	government's enumerated powers, and not violate other constitutional	
7	limits on federal power As a constitutional provision identifying the	
8	supremacy of federal law, the Supremacy Clause assumes the underlying	
9	priority of federal authority, albeit only when that authority is expressed in	
10	the Constitution itself; no matter what the federal or state governments	
11	might wish to do, they must stay within the boundaries of the Constitution.	
12	III. DESCRIPTION OF AFFECTED PRIVATE TRUST PROPERTY	
13	This action affects title to the private Trust property (herein referred to as "private	
14	property" and/or "subject property") situated in the county of Riverside,	
15	California, commonly described as a '31990 Pasos Place, Temecula, California,' and	
16	described as follows: Lot 5 of Tract No. 23209, in the City of Temecula, California,	
17	County of Riverside, on file in Book 320, Pages 79 through 97 records of Riverside	
18	County, California,' hereinafter referred to as the "Property," and all bonds,	
19	securities, Federal Reserve Notes, assets, tangible and intangible, registered and	
20	unregistered, and more particularly described in the Authentic UCC1 filing and	
21	NOTICE #2024385925-4 and #2024385935-1, and UCC3 filing and NOTICE	
22	#2024402433-7 and 2024411182-7, all Filed in the Office of Secretary of State State Of	
23	Nevada. Attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, C, and D respectively, and incorporated	
24	herein by reference.	
25	This action also affected any titles, investments, interests, principal amounts,	
26	credits, funds, assets, bonds, Federal Reserve Notes, notes, bills of exchange,	
27	entitlements, negotiable instruments, or similar collateralized, hypothecated, and/	

or securitized items in any manner tied to Plaintiffs' signature, promise to pay,

order to pay, endorsement, credits, authorization, or comparable actions (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Assets").

IV. <u>STANDING</u>

- 1. Plaintiffs are <u>undisputedly</u> the Real Party(ies) in Interest, holder(s) in due course, Creditor(s), and hold allodial tittle to <u>any and all</u> assets, registered or unregistered, tangible or intangible, in accordance with contract law, principles, common law, exlcusive equity, the right to equitable subrogation, and the U.C.C. (Uniform Commercial Code). This is further evidenced by the following UCC filings, all duly filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Nevada: UCC1 filing #2024385925-4 and #2024385935-1, and UCC3 filing #2024402433-7 and 2024411182-7 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D), and in accordance with UCC §§ 3-302, 9-105, and 9-509.
- Plaintiffs' standing is further affirmed and evidenced by the GRANT DEED recorded in Official Records County of Riverside, DOC #2024-0291980, APN: 957-570-005, File No.: 37238 KH, where the private trust property is titled to 'WG Private Irrevocable Trust, dated February 7, 2022' (Exhibit E).
- 3. Plaintiffs maintain **exclusive and sole standing** in relation to said assets and their interests, as duly recorded and affirmed by these filing.
- 4. Plaintiff(s) alone possess(es) *exclusive equity*.
- \parallel 5. Defendants do <u>NOT</u> have **any** valid interest or standing.
 - 6. Defendants do <u>NOT</u> have a valid claim to the 'Property' (31990 Pasos Place,
 Temecula, California,' and described as follows: Lot 5 of Tract No. 23209, in the
 City of Temecula, California, County of Riverside, on file in Book 320, Pages 79
 through 97 records of Riverside County, California), or any of the respective
 Assets, registered and unregistered, tangible and intangible.
 - 7. Defendants do not possess any valid interest or standing concerning DEED OF TRUST #000+1365377+24+1+1-15, or NOTE #000+1365377+9+1-3 DATED JULY 15, 2022, which **both** have been **Accepted for Value and Returned for Value**,

with honor, for full satisfaction, setoff, and adjustment of all charges associated with the DEED OF TRUST, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933 (Public Law 73-10) and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The original document was special deposited into a private post registered account with the U.S. Treasury (Fiduciary), as evidenced by Registered Mail #RF661588808US and the accompanying form 3811, which was signed and returned. Said Acquired DEED OF TRUST and NOTE, as well as a Library of Congress Certified Copy of *The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America* from March 1933 to June 1934: House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933, Public Law 73-10 (Exhibits G, BB, and H respectively).

V. <u>Defendants' Actions as Acts of War Against the</u> <u>Constitution</u>

The defendants' conduct constitutes an **outright war against the Constitution** of the United States, its *principles*, and the **rule of law.** By their *bad faith* and deplorable actions, the defendants have demonstrated *willful and intentional* disregard and contempt for the **supreme law of the land**, as set forth in **Article VI**, **Clause 2 of the Constitution**, which declares that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the supreme law of the land, binding upon all states, courts, and officers.

A. Violations of Constitutional Protections

- The defendants have intentionally and systematically engaged in acts that directly violate the protections guaranteed to the plaintiffs and the people under the Constitution, including but not limited to:
 - **1. Violation of the Plaintiffs' Unalienable Rights**: The defendants have deprived the plaintiffs of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
 - **2. Subversion of the Rule of Law**: Through their actions, the defendants have undermined the separation of powers and checks and balances established

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by the Constitution. They have disregarded the judiciary's duty to uphold the Constitution by attempting to operate outside the confines of lawful authority, rendering themselves effectively unaccountable.

3. Treasonous Conduct: Pursuant to Article III, Section 3, treason against the United States is defined as levying war against them or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. The defendants' conduct in subverting the constitutional order, depriving citizens of their lawful rights, and unlawfully exercising power without jurisdiction constitutes a form of domestic treason against the Constitution and the people it protects.

B. Acts of Aggression and Tyranny

The defendants' actions amount to a usurpation of authority and a direct attack on the sovereignty of the people, who are the true source of all government power under the Constitution. As stated in the Declaration of Independence, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of the unalienable rights of the people, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it. The defendants, through their actions, have positioned themselves as adversaries to this principle, attempting to replace the rule of law with arbitrary and unlawful dictates.

C. Weaponizing Authority to Oppress

- The defendants' intentional misuse of their authority to act against the interests of the Constitution and its <u>C</u>itizens is a clear manifestation of tyranny. Rather than serving their constitutional mandate to protect and defend the Constitution, they have actively waged war on it by:
 - Suppressing lawful claims and evidence presented by the plaintiffs to protect their property and rights.
 - Engaging in acts of fraud, coercion, and racketeering that strip plaintiffs of their constitutional protections.

•	Dismissing the jurisdictional authority of constitutional mandates,	
	including but not limited to rights to due process and equal protection under	
	the law.	

The defendants' actions are not merely breaches of law; they are acts of *insurrection* and rebellion against the very foundation of the nation's constitutional framework. Such acts must not go unchallenged, as they jeopardize the constitutional order, the rights of the people, and the rule of law that ensures justice and equality. Plaintiffs call upon the court and relevant authorities to enforce the Constitution, compel accountability, and halt the defendants' treasonous war against the supreme law of the land.

VI. <u>'Bare Statutes' as Confirmation of Guilt and the</u> <u>Necessity of Prosecution by an Enforcer</u>

Plaintiffs' incorporation of "bare statutes" does <u>NOT</u> exonerate Defendants; rather, it serves as evidence of Defendants' guilt, which they have already *undisputedly* admitted through their actions and lack of rebuttal to any affidavits, which they have a duty to respond to. The invocation of bare statutes merely underscores the necessity for Plaintiffs to compel a formal enforcer, such as a District Attorney or Attorney General, to prosecute the criminal violations. This requirement for enforcement does <u>NOT</u> negate the Defendants' culpability but, instead, affirms the gravity of their admitted violations.

In this matter, Plaintiffs have thoroughly detailed the Defendants' willful and

intentional breaches of multiple federal statutes under Title 18, and Plaintiff's **private right(s) of action**. These *blatant* and *willful* violations have been clearly articulated in the **AMENDED COMPLAINT**, **which was delivered to the CLERK OF THE COURT on xx/xx/xxxx.** — ["]An instrument is deemed in law filed at <u>the time it is delivered to the clerk</u>, *regardless* of whether the instrument is filemarked.["] --Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d

- 1 ∥678, 680 (Tex.1979); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 89 Tex. 35, 42, 33 S.W.
- 2 | 112, 113 (1895); Turner v. State, 41 Tex. 549, 552 (1874); Holman v. Chevaillier,
- 3 | 14 Tex. 337, 339-40 (1855); Beal v. Alexander, 6 Tex. 531, 541 (1855).
- 4 Defendants' actions constitute **treasonous** conduct against the **Constitution**
- 5 and the American people. Their behavior, alongside that of their counsel,
- 6 reflects an attitude of being above the law, further solidifying their guilt.
- 7 $\|$ Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants' reliance on procedural defenses or
- 8 | technicalities does not absolve them of their criminal conduct. Instead, their
- 9 actions are an unequivocal admission of guilt that necessitates legal action by
- 10 | the appropriate prosecutorial authority. Plaintiffs reserve all rights to compel
- 11 such enforcement to ensure that the Defendants are held fully accountable for
- 12 their crimes.

