

Kevin: Realworldfare (*formerly Kevin: Walker*)

Care of: 2082 Highway 183, suite 170-229

Leander, Texas

non-domestic without the United States

Email: team@walkernovagroup.com

*Plaintiff, Real Party In Interest, Secured Party,
Injured Party*

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

Kevin: Realworldfare,

Plaintiff,

vs.

**Naji Doumit, MARINAJ PROPERTIES LLC,
Daniel Doumit, Mary Mare Doumit, John L.
Bailey, Therese Bailey, Barry Lee O'Connor,
FOCUS ESTATES INC, THE BAILEY
LEGAL GROUP, BARRY LEE O'CONNOR
& ASSOCIATES, DOES 1-10, inclusive,**
Defendants.

Case No. 5:25-cv-01357-__ - __

**VERIFIED NOTICE OF APPEAL OF
FRAUDULENT, VOID *AB INITIO* SO-
CALLED "ORDER" OF DISMISSAL
(DKT. 99)**

(SPECIAL LIMITED APPEARANCE — IN
EQUITY ONLY — EQUITY JURISDICTION
PRESERVED)

TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, AND TO ALL PARTIES OF RECORD:

This matter is brought in **equity**, under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of this Court as authorized by **Article III, Section 2** of the Constitution of the
United States. All statutory jurisdiction is expressly denied and rebutted. This
is a Court of Record. All rights are reserved without prejudice pursuant to UCC
1-308.

COMES NOW **Kevin: Realworldfare**, a natural, living man on the **land and
soil** of the ***De'Jure* Texas Republic**, **one of the people** of the united states of
America, and the **Real Party in Interest, Secured and Injured Party** in
this matter. Kevin proceeds *sui juris*, by ***specially limited appearing only*** in
proper private capacity, **not** as a 14th Amendment U.S. citizen, **not** as a

1 corporate “person,” **not** pro se, **not** pro per, **not** as a “resident,” and **not**
2 through any fictitious legal construct — but as **one of the people**, the
3 **Plaintiff, *Real Party in Interest*, Secured Party, and Creditor**, standing on
4 the land and soil jurisdiction of the **De Jure Republic**, without adhesion,
5 contract, or submission to any foreign corporate entity posing as government.
6 **Real Party In Interest** invokes invokers this Court’s **original jurisdiction**
7 in **equity**, as vested under Article III of the Constitution for the United States
8 of America and demand adjudication according to the **facts, truth, and**
9 **applicable law.**

10 **I. VERIFIED NOTICE OF APPEAL**

11 NOTICE is hereby given that **Kevin: Realworldfare, proceeding sui juris,**
12 **by *special limited appearance* only, as Movant in Equity and Real**
13 **Party in Interest**, appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
14 Circuit from the **fraudulent, treasonous, and void *ab initio*** so-called
15 **“Order” entered on August 26, 2025 (Dkt. 99) by Sunshine Suzanne**
16 **Sykes — a permanently disqualified impostor masquerading as a judge**
17 **— who, in open defiance of black-letter law, verified evidence, and**
18 **unrebutted filings, and in criminal contempt of Article III, falsely**
19 **purported to adjudicate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 27) and dismiss**
20 **this action.**

21 This was not “judicial error.” It was **criminal impersonation of judicial**
22 **authority**, a willful assault on Plaintiff/Real Party in Interest’s **due process,**
23 **unalienable rights, and constitutional access to remedy.**

24 The law is absolute and has been ignored with **reckless impunity**, in direct
25 violation of Plaintiff/Real Party in Interest’s **verified filings, verified sworn**
26 **affidavits, and *unrebutted* evidentiary record:**

- 27 • **Disqualification:** Once disqualification is invoked by verified affidavit,
28 the judge “shall proceed no further.” *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864,

