1	Kevin: Walker, sui juris, In Propria Persona			
2	C/o 30650 Rancho California Road #406-251			
3	Temecula, California [92591] non-domestic <i>without</i> the <u>U</u> nited <u>S</u> tates			
4	Email: team@walkernovagroup.com			
5	Attorney-In-Fact, Executor, and Authorized Representative,			
6	for Real Party(ies) in Interest and Purported Defendant **MKEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, **MKEVIN LEWIS WALKER©,			
7	TMKEVIN WALKER® ESTATE, TMREVIN LEVVIS WALKER®, TMKEVIN WALKER® IRR TRUST			
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
9	COUNTY OF			
10	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Case No.: MISW2501134		
	CALIFORNIA, [Purported] Plaintiff,	PURPORTED DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED		
11	- 1	NOTICE OF <i>CONDITIONAL</i> ACCEPTANCE, NOTICE OF		
12	TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER©,	MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM, AND		
13	[Purported]Defendant/Real Party In Interest.	NOTICE OF JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE UNDER		
14		COLOR OF LAW, AND DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS,		
15		RESTITUTION, AND SUMMARY		
16		JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAVOR OF <i>PURPORTED</i>		
17		DEFENDANT		
18				
19	PURPORTED DEFENDANT'S VER	IFIED NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL		
20	ACCEPTANCE, NOTICE OF MANDATO	RY COUNTERCLAIM, AND NOTICE OF		
21	JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE UNDER COLOR OF LAW,			
22	AND DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS, RESTITUTION, AND SUMMARY			
23	JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAVOR OF PURPORTED DEFENDANT			
24	COMES NOW, Purported Defendant ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©			
25	(hereinafter "Purported Defendant" and/or "Defendant" and/or "Real Party in			
26	Interest"), by and through Defendant's Attorney-in-Fact, Kevin: Walker, who is			
27	proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, and by Special Limited Appearance			
28	(NOT generally). Kevin is a natural, freeborn sovereign; one of the People invoking			
	-Page 1 of 31-			

- common law, exclusive equity, and fairness, and American national of the republic in its de jure capacity as one of the several states of the Union established in 1789. This incidentally makes him a non-citizen national of the republic as per 3 the De'Jure Constitution for the United States 1777/1789. Purported Defendant, acting through their Attorney-in-Fact, assert their 5 inherent unalienable right to contract, as secured by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which states: "No State shall... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," and thus which prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts. This clause unequivocally prohibits states from impairing the obligation of 10 contracts, including but not limited to, a trust and contract agreement as an 'Attorney-In-Fact,' and any private contract existing between Plaintiffs and 12 Defendants. A copy of the 'Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact,' is attached hereto 13 as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 14 Plaintiffs further rely on their inherent rights under the Constitution and the 15 common law - rights that predate the formation of the tatse and remain 16 safeguarded by due process of law. 17 'Attorney-in-Fact': Legal Authority and Recognition: I. 18 An attorney-in-fact is a private attorney authorized by another to act on their 19 behalf in specific matters, as granted by a power of attorney. This authority can be 20 limited to a specific act or extend to general business matters that are not of a 21 legal character. 22 According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary (1st, 2nd, and 8th 23 editions), and the American Bar Association (ABA): 24 An attorney-in-fact derives their authority from a written instrument, 25 commonly referred to as a "power of attorney." 26
 - A **constituent** may lawfully delegate authority to an **attorney-in-fact** to act in their place.

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This designation is distinct from an attorney-at-law, as it pertains to an individual acting under a special agency or letter of attorney for particular actions.

Even individuals who are otherwise disqualified from acting in their own legal capacity, such as minors or married women (historically referred to as femes coverts), may act as an attorney-in-fact for others if they have the necessary understanding.

Black's Law Dictionary defines an attorney-in-fact as follows:

"A person to whom the authority of another, who is called the constituent, is by him lawfully delegated. The term is employed to designate persons who are under special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in factum, for the deed, or special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense, it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another."

The American Bar Association (ABA) further affirms that the individual named in a power of attorney is legally referred to as an agent or attorney-in-fact and has the authority to take any action expressly permitted in the document. The American Bar Association (ABA) official website explicitly states:

"The person named in a power of attorney to act on your behalf is commonly referred to as your "agent" or "attorney-in-fact." With a valid power of attorney, your agent can take any action permitted in the document."

II. Statutory and U.C.C. Recognition of 'Attorney-in-Fact' Authority:

The authority of an attorney-in-fact is explicitly recognized in various statutory and commercial codes, reinforcing its binding nature:

- U.C.C. § 3-402: Establishes that an authorized representative, including an attorney-in-fact, can bind the principal in contractual and financial transactions.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1654: Confirms that "parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel", reinforcing the Plaintiffs' right to selfrepresentation and the use of an attorney-in-fact.

