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1	Kevin Walker, sui juris, In Propria Person a	ı
2	C/o 30650 Rancho California Road #406-251	
3	Temecula, California [92591] non-domestic <i>without</i> the <u>U</u> nited <u>S</u> tates	
4	Email: team@walkernovagroup.com	
5	Attorney-In-Fact, Executor, and Authorized F	Renresentatine
	for Real Party(ies) in Interest and Purported I	Defendant
6	TMKEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, TMKEVIN I TMKEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST	LEWIS WALKER©,
7		
8		E STATE OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE
9	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Case No./Bond No.: TE243660039 / RSDM
10	CALIFORNIA,	
11	[Purported]Plaintiff,	PURPORTED DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL
12	US.	ACCEPTANCE, NOTICE OF MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM, AND
13	™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, [Purported]Defendant.	NOTICE OF JUDICIAL FRAUD AND
14	- 1	CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE UNDER COLOR OF LAW, AND DEMAND FOR
15		DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS,
16		RESTITUTION, AND SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
17		IN FAVOR OF <i>PURPORTED</i> DEFENDANT
18		DEFENDANI
	DUDDODTED DEFENDANT'S VED	IEIED NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL
19		IFIED NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL
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21		TO DEPRIVE UNDER COLOR OF LAW,
22	AND DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANC	
23		N FAVOR OF <i>PURPORTED</i> DEFENDANT
24	COMES NOW, Purported Defendant	TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER (hereinafter
25	"Purported Defendant" and/or "Defenda	nt" and/or "Real Party in Interest"), by
26	and through Defendant's Attorney-in-Fact	t, Kevin: Walker, who is proceeding sui
27	juris, In Propria Persona, and by Special I	Limited Appearance (NOT generally).
28	Kevin is a natural, <i>freeborn</i> sovereign; one	of the People invoking common law,

-Page 1 of 32-

1	exclusive equity, and fairness, and a state Citizen of California the republic in its de
2	jure capacity as one of the several states of the Union established in 1789. This
3	incidentally makes him a non-citizen national/national American of the republic
4	as per the De'Jure Constitution for the United States 1777/1789 .
5	Dendant, acting through their Attorney-in-Fact, assert their inherent
6	unalienable right to contract, as secured by Article I, Section 10 of the
7	Constitution, which states: "No State shall pass any Law impairing the
8	Obligation of Contracts," and thus which <i>prohibits</i> states from impairing the
9	obligation of contracts .
10	This clause unequivocally prohibits states from impairing the obligation of
11	contracts, including but not limited to, a trust and contract agreement as an
12	'Attorney-In-Fact,' and any private contract existing between Plaintiffs and
13	Defendants. A copy of the 'Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact,' is attached hereto
14	as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.
15	Plaintiffs further rely on their inherent rights under the Constitution and the
16	common law – rights that predate the formation of the tatse and remain
17	safeguarded by due process of law .
18	I. 'Attorney-in-Fact': Legal Authority and Recognition:
19	An attorney-in-fact is a private attorney authorized by another to act on their
20	behalf in specific matters, as granted by a power of attorney . This authority can be
21	limited to a specific act or extend to general business matters that are not of a
22	legal character.
23	According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary (1st, 2nd, and 8th
24	editions), and the American Bar Association (ABA):
25	An attorney-in-fact derives their authority from a written instrument,
26	commonly referred to as a "power of attorney."
27	• A constituent may lawfully delegate authority to an attorney-in-fact to act in

their place.

- This designation is distinct from an attorney-at-law, as it pertains to an
 individual acting under a special agency or letter of attorney for particular
 actions.
- Even individuals who are otherwise disqualified from acting in their own legal
 capacity, such as minors or married women (historically referred to as femes coverts),
 may act as an attorney-in-fact for others if they have the necessary understanding.

Black's Law Dictionary defines an **attorney-in-fact** as follows:

"A person to whom the authority of another, who is called the constituent, is by him lawfully delegated. The term is employed to designate persons who are under special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in factum, for the deed, or special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense, it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another."

The American Bar Association (ABA) further affirms that the individual named in a power of attorney is legally referred to as an agent or attorney-in-fact and has the authority to take any action expressly permitted in the document. The American Bar Association (ABA) official website explicitly states:

"The person named in a power of attorney to act on your behalf is commonly referred to as your "agent" or "attorney-in-fact." With a valid power of attorney, your agent can take any action permitted in the document."

II. Statutory and U.C.C. Recognition of 'Attorney-in-Fact' Authority:

- The authority of an attorney-in-fact is explicitly recognized in various statutory and commercial codes, reinforcing its binding nature:
 - U.C.C. § 3-402: Establishes that an authorized representative, including an attorney-in-fact, can bind the principal in contractual and financial transactions.
 - 28 U.S.C. § 1654: Confirms that "parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel", reinforcing the Plaintiffs' right to self-representation and the use of an attorney-in-fact.