- 867 (9th Cir. 1980); *Studley v. United States*, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff filed verified affidavits of bias and disqualification (Dkts. 72–74), which triggered mandatory removal. Sykes’ persistence in acting thereafter was not judicial error but open impersonation of authority.
- **Void Acts:** Any order entered after disqualification is void ab initio. *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871) (a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction “acts in the face of the law, and is liable as any other individual”). Sykes’ rulings on dispositive motions (including striking verified motions for summary judgment, Dkt. 93) were nullities that never had lawful existence.
 - **Appellate Divestiture:** Once an appeal or mandamus is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction; subsequent orders are “a nullity.” *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff filed multiple verified notices and appeals (including Ninth Circuit Case Nos. 25-4549, 25-4877, 25-5113), which stripped the district court of jurisdiction before Dkt. 99 was entered.
 - **Absolute Nullities:** Orders without jurisdiction are “absolute nullities, open to collateral attack.” *Ex parte Lange*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874); *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1920). By law, Dkt. 99 cannot bind, confer rights, or impose obligations; it is void for all purposes.
 - **Verified and Unrebutted Record:** Every filing made by Plaintiff was verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and supported by sworn affidavits. Defendants never rebutted the record point-for-point. Unrebutted affidavits stand as truth and judgment. *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981); *Thompson v. Commissioner*, 631 F.2d 642, 649

(9th Cir. 1980). By black-letter law, the facts were fixed and summary judgment was mandated.

- **Fraud on the Court:** Fraud upon the court “strikes at the very integrity of the judicial process” and “cannot be tolerated.” *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). Sykes’ suppression of verified affidavits, her striking of un rebutted dispositive motions, and her issuance of Dkt. 99 **after** verified disqualification and divestiture are not “mistakes” — they are fraud, obstruction, and treason against Article III. Worse still, Dkt. 99 was entered as a “**text-only**” **docket entry** — unsigned, unsealed, and devoid of any lawful indicia of adjudication — a naked simulation of judicial process under color of law, deliberately concealing the absence of lawful authority.

Maxims of Law apply with full force:

- *Fraud vitiates everything it touches.*
- *That which is void produces no effect.*
- *No one can confer jurisdiction where none exists.*
- *He who fails to rebut admits.*

Accordingly, **Dkt. 99 is not law, not adjudication, and not entitled to respect. It is fraud on the court, obstruction of justice, and treason against Article III, void for all purposes and incapable of creating rights, obligations, or consequences.**

II. GROUNDS OF NOTICE

1. Fraudulent Adjudication by a Disqualified Judge

Sunshine Suzanne Sykes was **permanently disqualified** under **28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455** by verified affidavit of bias (Dkts. 72–74). The law is not discretionary — it is mandatory: once disqualification is invoked, the judge is stripped of all judicial power and “**shall proceed no**

1 **further.”** *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980);
2 *Studley v. United States*, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986). Every act
3 thereafter is **void ab initio**.

4 Despite this, Sykes continued to masquerade as a judge not only here, but
5 in **multiple related proceedings** where she had already been
6 disqualified:

- 7 • *Marinaj Properties LLC v. Kevin Walker, et al.*, Case No. **5:25-cv-01450**
8 (removed unlawful detainer).
- 9 • *WG Private Irrevocable Trust et al. v. Marinaj Properties LLC, et al.*, Case
10 No. **5:25-cv-01434** (removed quiet title).
- 11 • *WG Private Irrevocable Trust et al. v. Marinaj Properties LLC, et al.*, Case
12 No. **5:25-cv-01900** (re-removed related quiet title).

13 In each case, verified affidavits of bias were filed, permanently stripping her of
14 authority. Yet she unlawfully **ruled on her own recusal**, in direct defiance of
15 statute, precedent, and the maxim: “**Nemo judex in causa sua**” — **no one**
16 **may be judge in her own cause**.

17 After being disqualified in these proceedings, this case was then “**randomly**
18 **assigned**” **back to Sykes** — **a statistical impossibility and an obvious**
19 **fraud**. Having already been stripped of power, her very presence on this docket
20 is proof of **systemic manipulation of case assignment to force**
21 **adjudication by a disqualified impostor**. This is not judicial procedure but
22 **rigged tribunal fraud** under color of law.

23 The controlling authorities leave no doubt:

- 24 • *Ex parte Lange*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874) — “When a court has
25 no jurisdiction, its judgments and orders are void, and open to collateral
26 attack.”
- 27 • *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1920) —
28 Acts without jurisdiction are “absolute nullities.”

- 1 • *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) —
2 Fraud upon the court “strikes at the very integrity of the judicial process”
3 and “cannot be tolerated.”
- 4 • *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) — Courts have
5 inherent authority to vacate judgments obtained by fraud upon the
6 court.
- 7 • *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980) — Once an
8 affidavit of bias is filed, the judge “shall proceed no further.”
- 9 • *Studley v. United States*, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986) — A
10 disqualified judge may take no further action.