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- **26 U.S.C.** § **2203**: Recognizes executors, including attorneys-in-fact, in matters of estate administration and tax liability.
- 26 U.S.C. § 7603: Acknowledges that an attorney-in-fact may lawfully receive and respond to IRS summonses on behalf of the principal.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6903: Confirms that fiduciaries, including attorneys-in-fact, are recognized in tax matters and are legally bound to act in their principal's best interest.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6036: Establishes that attorneys-in-fact can handle affairs related to the administration of decedent estates and trust entities.
- 26 U.S.C. § 6402: Grants attorneys-in-fact the authority to receive and negotiate tax refunds and credits on behalf of the principal.

Defendant has clearly presented a valid "Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact" (Exhibit A), which lawfully confers upon them the authority to act in this matter. The legal principles established by the UCC and statutory law further reinforce the binding authority of Plaintiffs' affidavits and agreements. Defendants' assertion that a trust cannot be represented by an attorney-in-fact contradicts well-established statutory, commercial, and legal principles. By denying this legal reality, **Defendants engage in intentional misrepresentation**

Legal Basis for Proof of Delivery via Registered Mail III.

Under well-established legal precedent, documents sent via Registered Mail with return receipt requested (Form 3811) are presumed delivered upon mailing, providing strong evidentiary proof of service. Courts have consistently upheld this principle, reinforcing the Mailbox Rule, which states that a properly mailed document is presumed received by the addressee unless convincingly rebutted.

and mockery of long-standing legal doctrine, further demonstrating their lack of

Key Legal Precedents Supporting Proof of Delivery

credibility and bad faith in these proceedings

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it constitutes **prima facie evidence of delivery**, meaning the burden shifts to the

4 recipient to prove non-receipt.

- 2. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932) The Supreme Court ruled that mailing a document via Registered Mail creates a strong presumption of receipt by the intended party, further solidifying the evidentiary weight of proper mailing.
- 3. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) The Court established that a return receipt provides sufficient proof of service unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
- **4. Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 301** Under this rule, a presumption exists that a properly mailed document is **received by the intended recipient**, shifting the burden of proof to the recipient to disprove delivery.
- **5. 39 U.S.C. § 3009** Governs the legality and evidentiary weight of **Registered Mail**, affirming that mailing with proof of delivery (e.g., Form 3811) is **legally sufficient evidence of receipt**.
- 6. 26 U.S.C. § 7502 This statute explicitly states that the date of mailing is deemed the date of filing or receipt when Registered Mail is used, providing strong evidentiary support for the timely delivery and legal effect of mailed documents.

Application of the Mailbox Rule

- The Mailbox Rule dictates that once a document is properly addressed, stamped, and deposited with the postal service, it is presumed delivered and received by the addressee. Courts have repeatedly upheld this principle, ensuring that a party cannot simply deny receipt to evade legal responsibility. When Registered Mail with return receipt requested is used, the proof of mailing is further reinforced by
- 28 the signed receipt, making rebuttal even more difficult

Legal Presumption of Delivery and Evidentiary Weight Based on established case law and statutory authority, Registered Mail with return receipt requested (Form 3811) serves as prima facie evidence of delivery and 3 creates a strong presumption of receipt by the intended party. Under U.S. v. Bowen, Hagner v. United States, and NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, this 5 presumption stands unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, 26 U.S.C. § 7502 affirms that the date of mailing via Registered Mail is deemed the date of filing or receipt, solidifying its evidentiary value. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 301 shifts the burden to the recipient to prove non-receipt, while 39 U.S.C. § 3009 reinforces the legal sufficiency of proof of delivery through 10 postal records. 11 VII. FRAUDULENT NATURE OF ALL PURPORTED PLAINTIFF'S 12 **ACTIONS AND CLAIMS** 13 8. Purported Defendant asserts and affirms that the entirety of this action by the 14 purported Plaintiff is predicated entirely on fraudulent claims. 15 9. The Plaintiff, who purports to have authority and/or standing to bring this 16 action, is in fact a Defendant in a pre-existing claim and legal matter and 17 purported Plaintiff is in DEFAULT and DISHONOR, as evidenced by the 18 'Affidavit Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and 19 LIEN AUTHORIZATION' and LIEN AUTHORIZATION (see Exhibit E) and as 20 also evidenced by Federal Lawsuit Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA, filed 21 on March 11, 2025 (see Exhibit F). 22 IV. Plaintiff's Presumption of Dishonor under U.C.C. § 3-505 and **Evidence** Proving Plaintiff's Dishonor 24 1. The failure of Plaintiff and/or Does 1-100 inclusive to rebut or provide any valid 25 evidence of their performance is further confirmed by the, 'AFFIDAVIT 26 CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and

-Page 6 of 31-

LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (See

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Exhibit E), which is **duly notarized** and complies with the requirements of U.C.C. § 3-505.