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- **26 U.S.C. § 2203**: Recognizes executors, including attorneys-in-fact, in matters of estate administration and tax liability.
- 26 U.S.C. § 7603: Acknowledges that an attorney-in-fact may lawfully receive and respond to IRS summonses on behalf of the principal.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6903: Confirms that fiduciaries, including attorneys-in-fact, are recognized in tax matters and are legally bound to act in their principal's best interest.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6036: Establishes that attorneys-in-fact can handle affairs related to the administration of decedent estates and trust entities.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6402: Grants attorneys-in-fact the authority to receive and negotiate tax refunds and credits on behalf of the principal.

Defendant has clearly presented a valid "Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact" (Exhibit A), which lawfully confers upon them the authority to act in this matter. The legal principles established by the UCC and statutory law further reinforce the binding authority of Plaintiffs' affidavits and agreements. Defendants' assertion that a trust cannot be represented by an attorney-in-fact contradicts well-established statutory, commercial, and legal principles. By denying this legal reality, **Defendants engage in intentional misrepresentation** and mockery of long-standing legal doctrine, further demonstrating their lack of

Legal Basis for Proof of Delivery via Registered Mail III.

Under well-established legal precedent, documents sent via Registered Mail with return receipt requested (Form 3811) are presumed delivered upon mailing, providing strong evidentiary proof of service. Courts have consistently upheld this principle, reinforcing the Mailbox Rule, which states that a properly mailed document is presumed received by the addressee unless convincingly rebutted.

Key Legal Precedents Supporting Proof of Delivery

- U.S. v. Bowen, 414 F.2d 1268 (3rd Cir. 1969) The court held that when
 Registered Mail is sent with return receipt requested and the receipt is signed,
 it constitutes prima facie evidence of delivery, meaning the burden shifts to the
 recipient to prove non-receipt.
 - 2. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932) The Supreme Court ruled that mailing a document via Registered Mail creates a strong presumption of receipt by the intended party, further solidifying the evidentiary weight of proper mailing.
 - 3. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) The Court established that a return receipt provides sufficient proof of service unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
 - **4. Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 301** Under this rule, a presumption exists that a properly mailed document is **received by the intended recipient**, shifting the burden of proof to the recipient to disprove delivery.
 - **5. 39 U.S.C. § 3009** Governs the legality and evidentiary weight of **Registered Mail**, affirming that mailing with proof of delivery (e.g., Form 3811) is **legally sufficient evidence of receipt**.
 - **6. 26 U.S.C. § 7502** This statute explicitly states that the **date of mailing is deemed the date of filing or receipt** when Registered Mail is used, providing strong evidentiary support for the **timely delivery and legal effect** of mailed documents.

Application of the Mailbox Rule

The Mailbox Rule dictates that once a document is properly addressed, stamped, and deposited with the postal service, it is presumed delivered and received by the addressee. Courts have repeatedly upheld this principle, ensuring that a party cannot simply deny receipt to evade legal responsibility. When Registered Mail with return receipt requested is used, the proof of mailing is further reinforced by the signed receipt, making rebuttal even more difficult

Legal Presumption of Delivery and Evidentiary Weight Based on established case law and statutory authority, Registered Mail with return receipt requested (Form 3811) serves as prima facie evidence of delivery and 3 creates a strong presumption of receipt by the intended party. Under U.S. v. Bowen, Hagner v. United States, and NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, this 5 presumption stands unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, 26 U.S.C. § 7502 affirms that the date of mailing via Registered Mail is deemed the date of filing or receipt, solidifying its evidentiary value. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 301 shifts the burden to the recipient to prove non-receipt, while 39 U.S.C. § 3009 reinforces the legal sufficiency of proof of delivery through 10 postal records. 11 VII. FRAUDULENT NATURE OF ALL PURPORTED PLAINTIFF'S 12 **ACTIONS AND CLAIMS** 13 8. Purported Defendant asserts and affirms that the entirety of this action by the 14 purported Plaintiff is predicated entirely on fraudulent claims. 15 9. The Plaintiff, who purports to have authority and/or standing to bring this 16 action, is in fact a Defendant in a pre-existing claim and legal matter and 17 purported Plaintiff is in DEFAULT and DISHONOR, as evidenced by the 18 'Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and 19 LIEN AUTHORIZATION' and LIEN AUTHORIZATION (see Exhibit E) and as 20 also evidenced by Federal Lawsuit Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA, filed 21 on March 11, 2025 (see Exhibit F). 22 IV. Plaintiff's Presumption of Dishonor under U.C.C. § 3-505 and **Evidence** Proving Plaintiff's Dishonor 24 1. The failure of Plaintiff and/or Does 1-100 inclusive to rebut or provide any valid 25 evidence of their performance is further confirmed by the, 'AFFIDAVIT 26 CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and 27 LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (See 28

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(2) A purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank, or presenting bank on or accompanying the instrument stating that acceptance or payment has been refused unless reasons for the refusal are stated and the reasons are (3) A book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or collecting bank, kept in the usual course of business which shows dishonor, even if there is no evidence (b) A protest is a certificate of dishonor made by a United States consul or vice consul, or a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths by the law of the place where dishonor occurs. It may be made upon information satisfactory to that person. The protest must identify the instrument and certify either that presentment has been made or, if not made, the reason why it was not made, and that the instrument has been dishonored by nonacceptance or nonpayment. The protest may also certify that notice of dishonor has been given to some or all parties. The **notarized** 'AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, -Page 7 of 32-

DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit H), complies with these requirements and

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serves as a formal protest and evidence of dishonor under U.C.C. § 3-505, as it clearly documents Plaintiff's refusal to respond or provide the necessary rebuttal to Defendants' verified claims.