11 Thus, Sykes’ issuance of **Dkt. 99** was not adjudication but **fraud**,
12 **impersonation of judicial office, and a simulated legal process** entered
13 by a judge already disqualified in three other related cases. Her continued
14 intrusion, after “random reassignment,” is irrefutable proof of **judicial fraud**,
15 **case-rigging, and treason against Article III.**

16 Accordingly, **Dkt. 99 is a nullity.** Every act taken by Sykes post-
17 disqualification — in **Cases 5:25-cv-01450, 5:25-cv-01434, 5:25-cv-01900, and**
18 **here** — is fraudulent, ultra vires, and incapable of legal force. To recognize
19 them as lawful would be to **ratify systemic fraud upon the court and make**
20 **this Court complicit in treason.**

21 **2. Summary Judgment in Equity Was Demanded**

22 Before Dkt. 99, Plaintiff filed multiple **Verified Motions and Demands**
23 **for Summary Judgment in Equity** and dispositive demands —
24 including Dkt. 25 (*Verified Motion for Summary Judgment in Equity*),
25 Dkt. 58 (*Demand for Clerk’s Entry of Default and Final Judgment*), and
26 Dkt. 59 (*Demand to Enforce Summary Judgment in Equity*). Each was
27 **verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, supported by sworn affidavits, and**
28 **unrebutted.**

Equity required immediate judgment. “Summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Where no genuine dispute exists, “judgment as a matter of law” is not optional but mandatory. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970).

Defendants never rebutted Plaintiff’s sworn affidavits point-for-point. By binding precedent and equity, unrebutted affidavits stand as conclusive truth:

- *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981) — “Unrebutted allegations in affidavits must be taken as true.”
- *Thompson v. Commissioner*, 631 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 1980) — unrebutted sworn statements are deemed admitted.
- *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) — a nonmovant cannot defeat summary judgment without specific, material rebuttal.
- *Eberle v. City of Anaheim*, 901 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1990) — the court must accept uncontroverted evidence as true.
- *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) — once properly supported, a motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by silence or conclusory allegations.

Legal Maxims Confirming the Rule:

- “*What is not denied is admitted.*”
- “*Unrebutted affidavits stand as truth in commerce.*”
- “*Equity regards that as done which ought to be done.*”
- “*He who does not deny, admits.*”

This left nothing to adjudicate but the ministerial act of entering judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.

1 Instead, Sykes fraudulently **struck and ignored** these dispositive filings,
2 culminating in Dkt. 93, where she unlawfully struck Plaintiff's verified motions for
3 summary judgment and default. This was not judicial "error" — it was **obstruction**
4 **of justice and fraud upon the court**. As the Supreme Court declared: "Fraud
5 upon the court... strikes at the very integrity of the judicial process... and cannot be
6 tolerated." *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
7 By law, fact and judgment were already fixed. In equity, the court was bound to enter
8 final decree for Plaintiff. By refusing, Sykes did not act as a judge — she impersonated
9 judicial authority, obstructed justice, and ratified fraud under color of law.

10 **3. Verified and Unrebutted Filings.**

11 Every filing submitted by Movant was verified under **28 U.S.C. § 1746**,
12 supported by sworn affidavits and commercial defaults. Defendants never
13 rebutted these affidavits point-for-point. By law, **unrebutted verified**
14 **affidavits stand as truth and judgment**:

- 15 • *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981): "Unrebutted
16 allegations in affidavits must be taken as true."
- 17 • *Munn v. Illinois*, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876): Facts not denied are "taken as
18 admitted."
- 19 • *Thompson v. Washington*, 497 F.2d 626, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1973): "Allegations
20 not traversed are admitted."
- 21 • *Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank*, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th
22 Cir. 1975): A default admits well-pleaded allegations.
- 23 • *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944):
24 Fraud upon the court "strikes at the integrity of the process" and cannot
25 be ignored.

26 The equity maxim applies with full force: **"He who does not deny, admits"**
27 **(Qui non negat, fatetur)**. Another controlling maxim: **"What is not rebutted**
28 **is deemed true."** Silence in the face of a verified affidavit is acquiescence.

Thus, every verified affidavit and filing of Movant — **unrebutted, sworn, and served** — stands as established fact and judgment in equity. Under *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986), summary judgment is mandatory where no genuine dispute exists. Nothing remained to adjudicate but the ministerial act of entering final judgment in Movant’s favor.