Under U.C.C. § 3-505, a document regular in form, such as the notarized Affidavit Certificate serves as evidence of dishonor and creates a presumption of dishonor.

U.C.C. § 3-505. Evidence of Dishonor:

- (a) The following are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor stated:
- (1) A document regular in form as provided in subsection (b) which purports to be a protest;
- (2) A purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank, or presenting bank on or accompanying the instrument stating that acceptance or payment has been refused unless reasons for the refusal are stated and the reasons are not consistent with dishonor;
- (3) A book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or collecting bank, kept in the usual course of business which shows dishonor, even if there is no evidence of who made the entry.
- (b) A protest is a certificate of dishonor made by a United States consul or vice consul, or a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths by the law of the place where dishonor occurs. It may be made upon information satisfactory to that person. The protest must identify the instrument and certify either that presentment has been made or, if not made, the reason why it was not made, and that the instrument has been dishonored by nonacceptance or nonpayment. The protest may also certify that notice of dishonor has been given to some or all parties.
- The **notarized** 'AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of DISHONOR, NON-RESPONSE, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN AUTHORIZATION"/Self-Executing Contract Security Agreement (Exhibit H), complies with these requirements and

serves as a formal protest and **evidence of dishonor** under **U.C.C. § 3-505**, as it clearly documents Plaintiff's refusal to respond or provide the necessary rebuttal to Defendants' **verified** claims.

- 4. Plaintiff has <u>not</u> submitted any evidence to contradict or rebut the statements made in the **affidavits**. As a result, the facts set forth in the affidavits are deemed true and uncontested. *Additionally*, the **California Evidence Code § 664** and related case law support the *presumption* that official duties have been regularly performed, and *unrebutted* affidavits stand as **Truth**.
- 5. Plaintiff may <u>not</u> argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative findings established through the *unrebutted* affidavits. As per established legal principles, once an affidavit is submitted and not rebutted, its content is accepted as true, and Plaintiff and Does-100 inclusive is/are barred from contesting these findings in subsequent processes, whether administrative *or* judicial.
- X. <u>Constitutional and State Protections for Private Rights</u>
 The Purported Defendant asserts that their **private**, **secured rights** are protected by the **United States Constitution**, the **Bill of Rights**, the **common law**, and **exclusive equity jurisdiction**, which together govern the individual's ability to contract freely, maintain dominion over private property, and be free from arbitrary interference by the State or its agents.
- The following legal authorities support the Defendant's position:
 - "The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of

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himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." — Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 47 (1905)

- "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime."
 - Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d 486, 489
- "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
 - Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
- "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 945
- "A law repugnant to the Constitution is void."
 - Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
- "It is not the duty of the citizen to surrender his rights, liberties, and immunities under the guise of police power or any other governmental power."
 - Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)
- "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
 - Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)
- "No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to enforce it."
 - 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 177; Late Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 256
- "Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
 - Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)

VI. <u>Supremacy Clause:</u>

The Purported Defendant further affirms that the **Supremacy Clause** of the United States Constitution, **Article VI**, **Clause 2**, provides that:

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"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

As such, federal constitutional protections override any conflicting state laws, rules, or ordinances. State Courts, officers, and agents are bound to uphold the federal Constitution as the highest law of the land. This authority, however, is limited to acts made in pursuance of the Constitution – federal or state laws or actions outside of constitutional limits are null and void.

California State Constitution - Parallel Protections VII.

Under the California Constitution, Article I - Declaration of Rights, the Defendant's rights are similarly preserved:

- **Section 1**: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
- **Section 7**: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law..."
- **Section 13**: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated..."

These provisions reiterate that the Defendant's private rights are secured not only by the federal Constitution but also by the organic law of California, which exists in harmony with and subordinate to the supreme law of the United States.

