

From/Plaintiff: Kevin: Walker, *sui juris, In Propria Persona.*
Executor, Authorized Representative, Secured Party.

™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©
c/o 30650 Rancho California Road Suite #406-251
Temecula, California [92591]
non-domestic *without* the United States
Email: team@walkernovagroup.com

*** NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL ***
*** NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT ***

*** SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT ***

To/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s): Gregory D Eastwood,
Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes.
C/o SOUTHWEST JUSTICE CENTER
30755-D Auld Road
Murrieta, California [92563]
Registered Mail # RF775820621US
Email: info@riversidesheriff.org / ssherman@law4cops.com

To/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s): Chad Bianco.
C/o RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF
4095 Lemon Street, 2nd floor
Riverside, California [92501]
Registered Mail # RF775821613US
Email: info@riversidesheriff.org / ssherman@law4cops.com

AFFIDAVIT and Plain Statement of Facts

NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON.

Kevin: Walker, ™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST,

Claimant(s)Plaintiff(s),

vs.

Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT, GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100 Inclusive,* Defendant(s)/Respondent(s).

CITATION/BOND NO.: TE464702

1. FRAUD
2. RACKETEERING
3. EMBEZZLEMENT
4. IDENTITY THEFT
5. CONSPIRACY
6. DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW
7. RECEIVING EXTORTION PROCEEDS
8. FALSE PRETENSES
9. EXTORTION
10. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT
11. TORTURE
12. FORCED PEONAGE
13. MONOPOLIZATION OF TRADE AND COMMERCE
14. BANK FRAUD
15. TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, MONEY, & SECURITIES
16. CONSIDERED AND STIPULATED ONE TRILLION DOLLAR (\$1,000,000,000.00) JUDGEMENT AND LIEN.

COMES NOW ™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST, by and through their *Attorney-In-Fact,* **Kevin: Walker,** who is proceeding *sui juris, In Propria Persona,* and by

1 *Special Limited Appearance*, hereby acknowledges receipt of your **OFFER/**
2 **BOND/CITATION #TE464702**, dated **December 31, 2024, at 9:32 a.m.**

3 (attached hereto as **Exhibit F**). Kevin is a living man, a natural freeborn
4 Sovereign, **state Citizen: Californian**, and national, invoking His inherent
5 constitutionally secured and protected rights and exercising the authority
6 granted by the executed '**Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact**', attached
7 hereto as **Exhibit A** and incorporated herein by reference.

8 The Plaintiffs, acting through their *Attorney-in-Fact*, proceed in accordance
9 with their *unalienable* right to contract, as secured and protected by the
10 **Constitution of the United States of America**, and in particular **Article I,**
11 **Section 10**, which states: "**No State shall... pass any Law impairing the**
12 **Obligation of Contracts.**"

13 This communication serves as a formal **NOTICE OF CONDITIONAL**
14 **ACCEPTANCE** of the aforementioned coerced and extorted contract OFFER,
15 contingent **upon proof** of the conditions set forth below, governed by the
16 principles of contract law, legal maxims, common law, and the **Uniform**
17 **Commercial Code (UCC)**, including but not limited to **UCC §§ 1-103, 2-202,**
18 **2-204, 2-206**, and the **mailbox/postal rule**.

19 The undersigned, **Kevin: Walker**, herein referred to as Affiant. Affiant is
20 the Agent, Attorney-In-Fact, **holder in due course**, and **Secured Party** and
21 Creditor of and for **™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS**
22 **WALKER©, ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST**. Affiant hereby states that he
23 is of legal age and competent to state on belief and first hand personal
24 knowledge that the facts set forth herein as duly noted below are true, correct,
25 complete, and presented in **good faith**, regarding the **coerced and extorted**
26 commercial contract **OFFER/CONTRACT/TICKET/BOND #TE464702**,
27 listed under **™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©**, pertaining to the private trust
28 property and private automobile hereafter referred to as "Private Property".

**** Notice of Administrative Process ****

This **VERIFIED** Affidavit, NOTICE, and SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT SECURITY AGREEMENT concerns Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)/You, Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT, GEORGE REYES, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100 Inclusive*, and their **blatant bad faith** acts of **fraud, racketeering, conspiracy, threats and extortion against foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons, extortion, embezzlement, larceny, coercion, identity theft, extortion of national/internationally protected person, conspiracy to deprive of rights under the color of law, treason, bank fraud, trusts, etc., in restraint of trade, frauds and swindles, mail fraud, forced peonage, monopolization of trade and commerce, willful violation of the Constitution, deprivation of rights under color of law, monopolization of trade and commerce, and intentional and willful and intentional trespass and infringement** of the TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER© trademark, trade name, patent and copyright.