- Plaintiff has <u>not</u> submitted any evidence to contradict or rebut the statements made in the affidavits. As a result, the facts set forth in the affidavits are deemed true and uncontested. Additionally, the California Evidence Code § 664 and related case law support the *presumption* that official duties have been regularly performed, and *unrebutted* affidavits stand as **Truth**.
- 5. Plaintiff may **not** argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the unrebutted affidavits. As per established legal principles, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Plaintiff and Does-100 inclusive is/are barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative or judicial.
- The Purported Defendant asserts that their private, secured rights are protected by the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the common law, and exclusive equity jurisdiction, which together govern the individual's ability to contract freely, maintain dominion over private property, and be free from arbitrary

Constitutional and State Protections for *Private* Rights

- interference by the State or its agents. The following legal authorities support the Defendant's position:
 - "The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of

1		himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes
2		nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." — Hale v. Henkel,
3		201 U.S. 43, 47 (1905)
4	•	"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime."
5		– Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d 486, 489
6	•	"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making
7		or legislation which would abrogate them."
8		- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
9	•	"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of
10		constitutional rights." – Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 945
11	•	"A law repugnant to the Constitution is void."
12		- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
13	•	"It is not the duty of the citizen to surrender his rights, liberties, and immunities
14		under the guise of police power or any other governmental power."
15		- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)
16	•	"An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; afford
17		no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
18		though it had never been passed."
19		- Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)
20	•	"No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to
21		enforce it."
22		– 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 177; Late Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 256
23	•	"Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
24		exists and acts."
25		- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
26	VI.	Supremacy Clause:
27	The P	urported Defendant further affirms that the Supremacy Clause of the United

28 States Constitution, **Article VI**, **Clause 2**, provides that:

-Page 10 of 32-

fraudulent charges filed against the purported Defendant in the document

received March 25, 2025, but dated March 14, 2025. The purported Defendant

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- 1. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff of the existence of a 5 6 7
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- valid corpus delicti, i.e., a demonstrable injury to person or property, committed by the purported Defendant, and a verified complaint from an actual injured party having firsthand knowledge, sworn under penalty of perjury.
- 2. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the government, agency, or officer can lawfully appear as an "injured party" in a private legal controversy, despite the long-settled principle that a fictitious entity or political subdivision cannot be a "party of interest" or suffer injury in fact without a living, natural man or woman asserting a verified claim.
- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the stop was conducted with probable cause and NOT in violation of constitutional protections under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as evidenced by Verified Commercial Affidavit #RF775820621US, #RF775821088US, #RF775822582US , and #RF775823645US. Copy of said Verified Commercial Affidavits are attached as Exhibits B, C, D, and E respectively, and incorporated herein by reference.
- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the "peace officer" had constitutional and lawful authority to demand a driver's license, despite the fact that the Purported Defendant was NOT engaged in commercial activity and was traveling in a private automobile and transport clearly marked as such: "PRIVATE".
- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the fabricated "charges" filed on March 14, 2025 with a was NOT a retaliatory action, filed in bad faith, just days after Federal Lawsuit Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA

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was initiated on March 11, 2025 against the same alleged "peace officer," Gregory Eastwood and/or Robert Bowman. A copy of the Federal Lawsuit, with affirmed violations under color of law and of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242, as well as other federal violations, is attached as Exhibit F and incorporated herein by reference.

- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the "charges" are NOT in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, concerning conspiracy and deprivation of rights under color of law.
- 7. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the 'charges' and related enforcement actions are not a form of commercial fraud, securities fraud, or bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, wherein negotiable instruments and personal identifying information are used without consent, disclosure, or lawful authority to generate revenue or initiate unauthorized financial transactions.
- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the initiation, enforcement, and perpetuation of the fabricated 'charges' are not part of a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, involving mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, conspiracy, and the deprivation of rights under color of law.
- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the 'charges' were not made or enforced under false pretenses, constructive fraud, or fraudulent inducement – wherein a legal obligation was presumed without full disclosure, valid contract, or lawful authority – contrary to established principles of equity, contract law, and the Constitution
- 10. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the enforcement of these 'charges' is not an act of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act), particularly targeting a private, peaceful national under threat, duress, or