VIII. **NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE**

This NOTICE OF **CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE** is issued in response to the fraudulent charges filed against the purported Defendant in the document received March 25, 2025, associated with OFFER/CONTRACT/CASE/trust action

- Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff of the existence of a valid corpus delicti, i.e., a demonstrable injury to person or property, committed by the purported Defendant, and a verified complaint from an actual injured party having firsthand knowledge, sworn under penalty of perjury.
- 2. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the government, agency, or officer can lawfully appear as an "injured party" in a private legal controversy, despite the long-settled principle that a fictitious entity or political subdivision cannot be a "party of interest" or suffer injury in fact without a living, natural man or woman asserting a <u>verified</u> claim.
- 3. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the stop was conducted *with* probable cause and NOT in violation of constitutional protections under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as evidenced by <u>Verified</u> Commercial Affidavit #RF775820621US, #RF775821088US, #RF775822582US, and #RF775823645US. Copy of said Verified Commercial Affidavits are attached as Exhibits B, C, D, and E respectively, and incorporated herein by reference.
- 4. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the "peace officer" had constitutional and **lawful** authority to demand a **driver's license**, despite the fact that the Purported Defendant was **NOT** engaged in **commercial activity** and was traveling in a **private automobile and transport clearly marked as such: "PRIVATE"**.
- 5. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the fabricated "charges" filed on **March 14, 2025** with a was **NOT** a **retaliatory action**, filed in

- 6. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the "charges" are **NOT** in violation of **18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242**, concerning conspiracy and deprivation of rights under color of law.
- 7. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the 'charges' and related enforcement actions are not a form of commercial fraud, securities fraud, or bank fraud in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 1344**, wherein negotiable instruments and personal identifying information are used without consent, disclosure, or lawful authority to generate revenue or initiate unauthorized financial transactions.
- 8. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the initiation, enforcement, and perpetuation of the fabricated 'charges' are not part of a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, involving mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, conspiracy, and the deprivation of rights under color of law.
- 9. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the 'charges' were not made or enforced under false pretenses, constructive fraud, or fraudulent inducement—wherein a legal obligation was presumed without full disclosure, valid contract, or lawful authority—contrary to established principles of equity, contract law, and the Constitution
- 10. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the enforcement of these 'charges' is not an act of extortion under **18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act)**,

particularly targeting a private, peaceful national under threat, duress, or coercion, and without jurisdictional or lawful authority to compel performance or payment.

- 11. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the fabricated 'charges' and all acts of enforcement thereunder do not violate **18 U.S.C. § 112**, which prohibits threats, coercion, intimidation, or obstruction against internationally protected persons or official guests, and further that the Defendant is not acting in a private foreign capacity with protected status under international law or treaty
- 12. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the use of mailing systems, citations, or instruments in the matter at hand does not constitute mail fraud in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 1341**, or the unlawful use of government channels to deliver unconscionable or fraudulent offers disguised as legal obligations.
- 13. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the instruments involved have not been converted, securitized, monetized, or used as collateral in a manner constituting securities fraud or unlawful conversion of bonded energy under **15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 77q,** or related statutory violations
- 14. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the use of the Defendant's legal name or identifying information does not amount to unlawful impersonation, identity theft, or misrepresentation under **18 U.S.C. § 1028**, and that no presumption of corporate personhood has been fraudulently assigned to a living man or woman without consent.
- 15. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that the alleged requirement to provide a "driver's license" **is applicable** to the Defendant even when no crime was being committed, **and the stop itself was lawful.**
- 16. **Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that** the CITATION/ INSTRUMENT/OFFER #TE464702 was accepted intentionally, *willfully*, and

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- and indorsed, and not done so under threat, duress, and/or coercion, and with full and complete disclosure, and lawful authority.
- 17. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the California Vehicle Code § 260 lawfully applies to private "automobiles" and explicitly requires their registration, notwithstanding the clear distinction made between **private** and *commercial* vehicles in the code itself.
- 18. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that anything allegedly obtained during the unconstitutional and unlawful stop was not the fruit of a poisonous tree, as admitted by the peace officer Gregory Eastwood in the unrbutted affidavits (See Exhibits B, C, D, and E).
- 19. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that Exhibits B, C, D, and E and do NOT serve as prima facie evidence of fraud, coercion, extortion, kidnapping, torture, identity theft, false pretenses, bank fraud, treason, and deprivation of rights under color of law by Purported Plaintiff and/or Gregory Eastwood and/or Robert Bowman and/or Nicholas Gruwell and/or Joseph Sinz and/or Chad Bianco.
- 20. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the 18 U.S. Code § 31(6) includes private "automobiles" within its definition of "motor vehicle," contrary to its express limitation to vehicles used for **commercial** purposes.
- 21. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that it is NOT a fundamental Right to travel, and it is factually and actually a privilege, and NOT a gift granted by the Supreme Creator and restated by our founding fathers as *Unalienable* and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made Law or color of law known as a private "Code" (secret) or a "Statute.
- 22. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff demonstrating the issuing authority's jurisdiction to impose statutory obligations upon private individuals utilizing <u>private</u> automobiles for personal purposes.
- 23. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the living man, natural freeborn sovereign, state Citizen: Californian, national/non-citizen

national, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, does <u>NOT</u> possess the *unalienable* inherent, unalienable **right** to travel in His private automobile/private transport, free of harassment, tresspass, restrictions, and/or encumbrances.