As with any administrative process, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s), Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT, GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100 Inclusive* may controvert the statements and/or claims made by Affiants by executing and delivering a verified response point by point, in affidavit form, **sworn and attested to under penalty of perjury**, signed by Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT, GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100* or other designated officer of the corporation with evidence in support by Certified, Express, or Registered Mail. **Answers by any other means are considered**

1 a non-response and will be treated as a non-response.

2 ***** SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT*** :**

3 Again for the record, this **contract, received and accepted per the mailbox**
4 **rule, is self-executing and serves as a SECURITY AGREEMENT, and establishes**
5 **a lien, Authorized by You/They/the DEBTOR(S). Acceptance of this contract is**
6 **deemed to occur at the moment it is dispatched via mail, in accordance with the**
7 **mailbox rule established in common law. Under this rule, an acceptance becomes**
8 **effective and binding** once it is properly addressed, stamped, and placed in the
9 control of the postal service, as supported by **Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 ER 250.**
10 **Furthermore, as a self-executing agreement, this contract creates immediate and**
11 **enforceable obligations** without the need for further action, functioning also as a
12 **SECURITY AGREEMENT under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).**

13 ***** SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT*** :**

14 **Contract Agreement Terms of Conditional Acceptance:**
15 **Plain Statement of Facts**

16 KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT, that I, **Kevin: Walker**, proceeding
17 **sui juris, In Propria Persona**, by **Special Limited Appearance**, a man upon the land,
18 a follower of the Almighty Supreme Creator, first and foremost and the laws of man
19 when they are not in conflict (Leviticus 18:3, 4) Pursuant to Matthew 5:33 - 37 and
20 James 5:12, let my yea mean yea and my nay be nay, as supported by Federal Public
21 Law 97-280, 96 Stat.1211, depose and say that I, **Kevin: Walker** over 18 years of age,
22 being competent to testify and having **first hand knowledge** of the facts herein
23 **declare (or certify, verify, affirm, or state)** under penalty of perjury under the laws
24 of the **United States of America** that the following is true and correct, to the best of
25 my understanding and belief, and in good faith:

26 I. I, **Kevin: Walker**, proceeding **sui juris, In Propria Persona**, by **Special Limited**
27 **Appearance**, hereby state again for the record that I explicitly **reserve all my**
28 **rights and waive absolutely none.** See U.C.C. § 1-308.

1 II. I, Kevin: Walker, *proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona*, by *Special*
2 *Limited Appearance*, hereby invoke *equity and fairness*.

3 III. As a a natural freeborn **Sovereign**, state **Citizen: Californian**, and
4 **national**, there is no legal *requirement* for me to have such a “license” for
5 **traveling** in my **private** car and/or means of transport. The unrevealed
6 legal purpose of driver's licenses is commercial in nature. Since I **do not**
7 carry passengers ‘for hire,’ and I **am not** engaged in trade or commerce on
8 the highways, **there is no law ‘requiring’** me to have a license to **travel** for
9 my own **private** pleasure and that of my family and friends.

10 IV. I, Kevin: Walker, *proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona*, by *Special*
11 *Limited Appearance*, hereby **declare, state, verify, and affirm** for the record
12 that the ‘commercial’ and ‘for hire’ Driver’s License/Contract/Bond #
13 **B6735991** has been canceled, revoked, terminated, and liquidated, as
14 evidenced by instructions and notice accepted by **Steven Gordon**, with the
15 California Department of Motor Vehicles,” as **evidenced** by Affidavit of
16 TruthRegistered Mail #**RF661447751US**.

17 V. Consistent with the **eternal tradition of natural common law**, unless I
18 **have harmed or violated someone or their property, I have committed no**
19 **crime; and I am therefore not subject to any penalty**. I act in accordance
20 with the following **U.S. Supreme Court case**: "The individual may stand
21 upon his **constitutional rights** as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his
22 **private** business in his own way. **His power to contract is unlimited**. He
23 owes no such duty [to submit his books and papers for an examination] to
24 the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his
25 life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land
26 [Common Law] **long antecedent to the organization of the State**, and can
27 only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
28 Constitution. Among his **rights** are a **refusal to incriminate himself**, and

1 **the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except**
2 **under a warrant of the law.** He owes nothing to the public so long as he
3 does not trespass upon their rights." **Hale v. Henkel**, 201 U.S. 43 at 47
4 (1905).