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VII. <u>'state Citizen' vs 'citizen of the United States'</u>

- 1. "The fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United
- 15 States. It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned
- authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was
- 17 no such thing as a citizen of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, except as that condition arose
- from citizenship of some state. No mode existed, it was said, of obtaining a
- citizenship of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, except by first becoming a citizen of some state.
- 20 | This question is now at rest. The fourteenth amendment defines and declares
- 21 who shall be citizens of the <u>United States</u>, to wit, "all persons born or
- 22 naturalized in the <u>United States</u>, <u>and</u> subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The
- 23 latter qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign
- representatives and the like. With this qualification, every person born in the
- 25 United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the <u>United States</u> and
- of the state wherein he resides." UNITED STATES V. ANTHONY. [11 Blatchf.
- 27 200; 5 Chi. Leg. News. 462, 493; 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 197; 30 Leg. Int. 266; 5 Leg. Op.
 - 63; 20 Pittsb. Leg. J. 199.] Circuit Court, N. D. New York. June 18, 1873.

2. "It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates** **and** a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual." — <u>Slaughter House Cases</u>, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).

- 3. "We have in our political system a Government of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and a government of each of the several <u>S</u>tates. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a <u>c</u>itizen of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and a <u>C</u>itizen of a <u>S</u>tate, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those he has under the other." Slaughter House Cases <u>United States vs. Cruikshank</u>, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
- 4. "One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States." Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507; *In Re* Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443. [McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883)] [underlines added].
- 5. "The first clause of the <u>fourteenth amendment</u> of the federal Constitution made negroes citizens of the <u>United States**</u>, and citizens of the <u>state</u> in which they reside, and thereby created **two classes** of citizens, one of the <u>United States**</u> and the other of the state." [4 Dec. Dig. '06, p. 1197, sec. 11] ["Citizens" (1906), emphasis added].
- 6. "That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country." [Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927)].
- 7. "... both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state." [Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections] [221 A.2d 431 (1966)].

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- "The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873). Instead, this provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship." — [Jones v. Temmer, 829 F.Supp. 1226 (USDC/DCO 1993)]
- The 1st clause of the <u>fourteenth Amendment</u> states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside."
- 10. The 1st clause of the fourteenth Amendment does not say: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, **are** subject to the jurisdiction thereof " 12
 - 11. The 1st clause of the fourteenth Amendment contains two requirements for United States citizenship: (a) that a person be born or naturalized in the United States and (b) that a person be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

national/non-citizen national' aka state Citizen VIII.

- The **DEPARTMENT OF STATE** document, "Certificates of Non-Citizen Nationality," located at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travellegal-considerations/us-citizenship/Certificates-Non-Citizen-Nationality.html says — in part — in the 3rd paragraph: "Section 101(a)(21) of the INA defines the term 'national' as 'a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.' Section 101(a)(22) of the INA provides that the term 'national of the United States' includes all U.S. citizens as well as persons who, though not citizens of the United States, owe permanent allegiance to the United States (non-citizen nationals)."
- <u>Title 8 U.S. Code § 1101(22) Definition</u>, expressly stipulates, " (22)The term "national of the United States" means (A) a citizen of the United

- States, <u>OR</u> (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."
- 3. **22 CFR § 51.2 Passport issued to nationals only**, stipulates: (a) A passport may be issued **only** to a U.S. **national**.

- 4. <u>22 CFR § 51.3 Types of passports</u>, stipulates: (a) Regular passport. A regular passport is issued to a **national** of the United States. (e) Passport card. A passport card is issued to a **national** of the United States on the same basis as a regular passport.
- 5. <u>Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons</u>, expressly stipulates that "foreign government", "foreign official", "internationally protected person", "international organization", "national of the United States", and "official guest" have the <u>same meaning</u>.
- 6. It is <u>unequivocally true</u> that <u>Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 Protection of foreign officials</u>, <u>official guests</u>, <u>and internationally protected persons</u> expressly stipulates that in additional to being a <u>national</u>, a <u>national</u> is <u>also</u> considered a "foreign government", "foreign official", "internationally protected person", "international organization", "national of the United States", and "official guest."
- 7. Attached is national's PASSPORT #A39235161, as defined by 22 CFR § 51.2 and 22 CFR § 51.3 and this DOCUMENT *unequivocally* evidences and demonstrates that the holder is a 'national,' as defined by these provisions. A copy attached hereto as Exhibits EE and incorporated herein by reference.

IX. <u>Unrebutted AFFIDAVITS</u>, Stipulated Facts, Contract Security <u>Agreements</u>, and Authorized Judgement and Lien

Plaintiffs and Defendants are parties to certain Contract and Security
 Agreements, specifically contract security agreement numbers
 9589071052700983677494, EI948566806US, RF661592042US, RF661592201US, and
 RF661592802US. Each contract security agreement and/or self-executing

	contract security agreement was received, considered, and agreed to by
	Defendants through silent acquiescence, tacit agreement, and tacit procuration
	Each contract also includes a corresponding Form 3811, which was signed as
	evidence of receipt. AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN
	<u>COMMERCE. — '</u> He who does not deny, admits. <u>AN UNREBUTTED</u>
	AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGEMENT IN COMMERCE. — There is
	nothing left to resolve.' (See Exhibits I, J, K, L, M, N, and O respectively).
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- 2. **Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement #RF661592201US (Exhibit L)** was *received, considered*, and *agreed* to by Defendants, acknowledging and accepting a Judgement, Summary Judgement, and/or Lien Authorization (in accordance with U.C.C. § 9-509), against Defendants in the amount of One Billion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000.00 USD), in favor of Plaintiffs.
- 3. Defendant(s) have a duty to respond to all of Plaintiffs' NOTICES and binding CONTRACTS, and have intentionally and willfully remained silent and and dishonor.
 - Defendants have received, considered, and agreed to all the terms of all contract agreements, including the Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit L), constituting a bona fide contract under the principles of contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Pursuant to the mailbox rule, which establishes that acceptance of an offer is effective when dispatched (U.C.C. § 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract) and principles of silent acquiescence, tacit procuration, and tacit agreement, the acceptance is valid. This acceptance is in alignment with the doctrine of 'offer and acceptance' and the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-202, which governs the final expression of the CONTRACT. Furthermore, under the U.C.C., all assets whether registered or unregistered are held subject to the allodial title, with Plaintiffs maintaining sole and exclusive standing over all real property, assets, securities, both tangible and intangible, registered and unregistered, as evidenced by UCC1 filing

#2024385925-4 and #2024385935-1, and UCC3 filing #2024402433-7 and

2024411182-7 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D).

X. <u>FIVE (5) UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVITS AND NO AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATION AND VALIDATION OF BINDING CONTRACT(S) UNDER U.C.C. PRINCIPLES</u>

- No Stipulation to Arbitration: It is important to clarify that there is no stipulation to arbitration as evidenced by the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N). These affidavits present facts that all parties have agreed to.
 Consequently, all issues are considered settled according to the principles of *res judicata*, which are further supported by U.C.C. § 2-202, *Final* Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence. This section states that a writing intended by the parties to serve as the definitive *final* expression of their agreement cannot be contradicted by any evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements.
- 2. U.C.C. § 1-103 Enforcement of Contract and Fraud: Under U.C.C. § 1-103, the Uniform Commercial Code applies to contracts unless explicitly stated otherwise. This section provides that fraud, duress, or any unlawful condition does not negate the binding nature of the contract. Therefore, the contracts in question are enforceable as written, free from fraud or misrepresentation, and valid under commercial law principles.
- 3. U.C.C. § 2-204 Formation of Contract: As further supported by U.C.C. § 2-204, a contract can be formed even if the exact terms are not yet agreed upon, provided that there is an intention to form a contract and an agreement on essential terms. This principle affirms that the actions of the parties and the language in the unrebutted affidavits constitute an agreement to the terms at hand, making arbitration unnecessary.
- 4. **U.C.C. § 2-206 Offer and Acceptance**: Additionally, U.C.C. § 2-206 confirms that an offeror is bound by the terms once an offer is accepted, unless the offer states otherwise. The verified commercial affidavits and

contract and security agreements (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N) submitted are

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- prima facie evidence that the parties have mutually agreed to the terms, thereby forming a CONTRACT under the principles of offer and acceptance outlined in U.C.C. § 2-206. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing
 - contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants may **<u>not</u>** argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits. As per established legal principles and legal maxims, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Defendants are estopped and barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative or judicial.
- 6. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants or the entity they represent is/are the <u>DEBTOR(S)</u> in this matter.
- 7. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants are **NOT** the CREDITOR, or an ASSIGNEE of the CREDITOR, in this matter.
- 8. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants are indebted to Plaintiffs in the amount of One Billion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000.00).