- 24. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, it is NOT well established law that the highways of the State are public property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." See, Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313.
- 25. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, a vehicle <u>NOT</u> used for **commercial** activity is **NOT** a "consumer good , and …it IS a type of vehicle **required** to be registered and "use tax" paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax. See, <u>Bank of Boston vs Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14</u>.
- 26. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, the entirety of this transaction does not constitute a "commercial" matter under applicable law.
- 27. **Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff** that, 'the claim and exercise of a constitutional **right CAN** be converted into a crime.' See, <u>Miller v. U.S., 230</u> <u>F 2d 486, 489.</u>
- 28. **Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff** that, One does **NOT** have constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his property." See, <u>Simpson v. Los Angeles (1935), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474</u>.

29. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that private men and

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women are required to give up their right to "travel," for the purported "benefit" and privilege of "driving" a "motor vehicle." 30. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that 28 U.S. Code §

- 3002(15) Definitions does NOT stipulate, "United States" means (A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or **(C)** an instrumentality of the United States.
- 31. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, 8 U.S. Code 1101(a)(22) - Definition, does NOT expressly stipulates, " (22)The term "national of the United States" means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
- 32. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, the individual may **NOT** stand upon his **constitutional rights** as a citizen. He is NOT entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is NOT unlimited. He owes such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to the State, and upon proof that his rights are NOT such as existed by the law of the land [Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the State, and CAN be taken from him without due process of law, or in accordance with the Constitution. NOT among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law, and upon proof that he owes the public even though does not trespass upon their rights. See, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 <u>(1905).</u>
- 33. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that, all laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are NOT null and void. See, Chief Justice Marshall, Marbury vs Madison, 5, U.S. (Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803).

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34.	34. Upon evidence and proof from the purported Plaintiff that the for Hire"		
	DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT and AGREEMENT BOND #B6735991 was		
	NOT CANCELED, TERMINATED, REVOKED, and LIQUIDATED, ACCEPTED		
	FOR VALUE AND EXEMPT FROM LEVY, FOR RELEASE, CREDIT, AND		
	DEPOSIT TO PRIVATE POST REGISTERED, with the U.S. Treasury, with the		
	retaining full control and access to all respective right, interest, titles, and		
	credits, as evidenced by the contract security agreement and affidavit titled,		
	'AFFIDAVIT RIGHT TO TRAVEL CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND		
	REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE		
	CONTRACT and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND # B6735991. A true and		
	correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit G and incorporated herein by reference.		

- 35. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that it was NOT noted in Land v. Dollar, 338 US 731 (1947), "that when the government entered into a commercial field of activity, it left immunity behind." This principle is further affirmed in Brady v. Roosevelt, 317 U.S. 575 (1943); FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); and Kiefer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
- 36. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that it was NOT established under the Clearfield Doctrine, as articulated in Clearfield Trust Co. v. *United States*, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), that when the government engages in commercial or proprietary activities, it sheds its sovereignty and is subject to the same rules and liabilities as any **private** corporation.
- 37. Upon evidence and proof from purported Plaintiff that these matters have not already been settled under res judicata, stare decisis, and collateral estoppel, as evidenced by Exhibits B, C, D, and E.

EVIDENCE OF FRAUD, EXTORTION, AND CONSPIRACY TO IX. **DEPRIVE RIGHTS**

These fraudulent 'charges' are further evidenced as act of judicial fraud, extortion, coercion, and conspiracy to deprive under color of law, as evidenced in the four

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(4) Unrebutted Affidavits and Contract and Security Agreements (Exhibits B, C, D, and E) that have been lawfully executed and remain unrebutted. These affidavits serve as **prima facie evidence** of:

- Fraudulent and Retaliatory Prosecution The charge was filed immediately after Federal Lawsuit Case #5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA (Exhibit F), evidencing intent to intimidate, retaliate, and coerce under false pretenses.
- False Pretenses and Unlawful Detainment The stop itself was unconstitutional and illegal, making all evidence obtained fruit of the poisonous tree (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
- Kidnapping and Torture Under Color of Law The unlawful seizure and detainment constitute kidnapping, while any coercion, intimidation, or mistreatment while in custody constitutes torture under federal and international law.
- Criminal Extortion and Abuse of Process The use of fraudulent charges to compel compliance constitutes extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and fraud upon the court (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)).

Since these **affidavits** remain *unrebutted*, their contents must be accepted as truth and judgment in commerce and law. Any continued action in reliance on fraudulent claims is malicious prosecution and subject to immediate legal consequences.