5 VI. I reserve my natural **common law right** not to be compelled to perform under
6 any **contract** that I did not enter into knowingly, voluntarily, and
7 **intentionally**. And furthermore, I do **not** accept the liability associated with the
8 compelled and pretended "benefit" of any hidden or unrevealed contract or
9 commercial agreement. As such, the hidden or unrevealed contracts that
10 supposedly create obligations to perform, for persons of subject status, are
11 inapplicable to me, and are null and void. If I have participated in any of the
12 supposed "benefits" associated with these hidden contracts, I have done so under
13 duress, for lack of any other practical alternative. I may have received such
14 "benefits" but I have not accepted them in a manner that binds me to anything.

15 VII. **Affiant states and alleges that this Affidavit Notice and Self-Executing**
16 **Contract and Security Agreement is *prima facie* evidence of fraud,**
17 **racketeering, indentity theft, treason, breach of trust and fiduciary duties,**
18 **extortion, coercion, deprivation of rights under the color of law, conspiracy to**
19 **deprive of rights under the color of law, monopolization of trade and commerce,**
20 **forced peonage, obstruction of enforcement, extortion of a national/**
21 **internationally protected person, false imprisonment, torture, creating trusts in**
22 **restraint of trade dereliction of fiduciary duties, bank fraud, breach of trust,**
23 **treason, tax evasion, bad faith actions, dishonor, injury and damage to Affiant**
24 **and proof of claim. See *United States v. Kis*, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981),,**
25 **"Appellee had the burden of first proving its prima facie case and could do so**
26 **by affidavit or other evidence."**

27 **UNLAWFUL DETAINMENT AND ARREST while**
28 **Traveling in *Private* Automobile**

1 VIII. On **December 31, 2024**, at approximately 9:32am I, **Kevin: Walker, sui**
2 **juris**, was **traveling privately** in my **private** automobile, displaying a
3 'PRIVATE' plate, indicating I was 'not for hire' or operating commercially,
4 and the private automobile was not displaying a STATE plate of any sort .
5 This clearly established that the **private** automobile was '**not for hire**' or
6 '**commercial**' use and, therefore explicitly classifying the automobile as
7 **private property**, and **NOT** *within* any statutory and/or commercial
8 jurisdiction. See Exhibit G.

9 IX. Upon being unlawfully stopped and detained by Defendant/Respondents,
10 Gregory D Eastwood and Robert C V Bowman, I, Affiant, informed **all**
11 **Defendants** who willfully **conspired** on the scene in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
12 and 242, that I was a state Citizen, non-citizen national/**national, privately**
13 **traveling** in My **private** automobile, as articulated by Me and as evidenced by
14 the 'PRIVATE' plate on the private automobile. **This includes William Pratt**
15 **and George Reyes.**

16 X. The **private** automobile and **trust property** was **not** in **any** way displaying
17 STATE or government registration or stickers, and was displaying a
18 PRIVATE plate, removing the automobile from the Defendant's
19 jurisdiction. See Exhibit G.

20 XI. The **private** automobile is duly reflected on Private UCC Contract Trust/
21 UCC1 filing #**2024385925-4**, and **UCC3 filing #2024402990-2**, both filings
22 attached hereto as **Exhibits B and C** respectively, and incorporated herein
23 by reference

24 XII. Under **threat, duress, and coercion, and at gunpoint**, Gregory D
25 Eastwood and Robert C V Bowman were presented with a national/non-
26 citizen national, #**C35510079** and passport book #**A39235161**. Copy
27 attached hereto as **Exhibits N and O** respectively, and incorporated herein
28 by reference.

1 XIII. Defendant/Respondents, acted against the Constitution, even when
2 reminded of their duties to support and uphold the Constitution.

3 XIV. At no point in time were Defendants/Respondents presented with a
4 CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S LICENSE (COMMERCIAL CONTRACT), and any
5 information added to the CITATION/CONTRACT was done so in fraud,
6 without consent, full disclosure, and thus is *void ab initio*.

7 XV. I, Kevin: Walker, *sui juris*, should never have been stopped exercising my
8 right to travel, in a private automobile that was clearly marked "PRIVATE"
9 and "not for hire" and "not for commercial use."