Any refusal to do so is not adjudication but **theft of judgment, obstruction of justice, and fraud upon the court**

4. Parallel Proceedings and Pattern of Fraud.

The fraudulent dismissal here is part of a **documented pattern of obstruction** across parallel proceedings:

- *Marinaj Properties LLC vs KEVIN WALKER, et al*, Case No. **5:25-cv-01450** (removed unlawful detainer).
- *WG Private Irrevocable Trust et al. v. Marinaj Properties LLC, et al.*, Case No. **5:25-cv-01434** (removed quiet title).
- *WG Private Irrevocable Trust et al. v. Marinaj Properties LLC, et al.*, Case No. **5:25-cv-01900** (re-removed related removed quiet title).

In each, **verified filings, UCC perfected interests, and sworn affidavits were unrebutted yet unlawfully ignored or obstructed**, proving a systemic pattern of fraud, collusion, and denial of Article III rights.

5. Jurisdictional Usurpation Post-Divestiture.

At the time of **Dkt. 99**, jurisdiction had already **transferred exclusively to the Ninth Circuit** by virtue of pending appellate proceedings in **Case Nos. 25-4549, 25-4877, and 25-5113**. The law is absolute: once a notice of appeal or mandamus is filed, the district court is **divested of jurisdiction**.

- **U.S. Supreme Court Authority**
 - *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)
— “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional

significance — it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”

- *Ex parte Lange*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874) — “When a court has no jurisdiction, its judgments and orders are void, and open to collateral attack.”
- *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1920) — Acts without jurisdiction are “absolute nullities.”

- **Ninth Circuit Authority**

- *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) — “Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters being appealed.”
- *McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley Typographical Union*, 686 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982) — Filing a notice of appeal “ousts the district court of jurisdiction.”
- *Ruby v. Secretary of U.S. Navy*, 365 F.2d 385, 388–89 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc) — “Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals and the district court has no power to modify its judgment.”

Orders entered without jurisdiction are not orders at all; they are **void ab initio** — nullities, incapable of legal effect. Accordingly, **Dkt. 99 is a legal nullity**. By issuing it after both disqualification and appellate divestiture, Sunshine Suzanne Sykes acted not as a judge but as an **impostor under color of law, usurping authority she did not possess**. No court of record can legitimize such a fraud without itself ratifying treason against Article III.

6. Obstruction and Treasonous Fraud

Dkt. 99 was not adjudication — it was a deliberate maneuver to erase the unrebuted record of fraud, verified affidavits, and perfected summary

1 judgment, while concealing judicial misconduct and obstructing justice. It is the
2 very definition of **fraud upon the court**: conduct that “strikes at the very
3 integrity of the judicial process” and “cannot be tolerated.” *Hazel-Atlas Glass*
4 *Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).

5 Every act undertaken by Sunshine Suzanne Sykes after disqualification
6 under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 and after appellate divestiture was not judicial
7 error but **impersonation of judicial authority**. The Ninth Circuit has
8 made the law absolute: once disqualification or appeal is invoked, the judge
9 “shall proceed no further.” *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir.
10 1980); *Studley v. United States*, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986); *Natural*
11 *Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1163, 1166
12 (9th Cir. 2001).

13 Orders issued without jurisdiction are not “errors” to be corrected on appeal but
14 **nullities incapable of legal effect**. *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount*
15 *Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); *Ex parte Lange*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874)
16 (“void and open to collateral attack”); *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*,
17 254 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1920) (“absolute nullities”). By definition, Dkt. 99 never
18 had lawful existence.

19 What Sykes attempted was not adjudication but **treason against Article III**
20 **itself**. A judge who acts without jurisdiction is “without lawful authority, and
21 her acts are void.” *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351–52 (1871).

22 Fraudulently usurping jurisdiction is not judicial conduct but **criminal**
23 **usurpation of office under color of law**.

24 **Legal Maxims Apply With Full Force:**

- 25 • “*Fraud vitiates everything it touches.*”
- 26 • “*What is void does not produce effect.*”
- 27 • “*The law does not compel impossibilities — an impostor cannot create*
28 *lawful judgments.*”

1 Accordingly, Dkt. 99 is not merely voidable — it is void ab initio, ultra vires,
2 and a **criminal act of obstruction and treasonous fraud**. To recognize it as
3 anything else would require this Court to ratify open impersonation of judicial
4 office and treason against the People’s constitutional right to remedy.