- Final Declaration and Legal Consequences of Non-Response
- Absent verified and admissible proof of all the claims and points of law outlined above - within three (3) days of receipt of this Verified Notice and Demand - it
- shall stand as a matter of fact and law that:
 - The purported Plaintiff is in **default and dishonor**; 1.
 - The purported Plaintiff has failed to rebut material facts and lawful objections made herein;

conspiracy and open all parties involved to personal liability, both civil

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and criminal.

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Let the record reflect: Silence is acquiescence. Silence is agreement. Silence is dishonor

XI. <u>DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS, AND</u> <u>RESTITUTION</u>

Given the fraudulent nature of this action, the following remedies are demanded:

- Immediate Dismissal With Prejudice These charges are void and unenforceable, and any continued prosecution constitutes malicious prosecution and judicial fraud.
- Sanctions Against Responsible Parties All individuals responsible for these fraudulent charges must face civil and criminal sanctions for their role in violating constitutional rights.
- **Restitution and Compensation for Damages** Full financial restitution is demanded for **damages suffered**, including legal fees, **emotional distress**, injury and harm resulting from the fraudulent "charges," in the amount **no less than** One Hundred Million Dollars (\$100,000,000.00).
- Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs Reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees totaling the sum of One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000.00)
- Referral for Federal Investigation This matter must be referred to the U.S.
 Department of Justice and appropriate oversight agencies for violations of no less than 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242.

XII. 'SPECIAL DEPOSIT' and 'Full Faith and Credit': 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104

- 25 | This notarized and indorsed VERIFIED NOTICE AND DEMAND/NEGOTIABLE
- 26 INSTRUMENT serves as a BOND, SPECIAL DEPOSIT, and/or MONETARY
- 27 INSTRUMENT, as defined by 31 U.S. Code § 5312 and U.C.C. § 3-104, and is further
- 28 supplemented by the Defendant's 'full faith and credit' as stipulated by the

Constitution. This BOND also satisfies the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 67 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Exclusive equity supports this claim, ensuring that no competing claims may infringe upon the Defendant's 3 established rights to this bond or any others, and said instruments shall be reported on IRS Forms 1099-A, 1099-OID, and/or 1099-B, with Plaintiff(s) evidenced as the 5 CREDITOR(S).. 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1): The term 'Deposit' Defined XIII. As under 12 U.S.C. 1813(L)(1), ["]the term 'deposit' means— the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable: Provided, 17 That, without limiting the generality of the term "money or its 18 equivalent", any such account or instrument must be regarded as 19 evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon 21 which the person obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a charge against a deposit account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments forwarded to such bank or savings association for collection.["]. 25 A MOTION is a Request; A DEMAND Asserts a Right XIV. 26 The Court must recognize and honor the critical legal distinction between a 27 motion and a demand: 28

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- 1. A **motion** is a **request** made to the Court, subject to its discretion and judicial interpretation.
- 2. A demand, by contrast, is the assertion of an established right under statutory, constitutional, or equitable law – requiring the Court to act in accordance with law, not discretion.

LEGAL NOTICE AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS XV.

This notice is made with full reservation of rights under UCC 1-308, and any further attempts to pursue this fraudulent charge will result in legal action for fraud, conspiracy, and deprivation of rightsWhereas a motion asks for permission, a demand invokes authority. The Court is not at liberty to ignore a demand grounded in unalienable rights and lawfully established protections.

LIST OF EXHIBITS / EVIDENCE:

- 1. Exhibit A: Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact'
- 2. E **Exhibit B**: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775820621US, titled:

NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING,

CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW,

IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON.

- 3. Exhibit C: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775821088US, titled:
 - NOTICE OF DEFAULT, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY,
 - DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT,
 - EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON
- 4. Exhibit D: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775822582US, titled:
- NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE AND NOTICE OF
- FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
- UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION,
 - 5. Exhibit E: Affidavit and Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US, titled:

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-Page 23 of 31-

constituent, is by him lawfully delegated. The term is employed to designate persons who are under

special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in factum, for the deed, or

special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense it includes all other agents employed in any

business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another. Bacon, Abr. Attorney; Story, Ag. § 25. All persons

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- 2. Attorney: Strictly, one who is designated to transact business for another; a legal agent. Also termed attorney-in-fact; private attorney. 2. A person who practices law; LAWYER. Also termed (in sense 2) attorney-at-law; public attorney. A person who is appointed by another and has authority to act on behalf of another. See also POWER OF ATTORNEY. See, Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition, pages 392-393, Oxford Dictionary or Law, 5th Edition, page 38, American Bar Association's website.
 - financial institution: a person, an individual, a private banker, a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales, persons involved in real estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal Service, a commercial bank or trust company, any credit union, an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this paragraph, a broker or dealer in securities or commodities, a currency exchange, or a business engaged in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency or funds, financial agency, a loan or finance company, an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or similar instruments, an operator of a credit card system, an insurance company, a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. Ref. 31 U.S. Code § 5312 Definitions and application.
- 4. **individual:** As a noun, this term denotes a single **person** as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it **may**, in proper cases,

include **artificial persons**. As an adjective: Existing as an indivisible entity. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.— See Black's Law Dictionary 4th, 7th, and 8th Edition pages 913, 777, and 2263

3 respectively.