10 **FRAUDULENT ALTERATION OF SIGNATURE,**
11 **COERCION, ASSAULT, DISPARAGEMENT,**

12 XVI. During release procedures, Defendant Robert Gell threatened to "house" Kevin:
13 Walker if Kevin did not sign every document presented, exactly as he (Robert
14 Gell) waned Kevin to. Camera records will evidence Robert telling to return to the
15 release tank for no apparent reason, and then **assaulting, shoving, and pushing**
16 Kevin into the tank at the end of the walk.

17 XVII. Defendant Robert Gell went as far as aggressively rushing around a desk and
18 assaulting Kevin, and snatching a pen from Kevin's hand, because Kevin
19 attempted to write 'under duress' by his signature.

20 XVIII. Defendant Robert Gell willfully and intentionally altered Affiant's signature
21 on one document and crossed out 'UCC 1-308,' immediately after Affiant hand
22 wrote it on the document.

23 XIX. Robert Gell stated he had no idea what an attorney-in-fact is and that Kevin:
24 Walker was a, ["jackass"].

25 **FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE**

26 XX. Affiant further asserts and establishes on the record that the undisputedly
27 unlawful and unconstitutional stop, arrest, and subsequent actions of the
28 Defendants/Respondents are in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the

1 Constitution of the united States of America and constitute an unlawful
2 arrest and seizure. The "**fruit of the poisonous tree**" doctrine, as articulated
3 by the U.S. Supreme Court, establishes that any evidence obtained as a
4 result of an unlawful stop or detainment is tainted and inadmissible in any
5 subsequent proceedings. The unlawful actions of Gregory D. Eastwood,
6 Robert C. V. Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, and Robert Gell
7 including *but not limited to* the issuance of fraudulent citations/contracts
8 under threat, duress, and coercion, render all actions and evidence derived
9 therefrom void ab initio. See *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

10 XXI. Affiant therefore declares and demands that all actions and evidence
11 obtained in connection with this unlawful stop be deemed inadmissible and
12 void as fruits of the poisonous tree.

13 **CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED upon proof**

14 XXII. All statements, claims, offer, terms presented in your **coerced and extorted**
15 OFFER (#TE464702) are **CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED upon proof** of the
16 following **from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)**:

- 17 1. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)** CITATION/
18 INSTRUMENT/OFFER #TE464702 was accepted intentionally, willfully, and
19 and indorsed, and not done so under threat, duress, and/or coercion, and
20 with full and complete disclosure (Exhibit F).
- 21 2. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that California Vehicle**
22 **Code § 260** applies to private "automobiles" and explicitly requires their
23 registration, notwithstanding the clear distinction made between private and
24 commercial vehicles in the code itself.
- 25 3. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that 18 U.S. Code**
26 **§ 31(6)** includes private "automobiles" within its definition of "motor
27 vehicle," contrary to its express limitation to vehicles used for
28 commercial purposes.

- 1 **4. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)** that the cited
2 private “automobiles” (“Private Property”) was required to be
3 registered despite displaying a **private plate** identifying it as a **private**
4 **transport** and not for commercial use, as evidenced by the photograph
5 of the private decal and PLATE displayed on the private “automobile.”
6 A picture of the private PLATE attached hereto as **Exhibit G** and
7 incorporated herein by reference.
- 8 **5. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)** that it is NOT a
9 fundamental **Right** to travel, and it is **factually** and actually a privilege, and
10 NOT a gift granted by the Supreme Creator and restated by our founding
11 fathers as *Unalienable* and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made
12 Law or color of law known as a private “Code” (secret) or a “Statute.”
- 13 **6. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) of Jurisdiction and**
14 **Authority:**
 - 15 • Provide evidence demonstrating the issuing authority’s jurisdiction to
16 impose statutory obligations upon private individuals utilizing private
17 *automobiles* for personal purposes.
- 18 **7. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) of Lawful**
19 **Consideration:**
 - 20 • Provide evidence that the coerced and extorted CITATION constitutes
21 a *valid* contract supported by **lawful consideration**, which was
22 entered into **knowingly, willfully, free of coercion, threat,**
23 **intimidation, or other felonious and bad faith actions, with full and**
24 **complete disclosure. Without mutual consent and valuable**
25 **consideration, no valid contract can exist under common law or UCC**
26 **principles.**
- 27 **8. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)** that the living
28 man, natural born Sovereign, state Citizen: Californian, national/non-