5 **7. Fraudulent ‘text only’ so-called dismissal entry**

6 The so-called “dismissal” of this action (Dkt. 99) is not a judicial order at all but
7 a **fraudulent text-only docket entry** — unsigned, unsealed, and devoid of
8 any lawful indicia of adjudication. By its very form, it fails the threshold
9 requirements of due process, record integrity, and Article III adjudication.
10 A court of record speaks only through its written orders, properly signed and
11 entered upon the record. A “text-only” entry without a written order is a **legal**
12 **nullity**, incapable of conferring or extinguishing rights. Maxims of law apply
13 with full force: *That which is not reduced to record is not law*.

14 This fraudulent device compounds the underlying jurisdictional defects:

- 15 **1. Disqualified Judge** – Sunshine Suzanne Sykes was permanently
16 disqualified by verified affidavit (Dkts. 72–74). Under *United States v.*
17 *Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980), and *Studley v. United States*, 783
18 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986), she was forbidden to “proceed any further.”
19 Any act thereafter is void ab initio.
- 20 **2. Appellate Divestiture** – At the time of Dkt. 99, jurisdiction had already
21 transferred exclusively to the Ninth Circuit in Case Nos. 25-4549,
22 25-4877, and 25-5113. Once an appeal is filed, the district court is
23 divested of jurisdiction; subsequent orders are “a nullity.” *Griggs v.*
24 *Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); *NRDC v.*
25 *Southwest Marine, Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001).
- 26 **3. Fraud Upon the Court** – To disguise this fraud in a “text-only” entry
27 rather than a signed order demonstrates knowing concealment of ultra
28 vires acts. Fraud upon the court “strikes at the very integrity of the

judicial process and cannot be tolerated.” *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).

Accordingly, Dkt. 99 is not adjudication, not law, and not entitled to respect. It is **fraudulent simulation of judicial process** under color of office, void for all purposes, and further proof that this matter lies exclusively within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court — and, if unremedied, within the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under Article III.

III. NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL

This Notice is grounded not merely in equitable maxim but in controlling doctrine. Under the **doctrine of imputed notice**, knowledge or notice given to an agent is legally imputed to the principal. *See, e.g., United States v. Leahy*, 464 F.3d 773, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The general rule is that notice to an agent is notice to the principal.”). This doctrine applies with equal force in judicial, corporate, and governmental contexts.

Accordingly, every act undertaken by Sunshine Suzanne Sykes while disqualified and divested of jurisdiction does not end with her personal liability, but binds her **principals and the entire chain of authority she purports to represent**, including:

1. **The Central District of California**, as the forum whose seal and caption she has usurped;
2. **The Judicial Council of California**, charged with the administration and discipline of judicial officers;
3. **The State of California**, the corporate fiction under which she purports to act;
4. **The People of the State of California**, whose sovereign name has been misappropriated to sustain void and fraudulent orders.

The United States Supreme Court has long held that **judges acting without jurisdiction are stripped of judicial immunity and act as mere**

1 **usurpers**. *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871). Orders so
2 entered are not judicial orders at all; they are **private nullities** incapable of
3 legal effect.

4 By operation of the **doctrine of imputed notice**, all knowledge of Sykes' fraud,
5 misconduct, and disqualification is imputed to her principals, and by extension, to
6 the **People of the State of California**. Fraudulent orders issued in their name are
7 frauds **upon the People themselves**, who cannot lawfully be bound by such acts.

8 **Maxims of Law Apply:**

- 9 • *"Notice to the agent is notice to the principal; notice to the principal is*
10 *notice to the agent."*
- 11 • *"Fraud vitiates everything."* (*United States v. Throckmorton*, 98 U.S. 61,
12 65–66 (1878)).
- 13 • *"That which is void produces no effect."*
- 14 • *"Silence in the face of duty to speak is fraud."*

15 Thus, the fraudulent acts of Sunshine Suzanne Sykes are imputed upward and
16 outward — to the Central District of California, the Judicial Council, the State
17 of California, and ultimately to the **People of the State of California**. Failure
18 by any principal to repudiate or correct such fraud is ratification of it, binding
19 them to the dishonor and making them complicit in treason against Article III
20 and the Constitution itself.