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- 9. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N) Defendants do NOT have 'standing.'
- 10. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c), summary judgement is appropriate when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. The unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N) submitted by Plaintiff(s) demonstrate that no triable issues of material fact remain in dispute, and Plaintiffs are entitled to judgement based on the evidence presented and as a matter of law.
- 11. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), "Statements of fact contained in affidavits which are not rebutted by the opposing party's affidavit or pleadings may [must] be accepted as true by the trial court." --Winsett v. Donaldson, 244 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1976).
- 12. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), the principles of res judicata, stare decisis, and collateral estoppel apply to the unrebutted commercial affidavits, establishing that all issues are deemed settled and cannot be contested further. These principles reinforce the finality of the administrative findings and support the granting of summary judgement,

as a matter of law. - 'HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST

LOSES BY DEFAULT.'

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XI. JUDGEMENT OF \$1,000,000,000.00 CONSIDERED, AGREED TO,

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AND AUTHORIZED BY DEFENDANTS. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified

- commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants fully authorize, endorse, support, and advocate for the entry of a UCC commercial judgement and lien in the amount of One Billion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000.00) against Defendants, in favor of Plaintiffs, as also evidenced by INVOICE/TRUE BILL #SIERRPHHDISHONOR13 which is a part of Exhibit L. INVOICE/TRUE BILL #SIERRPHHDISHONOR13 is attached hereto as **Exhibit P** and incorporated herein by reference.
- As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), should it be **deemed** necessary, the Plaintiffs are **fully Authorized** to initiate the filing of a lien, and the seizing of property to secure satisfaction of the ADJUDGED, DECREED, AND AUTHORIZED sum total due to Affiant, and/or Plaintiffs of, One Billion and 00/100 Dollars (\$1,000,000,000.00).
- **DEFENDANTS are DEBTORS** without and 'Standing' XII.
- Defendants are **undisputedly** the **DEBTORS** in this matter.
- Defendants are undisputedly NOT the CREDITOR(S), or an ASSIGNEE(S) of the CREDITOR(S), in this matter.
- **3.** Defendants do <u>NOT</u> have power of attorney in any way.
 - Defendants do **NOT** have **any** standing.
 - Defendants are **presumed** to be in **dishonor**, in accordance with U.C.C. § 3-505, as evidenced by the attached Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, **DEFAULT**, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION (Exhibit L).

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DEFENDANTS' PRESUMPTION OF DISHONOR UNDER U.C.C. § 3-505 AND EVIDENCE PROVING DEFENDANTS' **DISHONOR**

- The failure of Defendants to rebut or provide any valid evidence of their performance is further confirmed by the, 'AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit E), which is **duly notarized** and complies with the requirements of U.C.C. § 3-505.
- Under U.C.C. § 3-505, a document regular in form, such as the notarized Affidavit Certificate serves as evidence of dishonor and creates a **presumption** of dishonor.

U.C.C. § 3-505. Evidence of Dishonor:

- (a) The following are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor stated:
- (1) A document regular in form as provided in subsection (b) which purports
- (2) A purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank, or presenting bank on or accompanying the instrument stating that acceptance or payment has been refused unless reasons for the refusal are stated and the reasons are not consistent with dishonor;
- (3) A book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or collecting bank, kept in the usual course of business which shows dishonor, even if there is no evidence of who made the entry.
- (b) A protest is a certificate of dishonor made by a United States consul or vice consul, or a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths by the law of the place where dishonor occurs. It may be made upon information satisfactory to that person. The protest must identify the instrument and certify either that presentment has been made or, if not made, the reason why it was not made, and that the instrument has been

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dishonored by nonacceptance or nonpayment. The protest may also certify that notice of dishonor has been given to some or all parties.

- 3. The **notarized** 'AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit L), complies with these requirements and serves as a formal protest and evidence of dishonor under U.C.C. § 3-505, as it clearly documents Defendants' refusal to respond or provide the necessary rebuttal to Plaintiffs' claims.
- 4. Defendants have not submitted any evidence to contradict or rebut the statements made in the affidavits. As a result, the facts set forth in the affidavits are deemed true and uncontested. Additionally, the California Evidence Code § 664 and related case law support the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, and *unrebutted* affidavits stand as **Truth**.
- Defendants may **not** argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the unrebutted affidavits. As per established legal principles, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Defendants are barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative or judicial.

DEFENDANTS are 'WARDS OF THE COURT' with 18 USC 8 Obligations

- 1. It is a well-established principle under 4 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. and 2-3 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. that clients represented by 'Attorneys at Law' are considered 'wards of the court.' A copy of 4 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. and 2-3 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. is attached hereto as Exhibit FF.
- As wards of the court, Defendants have *voluntarily* relinquished their authority and autonomy over their legal matters, subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction and authority of this Court or administrative tribunal. Specifically:

- Defendants' attorneys are obligated to prioritize the interests of the court over those of the Defendants;
- Defendants, by **contract**, have diminished their standing and authority in their own case, evidencing their incompetence to rebut Plaintiff's claims.
- 3. By voluntarily retaining legal counsel, Defendants have willfully accepted their diminished status as 'wards of the court.' This status is further evidenced by their collective failure to rebut or nullify Plaintiff's claims in accordance with U.C.C. § 1-103, which preserves the application of common law principles such as good faith and fair dealing when statutory law (U.C.C. provisions) is silent.
- XVI. <u>'Tender of Payment' made in 'full satisfaction'</u> and Dollar for Dollar Discharge: U.C.C §§ 3-104, 3-601, 3-603, 3-311, 9-105, 9-509, House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933 Public Law 73-10.
- 1. Plaintiffs under threat, duress, coercion, and extortion, made tender of payment to Defendant(s), in **good faith** in the amount of **Seven Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (\$700,000.00 USD)** for settlement and "<u>full satisfaction</u>," and have been made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument, as evidenced by UCC3 Filing #2024411189-0 (Exhibit D), Registered BILL OF EXCHANGE #RF661591339US, and LETTER OF CREDIT, #RF661591299US (See Exhibits Q and R).
- 2. Defendant(s) individually and collectively, **fully agree** that if said tender of payment is/was "refused" there is/was **discharge**, to the extent of the **amount of the tender**, as stipulated by <u>U.C.C. § 3-603</u>. Given the clear indication of tender of payment contained a statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as **full satisfaction** of the claim, as stipulated by <u>U.C.C. § 3-311</u>, there is again **discharge**.
- 3. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing

contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants individually and collectively, **fully agree**, that **House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933**, **Public Law 73-10** (Exhibit H) expressly stipulates, **'every provision** contained in or made with respect to **any** obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold **or a particular kind of coin or currency**, or in an amount in money of the **U**nited States measured thereby, **is declared to be against public policy**; and **no such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation**, heretofore of hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, **shall be discharged** upon payment, **dollar for dollar**, in **any coin** or **currency** which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts (see **Exhibit H**).

XVII. SPECIAL DEPOSIT and MASTER INDEMNITY BOND

- 4. The VERIFIED COMPLAINT itself acted as a BOND and/or MONETARY INSTRUMENT, as defined by 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104, supplemented by the MASTER INDEMNITY BOND (Exhibit S), and that the BOND also satisfies the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 67 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Exclusive equity supports this claim, as it ensures that no competing claims will infringe upon the Plaintiffs' established rights to this bond of and will be reported on the forms 1099-A, 1099-OID, and/or 1099-B, with Plaintiff(s) evidenced as the CREDITOR(S).
- 5. Janet Yellen, said Successor(s), and/or the <u>United States Treasury</u> is the registered holder and fiduciary of/for Plaintiff(s)' the private **Two Hundred Billion Dollar (\$200,000,000,000.00 USD) 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND**' #RF661448567US (Exhibit S), which was post deposited to private post registered account #RF 661 448

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023 US. Said 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND' (#RF661448567US) expressly stipulates it is "insuring, underwriting, indemnifying, discharging, paying and satisfying all such account holders and accounts dollar for dollar against any and all preexisting, current and future losses, costs, debts, taxes, encumbrances, deficits, deficiencies, liens, judgements, true bills, obligations of contract or performance, defaults, charges, and any and all other obligations as may exist or come to exist during the term of this Bond... Each of the said account holders and accounts shall be severally insured, underwritten and indemnified against any and all future Liabilities as may appear, thereby instantly satisfying all such obligations dollar for dollar without exception through the above-noted Private Offset Accounts up to and including the full face value of this Bond through maturity." It will serve as an additional CAUTION and/and/or BOND for immediate adjustment and setoff of any and all costs, taxes, judgements, and/or dues associated with these matters.