- 1 citizen national, **Kevin Walker**, *sui juris*, *In Propria Persona*, does
2 **NOT** possess the *unalienable* inherent, unalienable **right** to travel in
3 His private automobile/private transport, free of harassment, trespass,
4 restrictions, and/or encumbrances.
- 5 9. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that it is NOT**
6 **well established law that the highways of the State are public**
7 **property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes,**
8 and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary
9 which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it
10 sees fit." See, [Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton,](#)
11 [264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad](#)
12 [Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission vs. Inter-City](#)
13 [Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines,](#)
14 [164 A. 313.](#)
- 15 10. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that a vehicle**
16 **NOT** used for **commercial** activity is **NOT** a "consumer good , and ...it
17 IS a type of vehicle **required** to be registered and "use tax" paid of
18 which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax. See, [Bank of Boston vs](#)
19 [Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14.](#)
- 20 11. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that the entirety**
21 of this transaction does not constitute a "**commercial**" matter under
22 applicable law.
- 23 12. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that, 'the claim**
24 and exercise of a constitutional **right** CAN be converted into a crime.'
25 See, [Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.](#)
- 26 13. **Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that, the owner DOES**
27 **NOT** have constitutional **right** to use and enjoyment of his property." See,
28 [Simpson v. Los Angeles \(1935\), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474.](#)

- 1 **14. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that [private men and](#)**
2 **[women](#) are required to give up their [right](#) to “travel,” for the purported**
3 **“benefit” and privilege of “driving” a “motor vehicle.”**
- 4 **15. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that [28 U.S. Code §](#)**
5 **[3002\(15\) - Definitions](#) does **NOT** stipulate, “United States” means – (A) a**
6 **[Federal corporation](#); (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other**
7 **entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States.**
- 8 **16. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that [Title 8 U.S. Code](#)**
9 **[1101\(a\)\(22\) - Definition](#), does NOT expressly stipulates, “ (22)The term**
10 **“[national](#) of the United States” means (A) a citizen of the United States, or**
11 **(B) a person who, though **not** a citizen of the United States, owes permanent**
12 **allegiance to the United States.**
- 13 **17. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that, the**
14 **individual may **NOT** stand upon his **constitutional rights** as a citizen.**
15 **He is NOT entitled to carry on his **private** business in his own way. **His****
16 **[power to contract is NOT unlimited](#). He owes such duty [to submit his**
17 **books and papers for an examination] to the State, and upon proof that**
18 **his rights are NOT such as existed by the law of the land [Common**
19 **Law] **long antecedent to the organization of the State**, and CAN be**
20 **taken from him without due process of law, or in accordance with the**
21 **Constitution. NOT among his **rights** are a **refusal to incriminate****
22 ****himself**, and the **immunity of himself and his property from arrest or****
23 ****seizure except under a warrant of the law, and upon proof that he****
24 **owes the public even though does not trespass upon their rights. See,**
25 **[Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 \(1905\)](#).**
- 26 **18. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that All laws which are**
27 **repugnant to the Constitution are NOT **null and void**. See, [Chief Justice](#)**
28 **[Marshall, Marbury vs Madison, 5, U.S. \(Cranch\) 137, 174, 176 \(1803\)](#).**

1 **19. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that the for Hire”**
2 DRIVER’S LICENSE CONTRACT and AGREEMENT BOND
3 #B6735991 **was NOT CANCELED**, TERMINATED, REVOKED, and
4 **LIQUIDATED**, ACCEPTED FOR VALUE AND EXEMPT FROM LEVY,
5 FOR RELEASE, CREDIT, AND DEPOSIT TO **PRIVATE** POST
6 REGISTERED, with the U.S. Treasury, with the retaining full control
7 and access to all respective right, interest, titles, and credits, as
8 evidenced by the contract security agreement and affidavit titled,
9 ‘AFFIDAVIT RIGHT TO TRAVEL *CANCELLATION*, TERMINATION,
10 AND REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL “For Hire” DRIVER’S
11 LICENSE CONTRACT and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND #
12 B6735991. A true and correct copy attached hereto as **Exhibit D** and
13 incorporated herein by reference.

14 **20. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that it WAS NOT**
15 noted in *Land v. Dollar*, 338 US 731 (1947), “that when the government
16 entered into a **commercial** field of activity, it **left immunity behind.**”
17 This principle is further affirmed in *Brady v. Roosevelt*, 317 U.S. 575
18 (1943); *FHA v. Burr*, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); and *Kiefer v. RFC*, 306 U.S. 381
19 (1939).