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- 6. bank: a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company. The terms "banks", "national bank", "national banking association", "member bank", "board", "district", and "reserve bank" shall have the meanings assigned to them in section 221 of this title. An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered to receive deposits of money, to make loans. and to issue its promissory notes, (designed to circulate as money, and commonly called "bank-notes" or "bank-bills") or to perform any one or more of these functions. The term "bank" is usually restricted in its application to an incorporated body; while a private individual making it his business to conduct banking operations is denominated a "banker." Banks in a commercial sense are of three kinds, to wit; (1) Of deposit; (2) of discount; (3) of circulation. Strictly speaking, the term "bank" implies a place for the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an institution. See, UCC 1-201, 4-105, 12 U.S. Code § 221a, Black's Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th, pages 117-118, 116-117, 183-184, 139-140, and 437-439.
- 7. **discharge:**_To cancel or unloose the obligation of a contract; to make an agreement or contract null and inoperative. Its principal species are rescission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance, judgement, composition, bankruptcy, merger. As applied to demands claims, right of action, incumbrances, etc., to discharge the debt or claim is to extinguish it, to annul its obligatory force, to satisfy it. And here also the term is generic; thus a dent, a mortgage. As a noun, the word means the act or instrument by which the binding force of a contract is terminated, irrespective of whether the contract is carried out to the full extent contemplated (in which case the discharge is the result of performance) or is broken off before complete execution. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, page.
- 8. **pay:** To *discharge* a debt; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, for his acceptance. To pay is to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money

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- or In goods, for his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 3rd edition, pages 880, 883, and 1339 respectively.
- payment: The performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability. by the delivery of money or other value. Also the money or thing so delivered. Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the obligation. [Cases: Payment 1. C.J.S. Payment § 2.] 2. The money or other valuable thing so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st and 8th edition, pages 880-811 and 3576-3577, respectively.
- 10. may: An auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing ability, competency, liberty, permission, probability or contingency. - Regardless of the instrument, however, whether constitution, statute, deed, contract or whatnot, courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or "must". – See Black's :aw Dictionary, 4th Edition page 1131.
- extortion: The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. - See 18 U.S. Code § 1951 - Interference with commerce by threats or violence.
- 12. national: "foreign government", "foreign official", "internationally protected person", "international organization", "national of the United States", "official guest," and/or "noncitizen national." They all have the same meaning. See Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 - Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons.
- 13. **United States:** For the purposes of this Affidavit, the terms "United States" and "U.S." mean only the Federal Legislative Democracy of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other Territory within the "United States," which entity has its origin and jurisdiction from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17-18 and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution for the United States of America. The terms "United States" and "U.S." are **NOT** to be construed to mean or include the sovereign, <u>u</u>nited 50 <u>s</u>tates of America.
- 14. fraud: deceitful practice or Willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional. as applied to contracts is the cause of an error bearing on material part of

the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other. in the sense of court of equity, properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involved a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. See Black's Law Dictionary, 1st and 2nd Edition, pages 521-522 and 517 respectively.

- 15. color: appearance, semblance. or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence, a deceptive appearance; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality; a a disguise or pretext. See, Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 222.
- 16. **colorable:** That which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be. <u>See, Black's Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 2223</u>

COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION:

	,	
)	Commercial Oath and Verification
The State of California)	
I, KEVIN WALKER, under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath pa		

I, <u>KEVIN WALKER</u>, under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath proceeding in good faith being of sound mind states that the facts contained herein are true, correct, complete and not misleading to the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief under penalty of International Commercial Law and state this to be HIS Affidavit of Truth regarding same signed and sealed this <u>26TH</u> day of <u>MARCH</u> in the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty five:

proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, by Special Limited Appearance, All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.