- coercion, and without jurisdictional or lawful authority to compel performance or payment.
- 11. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the fabricated 'charges' and all acts of enforcement thereunder do not violate **18 U.S.C. § 112**, which prohibits threats, coercion, intimidation, or obstruction against internationally protected persons or official guests, and further that the Defendant is not acting in a private foreign capacity with protected status under international law or treaty
- 12. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the use of mailing systems, citations, or instruments in the matter at hand does not constitute mail fraud in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 1341**, or the unlawful use of government channels to deliver unconscionable or fraudulent offers disguised as legal obligations.
- 13. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the instruments involved have not been converted, securitized, monetized, or used as collateral in a manner constituting securities fraud or unlawful conversion of bonded energy under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 77q, or related statutory violations
- 14. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the use of the Defendant's legal name or identifying information does not amount to unlawful impersonation, identity theft, or misrepresentation under **18 U.S.C. § 1028**, and that no presumption of corporate personhood has been fraudulently assigned to a living man or woman without consent.
- 15. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the alleged requirement to provide a "driver's license" **is applicable** to the Defendant even when no crime was being committed, **and the stop itself was lawful.**
- 16. **Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that** the CITATION/ INSTRUMENT/OFFER #TE464702 was accepted intentionally, *willfully*, and

- and indorsed, and not done so under threat, duress, and/or coercion, and with full and complete disclosure, and lawful authority.
- 17. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the **California Vehicle Code § 260** lawfully applies to <u>private</u> "automobiles" and explicitly <u>requires</u> their registration, notwithstanding the clear distinction made between **private** and *commercial* vehicles in the code itself.
- 18. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that anything allegedly obtained during the **unconstitutional and unlawful** stop was not the **fruit of a poisonous tree**, as admitted by the peace officer Gregory Eastwood in the *unrbutted* **affidavits** (See Exhibits B, C, D, and E).
- 19. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that Exhibits B, C, D, and E and do **NOT** serve as *prima facie* **evidence** of fraud, coercion, extortion, kidnapping, torture, identity theft, false pretenses, bank fraud, treason, and deprivation of rights under color of law by Purported Plaintiff and/or Gregory Eastwood and/or Robert Bowman and/or Nicholas Gruwell and/or Joseph Sinz and/or Chad Bianco.
- 20. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that** the **18 U.S. Code § 31(6)** <u>includes private</u> "automobiles" within its definition of "motor vehicle," contrary to its express limitation to vehicles used for <u>commercial</u> purposes.
- 21. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that** it is **NOT** a fundamental **Right** to travel, and it is **fact**ually and actually a privilege, and NOT a gift granted by the Supreme Creator and restated by our founding fathers as **Unalienable** and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made Law or color of law known as a <u>private</u> "Code" (secret) or a "Statute.
- 22. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** demonstrating the issuing authority's jurisdiction to impose statutory obligations upon <u>private</u> individuals utilizing <u>private</u> *automobiles* for personal purposes.
- 23. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the living man, natural freeborn sovereign, state Citizen: Californian, national/non-citizen

national, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, does <u>NOT</u> possess the *unalienable* inherent, unalienable **right** to travel in His private automobile/private transport, free of harassment, tresspass, restrictions, and/or encumbrances.

24. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, it is <u>NOT</u> well

- 24. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, it is NOT well established law that the highways of the State are public property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." See, Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313.
- 25. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, a vehicle <u>NOT</u> used for <u>commercial</u> activity is **NOT** a "consumer good , and …it IS a type of vehicle <u>required</u> to be registered and "use tax" paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax. See, <u>Bank of Boston vs Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14</u>.
- 26. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, the entirety of this transaction does not constitute a "commercial" matter under applicable law.
- 27. **Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff** that, 'the claim and exercise of a constitutional **right CAN** be converted into a crime.' See, <u>Miller v. U.S., 230</u> F 2d 486, 489.
- 28. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, One does **NOT** have constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his property." See, <u>Simpson v. Los Angeles (1935), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474</u>.
- 29. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that **private men and women** are required to give up their **right** to "travel," for the purported
 "benefit" and privilege of "driving" a "motor vehicle."

- 30. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that 28 U.S. Code § 3002(15) - Definitions does NOT stipulate, "United States" means - (A) a Federal 2 corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of 3 the United States; or **(C)** an instrumentality of the United States. 4 31. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, 8 U.S. Code 5 1101(a)(22) - Definition, does NOT expressly stipulates, " (22)The term 6 "national of the United States" means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a 7 person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent 8 allegiance to the United States. 9 32. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, the individual 10 may **NOT** stand upon his **constitutional rights** as a citizen. He is NOT entitled 11 to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is NOT 12 unlimited. He owes such duty [to submit his books and papers for an 13 examination] to the State, and upon proof that his rights are NOT such as 14 existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the 15 organization of the State, and CAN be taken from him without due process of 16 law, or in accordance with the Constitution. NOT among his rights are a refusal 17 to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from 18 arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law, and upon proof that he 19 owes the public even though does not trespass upon their rights. See, Hale v. 20 21 Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 (1905). 22
 - 33. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, all laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are **NOT null and void**. **See**, <u>Chief Justice</u>

 <u>Marshall, Marbury vs Madison</u>, 5, U.S. (Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803).