XVIII. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Public Law 73-87, Title III, Section 3

As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants individually and collectively, <u>fully agree</u> that Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Public Law 73-87, Title III, Section 3, stipulates: "(a) *every* provision contained in or made with respect to *any* obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a *particular kind of coin or currency* of the United States, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be *against* public policy. (b) <u>Every</u> obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, *shall be* <u>discharged</u> upon payment, <u>dollar for dollar</u>, in <u>any</u> coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.

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XIX. GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS (GAAS) and 12 U.S. Code §§ 83, 411, and 412

- 3 4 5 6 7 8 and the applicable provisions under the Federal Reserve System and Title 12 9 U.S. Code §§ 83, 411, and 412.
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- As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants never at any time risked any of their/its assets and truly only exchanged the GENUINE ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE for "credit" according to the Federal Reserve Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) with the FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
- As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the unrebutted verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (attached hereto as Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants never, at any time, risked any of their own assets in the transaction. Instead, Defendants merely exchanged the **GENUINE ORIGINAL PROMISSORY** NOTE provided by Plaintiffs for "credit," in accordance with the Federal Reserve's Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), and the applicable

provisions under the Federal Reserve System and Title 12 U.S. Code §§ 83, 411,

Specifically:

and 412.

- 1. Prohibition Against Lending Bank Funds:
 - Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 83 'Loans by bank on its own stock', a national bank is expressly prohibited from lending its own capital, including its funds or assets, for \emph{any} purpose. This statutory restriction ensures that banks do not risk their depositors' money or their reserve capital in loan transactions. Instead, banks act as intermediaries, aka money changers, exchanging currency and issuing "credit" based on MONETARY INSTRUMENTS of value provided by borrowers. The Plaintiffs'

promissory note served as such an MONETARY INSTRUMENT of value, enabling the Defendants to *purchase and acquire* Plaintiffs' MONETARY INSTRUMENT and then extend "credit" without utilizing their own funds.

12 U.S.C. § 83 provides:

"No national bank shall make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock. Nor shall any such association be the purchaser or holder of any such shares unless such security or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith..."

While the statute focuses on preventing national banks from engaging in self-dealing with their capital stock, it also establishes the general **principle** that banks *cannot* loan their own assets or funds directly. This underscores the fact that the Plaintiffs' promissory note, not the Defendants' capital, initiated and facilitated the transaction.

2. The PROMISSORY NOTE as Collateral:

Plaintiffs' promissory note was a **negotiable instrument** under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), representing real value. Defendants monetized this NOTE to create "credit," rather than lending any pre-existing funds or risking their own assets. The note became **collateral** for the credit issued by Defendants, effectively making the Plaintiffs' own MONETARY INSTRUMENT/PROMISSORY NOTE the originating instrument and asset of the transaction.

3. Exchange of Equivalent Value, Not a Loan:

The transaction constituted an **exchange of currency**, whereby Plaintiffs provided the asset (the promissory note) that Defendants used to generate credit. Defendants then issued this credit to Plaintiffs, demonstrating that no traditional loan of pre-existing money occurred. Plaintiffs' promissory

note became the basis for the issuance of credit in compliance with **12 U.S.C. § 411**, which governs the issuance of Federal Reserve Notes as obligations of the United States, backed by collateral.

4. Unjust Enrichment and Fraudulent Misrepresentation:

By accepting and monetizing Plaintiffs' promissory note, Defendants obtained the full value of the alleged loan at the outset, while failing to disclose that no actual funds of their own were provided. Defendants' retention of the note without returning equivalent collateral or funds constitutes **unjust enrichment**. Furthermore, their failure to disclose the true nature of the transaction represents **fraudulent misrepresentation**, as Plaintiffs were led to believe that Defendants provided a traditional loan.

5. Legal and Financial Implications:

The Plaintiffs' promissory note created the very credit extended to them, meaning that Plaintiffs have already provided the full value of the alleged loan. Consequently, no genuine debt exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Under the principles of equity and commercial law, the transaction must be treated as satisfied by the Plaintiffs' provision of the promissory note.

Defendants' reliance on the Plaintiffs' note as the originating asset further establishes that Plaintiffs are the rightful creators of the credit and should not be subjected to repayment obligations on funds that originated from their own instrument.

XX. <u>12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1): THE TERM 'DEPOSIT' DEFINED</u>

As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), as under 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1), "the term 'deposit' means — the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent

received or held by a bank or savings association in the usual course of business
and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or
unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or
which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment
certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft
drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings
association, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which
the bank or savings association is primarily liable: Provided, That, without
limiting the generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such account
or instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of
money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a
promissory note upon which the person obtaining any such credit or
instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a charge against
a deposit account, or in settlement of checks , drafts , or other instruments
forwarded to such bank or savings association for collection."

2. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants individually and collectively, <u>fully agree</u> 1that <u>Under Title 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1)</u> when the purported borrower gives, deposits, or surrenders or the subsequent <u>supposed</u> loan owner obtains the PROMISSORY NOTE, it becomes a CASH ITEM and Defendant(s), and/or their Corporation, parent Corporation and other subsidiaries are required to give the <u>purported</u> borrower a <u>CASH RECEIPT</u>. The deposit of Plaintifft's promissory note was made to a demand deposit account Defendant(s), and/or their Corporation, parent Corporation and other subsidiaries are required to show it on THEIR books, but <u>instead YOU/THEY do an offset</u> entry and <u>intentionally fail</u> to give the <u>purported borrower and/or Affiant a CASH RECEIPT</u>.

- 3. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants individually and collectively, <u>fully agree</u> that Plaintiff(s) is/are the Creditor(s) and the source of all equity used for the acquisition of the Property, and the holder in due course of all assets, as evidenced by **UCC1 filing #2024385925-4** and **#2024385935-1**, **and UCC3 filing #2024402433-7** and 2024411182-7 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D).
- 4. As *considered*, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), the forms 1099-A, 1099-C, and 1099-OID have been filed and Accepted by the Internal Revenue Service, correctly and appropriately listing Plaintiff(s) as "LENDER" and "PAYER," and Defendant(s) as BORROWER and "RECIPIENT," indicating discharge, settlement and satisfaction of any *purported* obligation. (See *Exhibits T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, and AA*).
- 5. As *considered*, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial **affidavits**, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), the negotiable instrument, titled 'BUYER'S FINAL SETTLEMENT STATEMENT,' valued at \$1,023,416.35, has been accepted for its assessed value and returned for setoff and discharge of the obligation as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 8. This action aligns with House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933 (Public Law 73-10), as well as U.C.C. §§ 3-603, 3-311, 3-104, Article I, Section 10, and Article IV of the Constitution, affirming the Republic's form of government. (See **Exhibit BB**).
- 6. As considered, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the <u>unrebutted</u> verified commercial **affidavits**, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), the 'Affidavit of WALKER TODD,' (Exhibit CC) a professional Witnesses and former

- Federal Reserve Attorney, further evidences that **Plaintiffs are the TRUE** Creditors.
- 7. As *considered*, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial **affidavits**, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendant(s) has/have been **paid in full** for **any** *purported* "contract" and/or obligation.