21 **IV. PURPOSE OF THIS NOTICE**

22 This Verified Notice of Appeal is filed solely to preserve appellate jurisdiction
23 and prevent any contrived claim of procedural waiver. It is not a concession that
24 Dkt. 99 is a lawful order — to the contrary, it is a legal **nullity, void *ab initio***,
25 and incapable of creating, altering, or extinguishing rights. *Ex parte Lange*, 85
26 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874) (orders issued without jurisdiction are "void and
27 open to collateral attack"); *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S.
28 348, 353–54 (1920) ("absolute nullities").

Movant in Equity expressly reserves the right to affirm that Dkt. 99 is not adjudication but further proof of:

1. **Fraud upon the court** (*Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) — “fraud ... strikes at the very integrity of the judicial process”).
2. **Obstruction of justice** under color of law, where the judicial office was weaponized to erase unrebutted affidavits, perfected summary judgment, and dispositive filings.
3. **Criminal impersonation of judicial authority**, as Sunshine Suzanne Sykes had already been permanently disqualified under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 and divested of jurisdiction by pending appeals. *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980) (disqualified judge “shall proceed no further”); *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (appeal “divests the district court of jurisdiction”).

This appeal is noticed not as recognition of lawful adjudication, but as evidence that **exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Ninth Circuit**, and ultimately, where the fraud proves systemic and uncorrected, with the United States Supreme Court under **Article III and Supreme Court Rule 20**.

Maxims of Law Apply With Full Force:

- “*Fraud vitiates everything it touches.*”
- “*What is void does not produce effect.*”
- “*A disqualified judge acts not as a judge, but as a usurper of office.*”

Accordingly, this Notice of Appeal stands as a safeguard of remedy, an assertion of jurisdictional truth, and a record of criminal obstruction masquerading as adjudication.

V. CONCLUSION AND INVOCATION OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The record leaves no room for doubt. Dkt. 99 is not adjudication but a **fraudulent, void ab initio act** by a permanently disqualified impostor

1 masquerading as a judge. Once disqualification was invoked (Dkts. 72–74),
2 Sunshine Suzanne Sykes was stripped of all judicial power and, by law, could
3 “proceed no further.” *United States v. Sibla*, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980);
4 *Studley v. United States*, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986). Once appeals and
5 mandamus were filed, the district court was divested of jurisdiction; any order
6 thereafter is a nullity. *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56,
7 58 (1982); *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.*, 242
8 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). Orders without jurisdiction are “absolute
9 nullities, open to collateral attack.” *Ex parte Lange*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176
10 (1874); *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1920).
11 Fraud upon the court “strikes at the very integrity of the judicial process” and
12 “cannot be tolerated.” *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S.
13 238, 246 (1944). Maxims of Law apply with full force: *Fraud vitiates everything.*
14 *That which is void produces no effect. No one can confer jurisdiction where none*
15 *exists.*

16 Accordingly, jurisdiction now lies **exclusively with the United States Court**
17 **of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.** This Notice of Appeal is entered not as
18 recognition of lawful adjudication, but as preservation of jurisdiction,
19 prevention of procedural waiver, and a demand that the Ninth Circuit strike,
20 vacate, and sanction the treasonous fraud embodied in Dkt. 99.

21 If this Court fails to remedy, then by operation of law **the State of California**
22 **becomes a party to the fraud**, making this matter one of **original**
23 **jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under Article III, § 2,**
24 **cl. 2**, where the Supreme Court has exclusive cognizance “in **all** Cases... in
25 which a **State** shall be Party.” Thus, failure to act not only ratifies fraud but
26 escalates the controversy directly into the Supreme Court’s mandatory
27 constitutional jurisdiction.

28 //

VERIFICATION:

Pursuant to **28 U.S.C. § 1746**

I, Kevin: Realworldfare, over the age of 18, competent to testify, and having **firsthand knowledge** of the facts stated herein, do hereby **declare, certify, verify, affirm, and state** under penalty of perjury under the laws of the **United States of America and the State of California**, that the foregoing statements are **true, correct, and complete**, to the best of my **understanding, knowledge, and belief**, and made in **good faith**.
Executed, signed, and sealed this 26th day of August in the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty five, *without* the United States, **with all rights reserved and without recourse and without prejudice**.

All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.

By: Kevin: Realworldfare

Kevin: Realworldfare, *Real Party In Interest,*
Plaintiff, Secured Party, Injured Party, Movant in Equity

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF TEXAS)

1. VERIFIED NOTICE OF APPEAL OF FRAUDULENT, VOID *AB INITIO* SO-CALLED
"ORDER" OF DISMISSAL (DKT. 99)

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/s/Chris Yarbra/
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