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34. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the for Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE <u>CONTRACT</u> and AGREEMENT BOND #B6735991 was NOT *CANCELED*, TERMINATED, REVOKED, and <u>LIQUIDATED</u>, ACCEPTED FOR VALUE AND EXEMPT FROM LEVY, FOR RELEASE,

1	CREDIT, AND DEPOSIT TO PRIVATE POST REGISTERED, with the U.S.
2	Treasury, with the retaining full control and access to all respective right,
3	interest, titles, and credits, as evidenced by the contract security agreement
4	and affidavit titled, 'AFFIDAVIT RIGHT TO TRAVEL CANCELLATION,
5	TERMINATION, AND REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire"
6	DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND #
7	B6735991. A true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit G and
8	incorporated herein by reference.
9	35. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that it was NOT noted in
10	Land v. Dollar, 338 US 731 (1947), "that when the government entered into a
11	commercial field of activity, it left immunity behind." This principle is further
12	affirmed in <i>Brady v. Roosevelt</i> , 317 U.S. 575 (1943); FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242
13	(1940); and <i>Kiefer v. RFC</i> , 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
14	36. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that it was NOT
15	established under the Clearfield Doctrine, as articulated in <i>Clearfield Trust Co. v.</i>
16	United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), that when the government engages in
17	commercial or proprietary activities, it sheds its sovereignty and is subject to the
18	same rules and liabilities as any <u>private</u> corporation.
19	37. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that these matters have not
20	already been settled under res judicata, stare decisis, and collateral estoppel, as
21	evidenced by Exhibits B, C, D, and E.
22	IX. EVIDENCE OF FRAUD, EXTORTION, AND CONSPIRACY TO
23	<u>DEPRIVE RIGHTS</u>
24	These fraudulent 'charges' are further evidenced as act of judicial fraud, extortion ,
25	coercion, and conspiracy to deprive under color of law, as evidenced in the four
26	(4) Unrebutted Affidavits and Contract and Security Agreements (Exhibits B, C,
27	D, and E) that have been lawfully executed and remain unrebutted . These

affidavits serve as **prima facie evidence** of:

•	Fraudulent and Retaliatory Prosecution - The charge was filed immediately
	after Federal Lawsuit Case #5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA (Exhibit F),
	evidencing intent to intimidate, retaliate, and coerce under false pretenses.

- False Pretenses and Unlawful Detainment The stop itself was unconstitutional and illegal, making all evidence obtained fruit of the poisonous tree (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
- Kidnapping and Torture Under Color of Law The unlawful seizure and detainment constitute kidnapping, while any coercion, intimidation, or mistreatment while in custody constitutes torture under federal and international law.
- Criminal Extortion and Abuse of Process The use of fraudulent charges to compel compliance constitutes extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and fraud upon the court (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)).

Since these **affidavits** remain *unrebutted*, their contents must be accepted as **truth and judgment in commerce and law**. Any continued action in reliance on fraudulent claims is **malicious prosecution** and **subject to immediate legal consequences**.

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X. Final Declaration and Legal Consequences of Non-Response

Absent **verified and admissible proof** of all the claims and points of law outlined above — **within three (3) days** of receipt of this <u>Verified</u> Notice and Demand — **it shall stand as a matter of fact and law** that:

- 1. The purported Plaintiff is in **default and dishonor**;
- 2. The purported Plaintiff has **failed to rebut material facts** and lawful objections made herein;
- 3. The purported Plaintiff has admitted to <u>all</u> allegations by silence, acquiescence, and failure to provide proof of claim; and

dishonor

XI. DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS, AND **RESTITUTION**

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Given the fraudulent nature of this action, the following remedies are demanded:

- Immediate Dismissal With Prejudice These charges are void and unenforceable, and any continued prosecution constitutes malicious prosecution and judicial fraud.
- Sanctions Against Responsible Parties All individuals responsible for these fraudulent charges must face civil and criminal sanctions for their role in violating constitutional rights.
- **Restitution and Compensation for Damages -** Full financial restitution is demanded for damages suffered, including legal fees, emotional distress, injury and harm resulting from the fraudulent "charges," in the amount no less than One Hundred Million Dollars (\$100,000,000.00).
- Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs Reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees totaling the sum of One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000.00)
- Referral for Federal Investigation This matter must be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice and appropriate oversight agencies for violations of no less than 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242.