- 8. As *considered*, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), the unrebutted affidavits themselves serve as *prima facie* evidence of fraud, embezzlement, fraud, larceny, intensity theft, conspiracy, deprivation of rights under the color of law, extortion. coercion, injury and damage to Affiant and proof of claim. See *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981)., "Appellee had the burden of first proving its prima facie case and could do so by affidavit or other evidence."
- 9. As *considered*, agreed, and stipulated by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants have **individually and collectively admitted the statements and claims** by **TACIT**PROCURATION, all issues are deemed **settled RES JUDICATA**, **STARE**DECISIS and by COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

XXI. GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (GAAP)

1. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), Defendants never at any time risked any of its assets and truly only exchanged the GENUINE ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE for "credit" according to the **Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).** 'Banks' are <u>required</u> to adhere Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and as <u>evidenced</u> by, <u>12 U.S.C 1831n</u> -

'Accounting objectives, standards, and requirements': ["](2) Standards
(A)Uniform accounting principles consistent with GAAP Subject to the
requirements of this chapter and any other provision of Federal law, the
accounting principles applicable to reports or statements required to be filed
with Federal banking agencies by all insured depository institutions shall be
uniform and consistent with generally accepted accounting principles.["]

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- 2. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), GAAP follows an accounting convention that lies at the heart of the **double-entry** bookkeeping system called the Matching Principle. This principle works are follows: when a bank accepts bullion, coin, currency, drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments (hereinafter "instruments") from customers and deposits or records the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that match the assets that it accepted from customers. The liabilities represent the amounts that the bank owes the customers, funds accepted from customers. If a fractional reserve banking system like the United States banking system, most of the funds advanced to borrowers (assets held by banks) are created by the banks, once they purchase/acquire the TRUE Creditor's Asset (NOTE, ORDER, DRAFT, LETTER OF CREDIT, MONEY ORDER, SECURITY, ETC.) and are not merely transferred from one set of depositors to another set of borrowers. Said Asset remains an Asset to Plaintiffs.
- 3. As *considered*, *agreed*, and *stipulated* by Defendant(s) in the *unrebutted* verified commercial affidavits, contract agreement, and/or self-executing contract security agreement(s) (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N), GAAP is <u>intended</u> to <u>ensure</u> consistency among financial records, financial transparency, and protection from fraud or misleading company reports.

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XXIII. PLAINTIFFS'S ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE AND DEFENDANTS'
VIOLATIONS OF PICHTS

28 VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS

XXII. DEFENDANTS' WILLFUL AND INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO REBUT FIVE (5) AFFIDAVITS IS CONSENT BY SILENCE: SILENT ACQUIESCENCE, TACIT AGREEMENT, AND TACIT PROCURATION

- Defendants' self-admitted collective acknowledgment of receipt,
 consideration, and agreement to Plaintiff's <u>affidavits</u>, coupled with their willful and blatant failure to rebut, dispute, or respond to the affidavits in any manner, constitutes:
 - A binding agreement to the facts and claims asserted therein;
 - A demonstration of Defendants' legal incapacity and incompetence as 'wards of the court;
 - Material facts supporting Plaintiff's entitlement to all relief sought and Summary Judgment.
- 2. In accordance with longstanding principles of law, **silence is acquiescence**, and *unrebutted* **affidavits** stand as **T**ruth in commerce and in **L**aw. Defendants' willful and intentional failure to respond constitutes tacit agreement to all claims and statements set forth in the **affidavits**.
- 3. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Defendants' collective failure to rebut or properly respond cannot be dismissed as mere oversight or negligence. It is a clear, willful, and intentional act that affirms the validity of all Plaintiff's claims.
- 4. Under U.C.C. § 2-206, 'Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract,' Defendants' actions further evidence an acceptance of Plaintiff's offer, contract, and claims as they fail to counter the presented affidavits, which constitute clear and unequivocal offers to establish material facts. Defendants' self-admitted willful and intentional silence and inaction are recognized under this provision as valid acceptance in the course of dealings.

- 1. Plaintiffs made several good-faith attempts to settle this matter with Defendants by formally requesting restitution and the cessation of fraudulent and bad faith acts, including the immediate filing of documents necessary to clear the title to the private trust property.
- 2. Defendants' **failure to address or rebut these violations** in their Response constitutes further silent acquiescence and tacit admission of the truth of Plaintiff's claims. Their silence on this matter evidences and confirms their acknowledgment of wrongdoing and liability.
- 3. Instead of doing the right thing returning the private trust Property as legally and lawfully requested, Defendants:
 - Willfully violated Plaintiff's rights;

• Demonstrated their bad faith and disregard for Plaintiff's rights, further evidencing their inability or refusal to act in good faith.

XXIV. <u>SUMMARY JUDGMENT ia due as A MATTER OF LAW</u>

1. <u>Unrebutted</u> Affidavits Establish No Disputed Facts

- Plaintiffs' unrebutted <u>verified</u> **affidavits** were submitted in **good faith**. These affidavits were duly served upon Defendants, **and** the **Defendants have admitted to receiving them** providing adequate notice and an opportunity to rebut or contest the factual assertions therein. Defendants' failure to respond or provide a substantive rebuttal results in a legal presumption of the **affidavits**' validity and acceptance as fact. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, an affidavit that remains *unrebutted* eliminates any genuine issue of material fact, thereby justifying summary judgment.
- 2. Judicial Finality and Legal Precedent Supporting Summary Judgment The binding nature of *unrebutted* affidavits has long been recognized by judicial precedent. Courts consistently affirm that where affidavits are left uncontested, they establish facts conclusively:
 - *Morris v. National Cash Register Co.*, 44 Cal.App.2d 811, 813 (1941) affirms that undisputed evidence is sufficient to warrant summary judgment.

1	Pursuant to Federal and State Rules of Evidence, facts established by
2	affidavit are considered binding in the absence of counter-affidavits or
3	contradictory evidence.
4	3. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Defendants' Failure to
5	Produce Contradictory Evidence
6	Defendants have neither presented competent evidence to dispute Plaintiffs'
7	claims nor identified any material facts warranting trial. Plaintiffs' unrebutted
8	verified affidavits and accompanying evidence collectively demonstrate the
9	absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Without the presentation of
10	contradictory evidence, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
11	under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
12	4. Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata, and Stare Decisis
13	Res Judicata: The unrebutted affidavits carry the same legal weight as a
14	judgment and are binding upon Defendants.
15	Collateral Estoppel: Defendants are barred and precluded from re-
16	litigating issues already resolved by the <i>unrebutted</i> affidavits .
17	Stare Decisis: Courts uphold that undisputed affidavits conclusively
18	establish facts in civil proceedings.
19	5. Equity and Procedural Compliance
20	Equity: It would be manifestly inequitable to permit Defendants to delay
21	proceedings after failing to rebut or contest the factual assertions within
22	Plaintiffs' affidavits.
23	Procedural Compliance: Plaintiffs have fully satisfied the procedural and
24	substantive requirements for summary judgment by submitting
25	admissible evidence establishing their claims.
26	6. California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c)
27	Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c), summary judgment is
28	warranted when "there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and the moving

party is *entitled* to judgment as **a matter of law**." The *unrebutted* **affidavits** submitted by Plaintiffs confirm that no triable issues of material fact remain.

7. 7. Request for Sua Sponte Summary Judgment

Given the clear evidence of Defendants' dishonor and failure to rebut any of the contents of Plaintiffs' affidavits or produce any competent evidence to dispute material facts, Plaintiffs respectfully demand that the Court recognize the undisputed validity of Plaintiffs' position and sanction the Defendants and grant default and summary judgment in the Plaintiffs favor sua sponte, *without* the necessity of any hearing.

XXV. <u>Foundational 'Case Law' on Standing, Mortgage Fraud,</u> <u>Foreclosure, Corporate Overreach</u>

Plaintiffs referenced the following case law summary highlights key legal principles on jurisdiction, standing, and procedural requirements in financial and mortgage-related cases. Courts consistently void judgments rendered without proper jurisdiction and emphasize the need for a party to demonstrate legal <u>standing</u>. Fraudulent lending practices, including violations of federal regulations, have led to dismissals with prejudice. Corporate overreach by banks is curtailed through rulings that prohibit lending credit and ultra vires contracts. Evidentiary standards stress the <u>sufficiency of affidavits</u> and the <u>duty</u> of full and complete disclosure of information to prevent fraud. Contract <u>principles</u> underscore the nullification of agreements lacking proper consideration,.

A. Jurisdiction and Standing in Court

Courts have consistently held that judgments rendered without subject matter jurisdiction are void from inception, and parties must have **standing** to invoke a court's jurisdiction. Notable cases emphasize that plaintiffs must demonstrate ownership of notes and mortgages at the time of filing to proceed with foreclosure actions. Failure to do so results in jurisdictional dismissal.

1. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St. 3d 68; 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988): "A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is **void ab initio**.

Consequently, the authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts. I see no evidence to the contrary that this would apply to ALL courts."

- **2. Lebanon Correctional Institution v. Court of Common Pleas**, 35 Ohio St.2d 176 (1973): "A party lacks **standing** to invoke the jurisdiction of a court unless he has, in an individual or a representative capacity, some **real interest** in the subject matter of the action."
- **3. Wells Fargo Bank v. Byrd**, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603, 897 N.E.2d 722 (2008): "If plaintiff has offered no evidence that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed, it would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
- **4. Indymac Bank v. Boyd**, 880 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2009): "To establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note. It is the law's policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of 'standing to sue,' in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a 'jurisdictional' dismissal."
- **5. Indymac Bank v. Bethley**, 880 N.Y.S.2d 873 (2009): "The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of plaintiff or at least malfeasance. Plaintiff INDYMAC (Deutsche) must have '**standing**' to bring this action."