By: Ten Call

Kevin Walker, Altorney-In-Fact, Secured Party, Executor, national, private bank(er) EIN # 9x-xxxxxxx

Let this document stand as truth before the Almighty Supreme Creator and let it be established before men according as the scriptures saith: "But if they will not listen, take one

1	or two others along, so that every matter may be established by the testimony of two or three	
2	witnesses." Matthew 18:16. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall every word be	
3	established" 2 Corinthians 13:1.	
4	sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance, All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.	
5	An rights reserved without prejudice of recourse, occ § 1-500, 5-402.	
6	By:	
7	Donnabelle Mortel (WITNESS)	
8	sui juris, By Special Limited Appearance,	
9	All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.	
10	By: Comy Dagfol Wagh	
11	Corey Walker (WITNESS)	
12	PROOF OF SERVICE	
13	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)	
14) ss.	
15	COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)	
16	I competent, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within	
17	action. My mailing address is the Walkernova Group, care of: 30650 Rancho	
18	C 116 - D - 1 - 11 - 406 051 Townson la California [00501] On Mount 21 0005 I	
19	served the within documents:	
20	1. PURPORTED DEFENDANT'S <u>VERIFIED</u> NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, NOTICE OF	
21	MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM, AND NOTICE OF JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE	
22	UNDER COLOR OF LAW, AND DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS, RESTITUTION, AND	
23	SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAVOR OF PURPORTED DEFENDANT	
24	2. Exhibits A through M.	
25	By United States Mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package	
26	addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below by placing the envelope for	
27	collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily	
28	familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence	
	-Page 28 of 31-	

for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States 3 Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was 4 placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail 5 with a form 3811. 6 Wesley Hsu C/o HONORABLE WESLEY HSU 8 350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor Los Angeles, California [90012] 9 Registered Mail #RF775824230US 10 Clerk of Court C/o CLERK OF COURT / MENIFEE JUSTICE CENTER 30755 Auld Road - D 11 Murrieta, California [92563] Registered Mail #RF775824380US 12 13 Pam Bondi C/o U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue 14 Washington, District of Colombia [20530-0001] Registered Mail #RF775824393US 15 16 Kash Patel C/o FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West 17 Washington, District of Colombia [20535-0001] 18 Registered Mail #RF775824257US 19 Michael Hestrin and Miranda Thomson C/o OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 3960 Orange Street Riverside, California [92501] 20 Registered Mail #RF775824402US 21 Rob Bonta 22 C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1300 "I" Street 23 Sacramento, California [95814-2919] Registered Mail #RF775824274US 24 25 **By Electronic Service.** Based on a contract, and/or court order, and/or an 26 agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the 27 documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed

-Page 29 of 31-

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below.

Į.			
1	Wesley Hsu C/o HONORABLE WESLEY HSU		
2 3	350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor Los Angeles, California [90012] <u>WLH_Chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov</u>		
4	Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William		
5	Pratt, Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas O Gruwell, C/o MENIFEE JUSTICE CENTER		
6	30755 Auld Road - D Murrieta, California [92563]		
7	ssherman@law4cops.com jsinz@riversidesheriff.org		
8	wpratt@riversidesheriff.org		
9	Pam Bondi C/o U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE		
0	950 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, District of Colombia [20530-0001]		
11	crm.section@usdoj.gov		
12	Kash Patel C/o FBI Headquarters		
13	935 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West Washington, District of Colombia [20535-0001]		
14	<u>crm.section@usdoj.gov</u>		
15	Rob Bonta C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL		
16	1300 "I" Street Sacramento, California [95814-2919]		
17	<u>police-Practices@doj.ca.gov</u> Michael Hestrin and Miranda Thomson		
18	C/o OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY		
19	3960 Orange Street Riverside, California [92501] DAOffice@rivco.org		
20	Ditolice Silveo.org		
21	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California		
22	that the above is true and correct. Executed on March 31, 2025 in Riverside County		
23	California/s/Donnabelle Mortel/		
24	Donnabelle Mortel		
25	NOTICE:		
26	Using a notary on this document does <i>not</i> constitute any adhesion, <i>nor does it alter</i>		
27	<i>my status in any manner.</i> The purpose for notary is verification and identification		
28	only and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.		
	-Page 30 of 31-		

Trust action/Case No.: MISW2501134 — Registered Mail #RF775824380US — Dated: 03/26/2025

1	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:		
2	State of California)	A notary public or other officer completing this certificate	
3) ss.	verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.	
4	County of Riverside)		
5	On this <u>26th</u> day of <u>March</u> , <u>2025</u> , before	me, <u>Joyti Patel</u> , a Notary Public,	
6	personally appeared <u>Kevin Walker</u> , who	proved to me on the basis of satisfactory	
7	evidence to be the person(s) whose nam	e(s) is/are subscribed to the within	
8	instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his,		
9	her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the		
10	instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,		
11	executed the instrument.		
12	I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California		
13	that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.		
14	WITNESS my hand and official seal.	JOYTI PATEL	
15		Notary Public - California Riverside County Commission # 2407742	
16		My Comm. Expires Jul 8, 2026	
17	Signature Jyyyater	_ (Seal)	
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-Page 31 of 31-