XII. 'SPECIAL DEPOSIT' and 'Full Faith and Credit': 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104

- This notarized and indorsed VERIFIED NOTICE AND DEMAND/NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT serves as a BOND, SPECIAL DEPOSIT, and/or MONETARY
- INSTRUMENT, as defined by 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104, and is further
- supplemented by the Defendant's 'full faith and credit' as stipulated by the
- Constitution. This BOND also satisfies the procedural and substantive requirements
- of Rule 67 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Exclusive equity supports this

1	claim, ensuring that no competing claims may infringe upon the Defendant's
2	established rights to this bond or any others, and said instruments shall be reported
3	on IRS Forms 1099-A, 1099-OID, and/or 1099-B, with Plaintiff(s) evidenced as the
4	CREDITOR(S)
5	XIII. <u>12 <i>U.S.C.</i> 1813(L)(1): The term 'Deposit' Defined</u>
6	As under 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1), ["]the term 'deposit' means— the unpaid balance of
7	money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings association in the
8	usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit,
9	either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or
10	thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate,
11	investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check
12	or draft drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings
13	association, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank or savings
14	association is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the generality of the
15	term "money or its equivalent", any such account or instrument must be regarded
16	as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or issued in
17	exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon which the person
18	obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a
19	charge against a deposit account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other
20	instruments forwarded to such bank or savings association for collection.["].
21	XIV. <u>A MOTION is a Request; A DEMAND Asserts a Right</u>
22	The Court must recognize and honor the critical legal distinction between a
23	motion and a demand:
24	1. A motion is a request made to the Court, subject to its discretion and judicial
25	interpretation.
- 1	

2. A **demand**, by contrast, is the **assertion of an established right** under statutory, constitutional, or equitable law – requiring the Court to **act in accordance with law**, not discretion.

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LEGAL NOTICE AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS XV. This notice is made with full reservation of rights under UCC 1-308, and any further attempts to pursue this fraudulent charge will result in legal action for 3 fraud, conspiracy, and deprivation of rightsWhereas a motion asks for permission, a demand invokes authority. The Court is not at liberty to ignore a demand grounded 5 in unalienable rights and lawfully established protections. **LIST OF EXHIBITS / EVIDENCE:** 8 1. Exhibit A: Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact' 2. E Exhibit B: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775820621US, titled: 10 NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, 11 CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, 12 IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON. 13 3. Exhibit C: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775821088US, titled: 14 NOTICE OF DEFAULT, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, 15 DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, 16 EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON 17 4. Exhibit D: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775822582US, titled: 18 NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE AND NOTICE OF 19 FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS 20 UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, 21 KIDNAPPING. 22 5. Exhibit E: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US, titled: Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and 24 LIEN AUTHORIZATION. 25 6. Exhibit F: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD, BREACH OF CONTRACT, 26 THEFT, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, 27 CONSPIRACY, RACKETEERING, KIDNAPPING, TORTURE, and SUMMARY 28

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- 1
- JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. Filed March 11, 2025.
- 2 | 7. Exhibit G: AFFIDAVIT RIGHT TO TRAVEL CANCELLATION, TERMINATION,
- 3 AND REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE
- 4 CONTRACT and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND # B6735991.
- 5 8.Exhibit H: Hold Harmless Agreement.
- 6 | 9. Exhibit I: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC1 filing #2024385925-4.
- 7 || 10.**Exhibit J:** ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER© Trademark and Copyright Agreement.
- 8 | 11.Exhibit K: AFFIDAVIT OF TAX-EXEMPT FOREIGN STATUS.
- 9 | 12. Exhibit L: AFFIDAVIT: Resolution, Revocation, and Termination of Franchise.
- 10 13. Exhibit M: Copy of Fraudulent NOTICE titled, 'MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT
 - & NOTICE TO APPEAR'. Dated 03/14/2025 and received 03/25/2025.

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WORDS DEFINED GLOSSARY OF TERMS:

- As used in this Affidavit, the following words and terms are as defined in this section, non-obstante:
- 1. Attorney-in-fact: A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of a legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a "letter of attorney," or more commonly a "power of attorney." A person to whom the authority of another, who is called the constituent, is by him lawfully delegated. The term is employed to designate persons who are under special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in *factum*, for the deed, or special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another. Bacon, Abr. Attorney; Story, Ag. § 25. All persons who are capable of acting for themselves, and even those who are disqualified from acting in their own capacity, if they have sufficient understanding, as infants of proper age, and femes coverts, may act as attorney of other. The person named in a power of attorney to act on your behalf is commonly referred to as your "agent" or "attorney-in-fact." With a valid power of attorney, your agent can take any action permitted in the document. See Bouvier's Law Dictionary, volumes 1,2, and 3, page 282, Blacks Law

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Dictionary 1, 2nd, 8th, pages 105, 103, and 392 respectively, and the American Bar Association's website on 'Power of Attorney' and 'Attorney-In-Fact'

- 2. Attorney: Strictly, one who is designated to transact business for another; a legal agent. — Also termed attorney-in-fact; private attorney. 2. A person who practices law; LAWYER. Also termed (in sense 2) attorney-at-law; public attorney. A person who is appointed by another and has authority to act on behalf of another. See also POWER OF ATTORNEY. See, Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition, pages 392-393, Oxford Dictionary or Law, 5th Edition, page 38, American Bar Association's website.
- 3. financial institution: a person, an individual, a private banker, a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales, persons involved in real estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal Service, a commercial bank or trust company, any credit union, an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this paragraph, a broker or dealer in securities or commodities, a currency exchange, or a business engaged in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency or funds, financial agency, a loan or finance company, an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or similar instruments, an operator of a credit card system, an insurance company, a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. Ref, 31 U.S. Code § 5312 - Definitions and application.
- 4. individual: As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. As an adjective: Existing as an indivisible entity. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as

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opposed to a group. - See Black's Law Dictionary 4th, 7th, and 8th Edition pages 913, 777, and 2263 respectively.