B. Fraud and Misrepresentation in Mortgage Cases

- Several cases illustrate fraudulent practices by lenders, including violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act and withholding vital loan information. Courts have dismissed cases with prejudice where fraud on the court was evident.
 - Wells Fargo, Litton Loan v. Farmer, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008): "Wells Fargo does not own the mortgage loan... Therefore, the matter is dismissed with prejudice."

Wells Fargo v. Reyes, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008): "Dismissed with prejudice,
 Fraud on Court & Sanctions. Wells Fargo never owned the Mortgage."

• **Deutsche Bank v. Peabody**, 866 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2008): "EquiFirst, when making the loan, violated Regulation Z of the Federal Truth in Lending Act 15 USC §1601 and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 15 USC §1692; 'intentionally created fraud in the factum' and withheld from plaintiff 'vital information concerning said debt and all of the matrix involved in making the loan.'"

C. Corporate and Banking Overreach

Decisions highlight that banks **cannot** lend their credit or guarantee debts, as these actions are ultra vires and not legally binding. These rulings reinforce the limitations on corporate and banking activities.

- Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank, 103 Wis. 125, 79 NW 229 (1899): "The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to private corporations within their legitimate spheres and punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it probably is not invoked too often."
- Howard & Foster Co. vs. Citizens National Bank, 133 S.C. 202, 130 S.E. 758
 (1926): "It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under
 Federal law, being limited in its power and capacity, cannot lend its credit by nor guarantee the debt of another. All such contracts being entered into by its officers are ultra vires and not binding upon the corporation."
- American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 181 Wis. 172, 194 NW 427 (1923): "Neither, as included in its powers not incidental to them, is it a part of a bank's business to lend its credit."

D. Procedural Requirements and Evidentiary Standards

The requirement for real party-in-interest prosecution is emphasized, along with rulings that affidavits alone can establish a prima facie case. Courts have ruled that silence in the face of a legal duty to respond can constitute fraud.

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- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1): "[A]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
- In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-66 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009): Emphasizes that actions must be filed by the real party in interest.
- United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981): "Indeed, no more than (affidavits) is necessary to make the prima facie case." Cert. denied, S. Ct. (1982).
- U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (1977): "Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading."

E. Contract and Consideration Principles

- If any part of a contract's consideration is illegal, the entire promise becomes void. Courts have also recognized the right to rescind contracts induced by false
- representations, even if made innocently.
 - Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C Co., 147 Wis. 559 at p. 572; 132 NW 1118 (1912): "If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several considerations for an un-severable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations induced the promise."

XXVI.LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS

- In support of this DEMAND as a matter of law, without hearing, Plaintiffs cite the following established legal standards, legal maxims, precedent, and *principles*:
 - Unrebutted Affidavits as Judgment in Commerce: Plaintiffs' unrebutted affidavits are binding truth under the maxim, "An unrebutted affidavit becomes the judgment in commerce."
 - **Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel:** Defendants are <u>barred</u> from contesting the finality of Plaintiffs' claims under the doctrines of res

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- judicata and collateral estoppel, as all material facts and claims have been resolved conclusively.
- Breach of U.C.C. Obligations and Presumed Dishonor: Defendants' dishonor and default are evidenced by their failure to fulfill obligations defined by U.C.C. § 3-505 (see Exhibit L) and other applicable statutes.
- **ALL ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW.** 'No one is above the law.'
- IN COMMERCE FOR ANY MATTER TO BE RESOLVED MUST BE **EXPRESSED.** – 'To lie is to go against the mind.'
- TRUTH IS EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT.
- **IN COMMERCE TRUTH IS SOVEREIGN.** Truth is sovereign and the Sovereign tells only the truth.
- <u>AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN COMMERCE.</u> 'He who does not deny, admits.'
- "Statements of fact contained in affidavits which are not rebutted by the opposing party's affidavit or pleadings may[must] be accepted as true by the trial court." -- Winsett v. Donaldson, 244 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1976).
 - See, Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley, 13 F.R.D. 113 (1952)., "Defendant(s) made no request for an extension of time in which to answer the request for admission of facts and filed only an unsworn response within the time permitted," thus, under the specific provisions of Ark. and Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, the facts in question were deemed admitted as true. Failure to answer is well established in the court. Beasley v. U. S., 81 F. Supp. 518 (1948)., "I, therefore, hold that the requests will be considered as having been admitted." Also as previously referenced, "Statements of fact contained in affidavits which are not rebutted by the opposing party's affidavit or pleadings may[must] be accepted as true by the trial court." --Winsett v. Donaldson, 244 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1976).
- 'The state cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516.

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- "Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights." – AFLCIO v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137 t.
- "Immunity **fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility** while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." (Civil Rights) Rabon vs Rowen Memorial Hospital, Inc. 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.
- "When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially (and thus are not protected by "qualified" or "limited immunity," - SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404) - - "but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a "ministerial" and not a "discretionary capacity..." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.
- "Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held **liable** for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees." Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
- "Ignorance of the law does **not** excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.
- "All are presumed to know the law." San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.
- "It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one." Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.
- "the people, not the States, are sovereign." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 2 U.S. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793).
- HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST LOSES BY DEFAULT. -'He who does not repel a wrong when he can occasions it.'

1	AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGEMENT IN					
2	<u>COMMERCE.</u> — There is nothing left to resolve.'					
3	//					
4	WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand that evidence of the five (5)					
5	unrebutted affidavits and contract security agreements (Exhibits I, J, K, L, and N),					
6	the Defendants' default and and presumed dishonor in accordance with UCC §					
7	3-505 (see Exhibit L), this Honorable Court grant this respectful Demand for					
8	Default and Summary Judgement as a matter of law, without hearing, in favor of					
9	the Plaintiffs.					
10	Unless the Court intends to act contrary to the Uniform Commercial Code, the					
11	United States Code, contract law, trust law, commercial law, international law,					
12	exclusive equity, legal maxims, principles, and the Constitution.?					
13	//					
14	//					
15	LIST OF EXHIBITS / EVIDENCE:					
16	1. Exhibit A: UCC1 filing #2024385925-4.					
17	2. Exhibit B: UCC1 filing #2024385935-1.					
18	3. Exhibit C: UCC1 filing #2024402433-7.					
19	4. Exhibit D: UCC1 filing #2024411182-7.					
20	5. Exhibit E: GRANT DEED recorded in Official Records County of Riverside, DOC					
21	#2024-0291980, APN: 957-570-005, File No.: 37238 KH, where the private trust property					
22	is titled to 'WG Private Irrevocable Trust, dated Febraury 7, 2022.'					
23	6. E xhibit F: Affidavit: Power of Attorney in Fact.					
24	7. Exhibit G: DEED OF TRUST #00000000000788382476307152022.					
25	8. Exhibit H: Library of Congress Certified Copy of The Public Statutes at Large of the United					
26	States of America from March 1933 to June 1934: House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5,					
27	1933, Public Law 73-10.					
28	9. Exhibit I: Contract Security Agreement #9589071052700983677494.					
	-39 of 52-					

PLAINTIFFS: VERIFIED DEMAND FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, AND VERIFIED DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS: FAVOR AS A MATTER OF LAW WITHOUT HEARING

- 1 | 10. Exhibit J: Contract Security Agreement #EI948566806US.
- 2 | 11. Exhibit K: Contract Security Agreement #RF661592042US.
- 3 | 12. Exhibit L: Contract Security Agreement #RF661592201US/ Affidavit Certificate of
- 4 Dishonor, Non-response, **DEFAULT**, JUDGEMENT, and **LIEN AUTHORIZATION**,
- 5 | #RF661592201US.
- 6 | 13. Exhibit M: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit L.
- 7 | 14. Exhibit N: Contract Security Agreement #RF661592802US.
- 8 | 15. **Exhibit O**: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit N.
- 9 | 16. Exhibit P: INVOICE/TRUE BILL #SIERRPHHDISHONOR13.
- 10 | 17. Exhibit Q: Registered BILL OF EXCHANGE #RF661591285US.
- 11 | 18. **Exhibit R:** LETTER OF CREDIT, #**RF661591308US**.
- 12 | 19. **Exhibit S:** Private Post Registered (with U.S. Treasury) \$200,000,000,000.00 USD
- 13 MASTER DISCHARGE AND BOND, #RF372320890US.
- 14 | 20. **Exhibit T**: 2022 form 1099-A, for \$669,595.
- 15 | 21. Exhibit U: 2022 form 1099-C, for \$669,595.
- 16 | 22. **Exhibit V**: 2022 form 1099-OID, for \$669,595.
- 17 | 23. **Exhibit W**: 2022 form 1099-A, for \$647,200.
- 18 | 24. **Exhibit X**: 2022 form 1099-C, for \$647,200.
- 19 | 25. **Exhibit Y**: 2022 form 1099-OID, for \$647,200
- 20 | 26. **Exhibit Z**: 2024 form 1099-A, for \$700,000.
- 21 | 27. **Exhibit AA**: 2024 form 1099-OID, for \$700,000
- 22 | 28.Exhibit BB: \$1,023,416.35 face value 'BUYER'S FINAL SETTLEMENT STATEMENT.'
- 23 || 29. Exhibit CC: Signed copy of the 'Affidavit of WALKER TODD.
- 24 | 30. Exhibit DD: NOTE #000+1365377+9+1-3 DATED JULY 15, 2022.
- 25 31. Exhibit EE: PASSPORT #A39235161 (this DOCUMENT *unequivocally* evidences and
- 26 demonstrates that the holder is a 'national).
- 27 32. Exhibit FF: Copy of 4 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. and 2-3 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7
- 28 C.J.S. (DEFENDANTS are wards of the court: 18 USC 8).