- person: Term may include artificial beings, as corporations. The term means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or The term "person" means a natural person or an organization. -Artificial persons. Such as are created and devised by law for the purposes of society and government, called "corporations" or bodies politic." -Natural persons. Such as are formed by nature, as distinguished from artificial persons, or corporations. -Private person. An individual who is not the incumbent of an office. Persons are divided by law into natural and artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws, for the purposes of society and government, which are called "corporations" or "bodies politic." - See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-201, Black's Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 4th edition pages 892, 895, and 1299, respectively, 27 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 72.11 - Meaning of terms, and 26 United States Code (U.S. Code) § 7701 - Definitions.
- bank: a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company. The terms "banks", "national bank", "national banking association", "member bank", "board", "district", and "reserve bank" shall have the meanings assigned to them in section 221 of this title. An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered to receive deposits of money, to make loans. and to issue its promissory notes, (designed to circulate as money, and commonly called "bank-notes" or "bank-bills") or to perform any one or more of these functions. The term "bank" is usually restricted in its application to an incorporated body; while a private individual making it his business to conduct banking operations is denominated a "banker." Banks in a commercial sense are of three kinds, to wit; (1) Of deposit; (2) of discount; (3) of circulation. Strictly speaking, the term "bank" implies a place for the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious

purpose of such an institution. — <u>See, UCC 1-201, 4-105, 12 U.S. Code § 221a, Black's Law</u> Dictionary 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th, pages 117-118, 116-117, 183-184, 139-140, and 437-439.

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- discharge: To cancel or unloose the obligation of a contract; to make an agreement or contract null and inoperative. Its principal species are rescission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance, judgement, composition, bankruptcy, merger. As applied to demands claims, right of action, incumbrances, etc., to discharge the debt or claim is to extinguish it, to annul its obligatory force, to satisfy it. And here also the term is generic; thus a dent, a mortgage. As a noun, the word means the act or instrument by which the binding force of a contract is terminated, irrespective of whether the contract is carried out to the full extent contemplated (in which case the discharge is the result of performance) or is broken off before complete execution. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, page.
- 8. **pay:** To *discharge* a debt; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, for his acceptance. To pay is to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or In goods, for his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 3rd edition, pages 880, 883, and 1339 respectively.
- 9. payment: The performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability. by the delivery of money or other value. Also the money or thing so delivered. Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the obligation. [Cases: Payment 1. C.J.S. Payment § 2.] 2. The money or other valuable thing so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st and 8th edition, pages 880-811 and 3576-3577, respectively.
- 10. **may:** An auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing ability, competency, liberty, permission, probability or contingency. Regardless of the instrument, however, whether constitution, statute, deed, contract or whatnot, **courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or "must".** See Black's :aw Dictionary, 4th Edition page 1131.
- 11. **extortion:** The term "**extortion**" means the obtaining of property from another, **with his consent**, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. See 18 U.S. Code § 1951 Interference with commerce by threats or violence.

1 12. national: "foreign government", "foreign official", "internationally protected person", "international organization", "national of the United States", "official guest," and/or "non-2 3 citizen national." They all have the same meaning. See Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 - Protection of 4 foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons. 5 United States: For the purposes of this Affidavit, the terms "United States" and "U.S." mean only the Federal Legislative Democracy of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, 6 7 Guam, American Samoa, and any other Territory within the "United States," which entity has 8 its origin and jurisdiction from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17-18 and Article IV, Section 3, 9 Clause 2 of the Constitution for the United States of America. The terms "United States" and 10 "U.S." are **NOT** to be construed to mean or include the sovereign, <u>u</u>nited 50 <u>s</u>tates of America. 11 14. fraud: deceitful practice or Willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his 12 right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always 13 positive, intentional. as applied to contracts is the cause of an error bearing on material part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to 14 15 the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other, in the sense of court of equity, 16 properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involved a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an 17 18 undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. See Black's Law Dictionary, 1st and 19 2nd Edition, pages 521-522 and 517 respectively. 20 15. color: appearance, semblance. or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A 21 prima facie or apparent right. Hence, a deceptive appearance; a plausible, assumed exterior, 22 concealing a lack of reality; a a disguise or pretext. See, Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, 23 page 222. 24 16. **colorable:** That which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be. See, 25 Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 2223 26 27

COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION: 1 County of Riverside 2 3 Commercial Oath and Verification The State of California 4 I, KEVIN WALKER, under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath proceeding 5 in good faith being of sound mind states that the facts contained herein are true, 7 correct, complete and not misleading to the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief 8 under penalty of International Commercial Law and state this to be HIS Affidavit of 9 Truth regarding same signed and sealed this 26TH day of MARCH in the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty five: 10 11 proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, by Special Limited Appearance, All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402. 12 13 Kevan Walker, Attorney-In-Fact, Secured Party, 14 Executor, national, private bank(er) EIN # 9x-xxxxxxx Let this document stand as truth before the Almighty Supreme Creator and let it be 15 established before men according as the scriptures saith: "But if they will not listen, take one 16 or two others along, so that every matter may be established by the testimony of two or three 17 witnesses." Matthew 18:16. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall every word be 18 established" 2 Corinthians 13:1. 19 sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance, 20 All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402. 21 22 onnabelle Mortel (WITNESS) 23 sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance, 24 All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402. 25 26 Grey Walker (WITNESS) 27 28

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SERVICE F 1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 3 SS. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 4 I competent, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within 5 action. My mailing address is the Walkernova Group, care of: 30650 Rancho 6 California Road suite 406-251, Temecula, California [92591]. On or before March 26, 2025, I served the within documents: 8 PURPORTED DEFENDANT'S <u>VERIFIED</u> NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, NOTICE OF 9 10 MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM, AND NOTICE OF JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE 11 UNDER COLOR OF LAW, AND DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS, RESTITUTION, AND 12 SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAVOR OF PURPORTED DEFENDANT. 13 Exhibits A through M. By United States Mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package 14 addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below by placing the envelope for 15 collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily 16 familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence 17 for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and 18 mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States 19 Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or 20 employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was 21 placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail 22 with a form 3811. 23 24 Wesley Hsu /o HONORABLE WESLEY HSU 25 350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor Los Angeles, California [90012] 26 Registered Mail #RF775824230US 27 Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas O Gruwell, 28 C/o MENIFÉE JÚSTICE CENTER 30755 Auld Road - D

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1	Murrieta, California [92563] Registered Mail #RF775824226US
2	Pam Bondi
3	C/o U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue
4	Washington, District of Colombia [20530-0001] Registered Mail #RF775824243US
5	Kash Patel
6	C/o FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West
7	Washington, District of Colombia [20535-0001] Registered Mail #RF775824257US
8	Michael Hestrin and Miranda Thomson C/o OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
9	3960 Orange Street Riverside, California [92501] Registered Mail #RF775824265US
10	Registered Mail #RF775824265US
11	Rob Bonta C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
12	1300 "I" Street Sacramento, California [95814-2919]
13	Registered Mail #RF775824274US
14	By Electronic Service. Based on a contract, and/or court order, and/or an
15	agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the
16	documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed
17	below.
18	Wesley Hsu
19	C/o HONORABLE WESLEY HSU 350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor
20	Los Angeles, California [90012] <u>WLH_Chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov</u>
21	Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William
22	Pratt, Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas O Gruwell, C/o MENIFEE JUSTICE CENTER 30755 Auld Road - D
23	Murrieta, California [92563]
24	ssherman@law4cops.com jsinz@riversidesheriff.org wpratt@riversidesheriff.org
25	Pam Bondi
26	C/o U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue
27	Washington, District of Colombia [20530-0001] crm.section@usdoj.gov
28	crimocenone abaoj.gov

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Registered Mail #RF775824226US — Dated: 03/26/2025

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Kash Patel C/o FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West Washington, District of Colombia [20535-0001] crm.section@usdoj.gov Rob Bonta C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1300 "I" Street Sacramento, California [95814-2919] police-Practices@doj.ca.gov Michael Hestrin and Miranda Thomson C/o OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 3960 Orange Street Riverside, California [92501] DAOffice@rivco.org
10	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
11	that the above is true and correct. Executed on March 26, 2025 in Riverside County,
12	California.
13	<u>/s/Donnabelle Mortel/</u> Donnabelle Mortel
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25	NOTICE:
26	Using a notary on this document does <i>not</i> constitute any adhesion, <i>nor does it alter</i>
27	my status in any manner. The purpose for notary is verification and identification
28	only and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.
	Page 31 of 32

1	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
2	State of California) A notary public or other officer completing this certificate
3	verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.
4	County of Riverside)
5	On this <u>26th</u> day of <u>March</u> , <u>2025</u> , before me, <u>Joyti Patel</u> , a Notary Public,
6	personally appeared Kevin Walker, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory
7	evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within
8	instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his,
9	her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the
10	instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,
11	executed the instrument.
12	I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California
13	that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.
14	WITNESS my hand and official seal. JOYTI PATEL
15	Notary Public - California Riverside County Commission # 2407742
16	My Comm. Expires Jul 8, 2026
17	Signature (Seal)
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