1	33.Exhibit EE: PASSPORT #A39235161 (this DOCUMENT <i>unequivocally</i> evidences and
2	demonstrates that the holder is a 'national).
3	34. Exhibit FF: Copy of 4 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S. and 2-3 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7
4	C.J.S. (DEFENDANTS are wards of the court: 18 USC 8).
5	35. Exhibit GG: Service of ' <u>VERIFIED</u> COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD, BREACH OF
6	CONTRACT, QUIET TITLE, RACKETEERING, and SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS A
7	MATTER OF LAW', via email on December 18, 2024 at 7:07pm.
8	36. Exhibit HH: Service of [AMENDED] <u>VERIFIED</u> COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD, BREACH
9	OF CONTRACT, QUIET TITLE, RACKETEERING, and SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS
10	A MATTER OF LAW', via email on January 10, 2025 at 7:07pm.
11	37. Exhibit II: USPS form 3811 for Service of, 'VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD,
12	BREACH OF CONTRACT, QUIET TITLE, RACKETEERING, and SUMMARY
13	JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW', via Registered Mail #RF775820935US.
14	38.Exhibit JJ: USPS form 3811 for Service of, '[AMENDED] VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
15	FRAUD, BREACH OF CONTRACT, QUIET TITLE, RACKETEERING, and SUMMARY
16	JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW', via Registered Mail #RF775821746US
17	39. Exhibit KK: Email sent to Plaintiffs by Joseph Moran on December 14, 2023 at 7:50am,
18	instructing all Defendants dishonorably ignore Plaintiffs, silently acquiesce, and
19	tacitly agree.
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22	WORDS DEFINED GLOSSARY OF TERMS:
23	As used in this Affidavit, the following words and terms are as defined in this
24	section, non-obstante:

1. Attorney: Strictly, one who is designated to transact business for another; a legal agent. — Also termed attorney-in-fact; private attorney. 2. A person who practices law; LAWYER. Also termed (in sense 2) attorney-at-law; public attorney. A person who is appointed by another and has authority to act on

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behalf of another. *See also* POWER OF ATTORNEY. See, Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition, pages 392-393, Oxford Dictionary or Law, 5th Edition, page 38, American Bar Association's website.

- Attorney-in-fact: A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place 2. and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of a legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a "letter of attorney," or more commonly a "power of attorney." A person to whom the authority of another, who is called the constituent, is by him lawfully delegated. The term is employed to designate persons who are under special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in *factum*, for the deed, or special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another. Bacon, Abr. Attorney; Story, Ag. § 25. All persons who are capable of acting for themselves, and even those who are disqualified from acting in their own capacity, if they have sufficient understanding, as infants of proper age, and femes coverts, may act as attorney of other. The person named in a power of attorney to act on your behalf is commonly referred to as your "agent" or "attorney-in-fact." With a valid power of attorney, your agent can take any action permitted in the document. - See Bouvier's Law Dictionary, volumes 1,2, and 3, page 282, Blacks Law Dictionary 1, 2nd, 8th, pages 105, 103, and 392 respectively, and the American Bar Association's website on 'Power of Attorney' and 'Attorney-In-Fact'
- 3. **financial institution:** a **person**, an **individual**, a **private banker**, a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales, persons involved in real estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal Service, a commercial bank or trust company, any credit union, an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described

in this paragraph, a broker or dealer in securities or commodities, a currency exchange, or a business engaged in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency or funds, financial agency, a loan or finance company, an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or similar instruments, an operator of a credit card system, an insurance company, a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. Ref, 31 U.S. Code § 5312 - Definitions and application.

- 4. **individual:** As a noun, this term denotes a single **person** as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it **may**, in proper cases, include **artificial persons**. As an adjective: Existing as an indivisible entity. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.— <u>See Black's Law Dictionary 4th, 7th, and 8th Edition pages 913, 777, and 2263 respectively.</u>
- 5. person: Term may include artificial beings, as corporations. The term means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation. The term "person" means a natural person or an organization. -Artificial persons. Such as are created and devised by law for the purposes of society and government, called "corporations" or bodies politic." -Natural persons. Such as are formed by nature, as distinguished from artificial persons, or corporations. -Private person. An individual who is not the incumbent of an office. Persons are divided by law into natural and artificial. Natural

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persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws, for the purposes of society and government, which are called "corporations" or "bodies politic." - See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-201, Black's Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 4th edition pages 892, 895, and 1299, respectively, 27 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 72.11 - Meaning of terms, and 26 United States Code (U.S. Code) § 7701 - Definitions. bank: a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and

loan association, credit union, and trust company. The terms "banks", "national bank", "national banking association", "member bank", "board", "district", and "reserve bank" shall have the meanings assigned to them in section 221 of this title. An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered to receive deposits of money, to make loans. and to issue its promissory notes, (designed to circulate as money, and commonly called "bank-notes" or "bank-bills") or to perform any one or more of these functions. The term "bank" is usually restricted in its application to an incorporated body; while a private individual making it his business to conduct banking operations is denominated a "banker." Banks in a commercial sense are of three kinds, to wit; (1) Of deposit; (2) of discount; (3) of circulation. speaking, the term "bank" implies a place for the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an institution. — See, UCC 1-201, 4-105, 12 U.S. Code § 221a, Black's Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th, pages 117-118, 116-117, 183-184, 139-140, and 437-439.

discharge: To cancel or unloose the obligation of a contract; to make an agreement or contract null and inoperative. Its principal species are rescission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance, judgement, composition, bankruptcy, merger. As applied to demands claims, right of action, incumbrances, etc., to discharge the debt or claim is to extinguish it, to annul its obligatory force, to satisfy it. And here also the term is generic; thus a dent, a mortgage. As a noun, the word means the act or instrument by which the binding force of a contract is terminated, irrespective of whether the contract is carried out to the full extent contemplated (in which case the discharge is the result of performance) or is broken off before complete execution. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, page.

- 8. **pay:** To *discharge* a debt; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, for his acceptance. To pay is to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or In goods, for his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 3rd edition, pages 880, 883, and 1339 respectively.
- 9. payment: The performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability. by the delivery of money or other value. Also the money or thing so delivered. Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the obligation. [Cases: Payment 1. C.J.S. Payment § 2.] 2. The money or other valuable thing so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st and 8th edition, pages 880-811 and 3576-3577, respectively.
- 10. **may:** An auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing ability, competency, liberty, permission, probability or contingency. Regardless of the instrument, however, whether constitution, statute, deed, contract or whatnot, **courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or "must".** See Black's :aw Dictionary, 4th Edition page 1131.
- 11. **extortion:** The term "**extortion**" means the obtaining of property from another, **with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.** See 18 U.S. Code § 1951 Interference with commerce by threats or violence.
- 12. **national:** "foreign government", "foreign official", "internationally protected person", "international organization", "national of the United States", "official guest," and/or "non-citizen national." **They all have the same meaning.** See Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons.
- 13. **United States:** For the purposes of this Affidavit, the terms "<u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates" and "U.S." *mean only the Federal Legislative Democracy of the District of Columbia*, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other Territory within the "United States," which entity has its origin and jurisdiction from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17-18 and Article IV, Section 3,

Clause 2 of the	Constitution 1	or the	United	States of	of America	. The	terms	"United	States"	ana
"U.S." are NOT	to be construed	to mear	ı or inclu	de the so	vereign, un	ited 5	0 states	s of Amer	ica.	

- 14. **fraud:** deceitful practice or Willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional. as applied to contracts is the cause of an error bearing on material part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other. in the sense of court of equity, properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involved a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. See Black's Law Dictionary, 1st and 2nd Edition, pages 521-522 and 517 respectively.
- 15. color: appearance, semblance. or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence, a deceptive appearance; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality; a a disguise or pretext. See, Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 222.
- 16. **colorable:** That which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be. See, Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 2223

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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)	
)	SS
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)	

I competent, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My mailing address is the Walkernova Group, care of: 30650 Rancho California Road suite #406-251, Temecula, California [92591]. On February 7, 2025, I served the within documents:

1	1. PLAINTIFFS' DEMAND [MOTION] FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND
2	PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, DEMAND [MOTION] FOR
3	DEFAULT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR AS <u>A MATTER</u>
4	OF LAW WITHOUT HEARING.
5	2. Exhibit KK.
6	3. NOTICE OF FILING OF <u>VERIFIED</u> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE
7	PLAINTIFFS PLAINTIFFS' <u>VERIFIED</u> <u>DEMAND</u> FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL
8	AND PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, AND <u>VERIFIED</u>
9	DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR
10	AS <u>A MATTER OF LAW</u> WITHOUT HEARING
11	4. <u>VERIFIED</u> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE PLAINTIFFS PLAINTIFFS'
12	<u>VERIFIED</u> <u>DEMAND</u> FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND PROSECUTION OF
13	DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, AND <u>VERIFIED</u> DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND
14	SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR AS <u>A MATTER OF LAW</u>
15	WITHOUT HEARING
16	By United States Mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package
17	addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below by placing the envelope for
18	
- 1	collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily
19	collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence
19 20	
	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence
20	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and
20 21	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States
20 21 22	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or
20 21 22 23	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was
20 21 22 23 24	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail with a form 3811. Jay Promisco, James E. Coffrini, Joseph Moran, Christian Gault, Amir Sabet,
20 21 22 23 24 25	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail with a form 3811.

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	Express Mail #EI988807142USS — Dated: February 7, 2025
1 2	950 Glenn Drive, suite #150 Folsom, California [95630] Registered Mail #RF775822517US
	Eric D Houser (SBN 130079), Neil J. Copper (SBN 277997)
3 4	C/o HOUSER LLP 9970 Research Drive Irvine, California [92618]
5	Susanne M. Nicholson, Daniel J. Foster
6	C/o WILKE FLEURY LLP 621 Capital Mall, suite 900 Sacramento, California [95814]
7	Paul Gustafson,
8	C/o PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION dba PHH MORTGAGE SERVICES, OWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION. 3000 Leadenhall Road
10	Mount Laurel, New Jersey [08054 Registered Mail # RF775822525US
11	Registered Wall # 10770022020
12	Devin Ormonde, C/o PRIME RECON LLC
13	27368 Via Industria, Suite 201 Temecula, California [92590]
14	Registered Mail # RF775822534US
15	James R. McHenry III, Pam Bondi, Agent(s), Fiduciary(ies) C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
16	950 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West Washington, District of Colombia [20530-0001]
17	Registered Mail # RF775822548US
18	On February 7, 2025, I served the within documents by Electronic Service.
19	Based on a court order and/or an agreement of the parties to accept service by
20	electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the
21	electronic notification addresses listed below.
22	Jay Promisco, James E. Coffrini, Joseph Moran, Christian Gault, Amir Sabet, Amanda Coffrini, John Goulding, Brian Mcginley, Virginia Erbes, Corey
23	Moore, Drew Fuerstenbergerm C/o SIERRA PACIFIC MORTGAGE COMPANY INC / GREENHEAD
24	INVESTMENTS
25	950 Glenn Drive, suite #150 Folsom, California [95630] amir.sabet@spmc.com
26	joseph.moran@spmc.com loanservicingqueue@spmc.com
27	christian.gault@spmc.com amanda.coffrini@spmc.com
28	john.goulding@spmc.com
	10.050

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PLAINTIESS VERIFIED DEMAND FOR CRIMINAL REFERRAL AND PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, AND VERIFIED DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIESS FAVOR AS A MATTER OF LAW BYTHOUT HEARING.

Express Mail #EI988807142USS — Dated: February 7, 2025 brian.mcginlev@spmc.com virginia.erbes@spmc.com 1 corev.moore@spmc.com 2 drew.fuerstenberger@spmc.com Eric D Houser (SBN 130079), Neil J. Copper (SBN 277997) C/o HOUSER LLP 9970 Research Drive 3 4 Irvine, California [92618] 5 ncooper@houser-law.com dfoster@wilkefleury.com 6 snicholson@wilkefleury.com 7 Susanne M. Nicholson, Daniel J. Foster C/o WILKE FLEURY LLP 8 621 Capital Mall, suite 900 Sacramento, California [95814] 9 dfoster@wilkefleury.com snicholson@wilkefleurv.com 10 Paul Gustafson, C/o PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION dba PHH MORTGAGE 11 SÉRVICES, OWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION. 12 3000 Leadenhall Road Mount Laurel, New Jersey [08054] 13 relationshipmanager@mortgagefamily.com Devin Ormonde, Fiduciary(ies) C/o PRIME RECON LLC 14 15 27368 Via Industria, Suite 201 Temecula, California [92590] 16 joseph.moran@spmc.com 17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California 18 that the above is true and correct. Executed on February 7, 2025 in Riverside 19 County, California. 20 /s/Corey Walker/ 21 Corey Walker 22 23 **COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION:** 24 County of Riverside 25 Commercial Oath and Verification 26 The State of California 27 28

-49 of 52PLAINTIFES, VERIFIED DEMAND FOR CRIMINAL REFERRALAND PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS, SANCTIONS, AND VERIFIED DEMAND FOR DEFAULT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFES, FAVOR AS A MATTER OF LAW BUTHOUT HEARING.

- 1	
1	I, <u>KEVIN WALKER</u> , under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath proceeding
2	in good faith being of sound mind states that the facts contained herein are true,
3	correct, complete and not misleading to the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief
4	under penalty of International Commercial Law and state this to be HIS Affidavit of
5	Truth regarding same signed and sealed this <u>7TH</u> day of <u>FEBRUARY</u> in the year of
6	Our Lord two thousand and twenty five:
7	proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, by Special Limited Appearance,
8	All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.
9	By: Jun Walh
10	Kevin Walker, Authorized Representative, Attorney-In-Fact, Secured Party, Executor, national, private bank(er)
11	// // // // // // // // // // // // //
12	COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION:
13	County of Riverside)
14) Commercial Oath and Verification
15	The State of California)
16	I, DONNABELLE MORTEL, under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath
17	proceeding in good faith being of sound mind states that the facts contained herein
18	are true, correct, complete and not misleading to the best of Affiant's knowledge
19	and belief under penalty of International Commercial Law and state this to be HIS
20	Affidavit of Truth regarding same signed and sealed this <u>7TH</u> day of <u>FEBRUARY</u> in
21	the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty five:
22	proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, by Special Limited Appearance,
23	All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.
24	By:
25	Donnabelle Mortel, Authorized Representative,
26	Attorney-In-Fact, Secured Party, Executor, national, private bank(er)
27	//
28	

1	Let this document stand as truth before the Almighty Supreme Creator and let it be
2	established before men according as the scriptures saith: "But if they will not listen,
3	take one or two others along, so that every matter may be established by the testimony of two
4	or three witnesses." Matthew 18:16. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall every
5	word be established" 2 Corinthians 13:1.
6	Sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance,
7	By: At Malet Leb
8	Steven MacArthur-Brooks (WITNESS)
9	Sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance,
10	By: Over Dethol (1/A)
11	Corey Walker (WITNESS)
12	//
13	//
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25	NOTICE:
26	Using a notary on this document does <i>not</i> constitute any adhesion, <i>nor does it alter</i>
27	my status in any manner. The purpose for notary is verification and identification

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only and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.

1	ACKNOW	/LEDG	EMENT:				
2	State of California)		A notary public or other officer completing this certificate				
3) ss.		verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.				
4	County of Riverside)						
5	On this 7th day of February, 2025, befo	re me, _J	oyti Patel_, a Notary Public,				
6	personally appeared Kevin Walker, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory						
7	evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within						
8	instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/						
9	her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the						
10	instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,						
11	executed the instrument.						
12	I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California						
13	that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.						
14							
15	WITNESS my hand and official seal.		1000000000000000000000000000000000000				
16			JOYTI PATEL Notary Public - California				
17			Riverside County Commission # 2407742 My Comm. Expires Jul 8, 2026				
18	Signature Myt Water	_ (Seal)					
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