20 **21. Upon Proof from You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) that it was NOT**
21 established under the Clearfield Doctrine, as articulated in *Clearfield*
22 *Trust Co. v. United States*, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), that when the government
23 engages in commercial or proprietary activities, it sheds its sovereignty
24 and is subject to the same rules and liabilities as any **private**
25 corporation.

26 **LEGAL STANDARDS, MAXIMS, and PRECEDENT**

27 XXIII. In support of this CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE and Affidavit and
28 Notice and Self-Executing Contract and Security Agreement Affiant cites

1 the following established legal standards, legal maxims, precedent, and
2 principles:

3 Use defines classification:

- 4 1. It is **well established law** that the **highways** of the state are **public**
5 **property**, and **their primary and preferred use is for private purposes**, and
6 that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which,
7 generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit."
8 **Stephenson vs. Rinford**, 287 US 251; **Pachard vs Banton**, 264 US 140, and
9 cases cited; **Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission**, 271 US 592;
10 **Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co.**, 57 SW.2d 290; **Parlett**
11 **Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines**, 164 A. 313
- 12 2. The **California Motor Vehicle Code, section 260**: Private cars/vans etc. not
13 in commerce / for profit, are immune to registration fees:
 - 14 1. (a) A "**commercial vehicle**" is a vehicle of a type **REQUIRED** to be
15 **REGISTERED** under this code".
 - 16 2. (b) "Passenger vehicles which are **not used** for the transportation
17 of persons **for hire**, compensation or profit, and housecars, **are not**
18 **commercial vehicles**".
 - 19 3. (c) "a vanpool vehicle is not a **commercial** vehicle."
- 20 3. **18 U.S. Code § 31 - Definition**, expressly stipulates, "The term "**motor**
21 **vehicle**" means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled
22 or drawn by mechanical power **and used for commercial purposes** on the
23 highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or
24 property or cargo".
- 25 4. A vehicle not used for **commercial** activity is a "consumer goods", ...it is
26 **NOT** a type of vehicle **required** to be registered and "use tax" paid of which
27 the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax." **Bank of Boston vs Jones**, 4 UCC Rep.
28 **Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14.**

- 1 5. “ The ‘privilege’ of using the streets and highways by the
2 operation thereon of motor carriers for hire can be acquired only
3 by permission or license from the state or its political subdivision.
4 ” – Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed, page 830.
- 5 6. “It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is
6 based upon a reasonable classification, and does not involve any
7 unconstitutional discrimination, although **it does not apply to**
8 **private vehicles**, or those used by the owner in his own business,
9 and not for hire.” **Desser v. Wichita, (1915) 96 Kan. 820; Iowa**
10 **Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22.**
- 11 7. “Thus self-driven vehicles are **classified according to the use** to
12 which they are put rather than according to the means by which
13 they are propelled.” Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20.
- 14 8. In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising
15 officials “**may**” exempt such persons when the transportation is
16 not on a **commercial** basis means that they “**must**” exempt them.”
17 **State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. section 94 page 581.**
- 18 9. “**The use to which an item is put, rather than its physical**
19 **characteristics**, determine whether it should be classified as
20 “consumer goods” under UCC 9- 109(1) or “equipment” under
21 UCC 9-109(2).” **Grimes v Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23 UCC Rep Serv**
22 **655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).**
- 23 10. “Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods
24 purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use.
25 The two are mutually exclusive and the **principal use to which the**
26 **property is put should be considered as determinative.” James**
27 **Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72**
28 **Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).**

- 1 11. "The **classification of goods** in UCC 9-109 **are mutually exclusive.**"
2 **McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.**, 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260
3 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).
- 4 12. "The classification of ``goods" under [UCC] 9-109 **is a question of fact.**"
5 **Morgan County Feeders, Inc. v McCormick**, 18 UCC Rep Serv 2d 632; 836
6 P.2d 1051 (Colo. App., 1992).
- 7 13. "The definition of ``goods" includes an automobile." *Henson v Government*
8 *Employees Finance & Industrial Loan Corp.*, 15 UCC Rep Serv 1137; 257 Ark
9 273, 516 S.W.2d 1 (1974).

10 **The RIGHT to Travel is not a Privilege:**

- 11 14. "**No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage**
12 **on the highways**, byways, nor waterways... transporting his vehicles
13 and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being
14 subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed
15 limits, etc. **Travel is not a privilege requiring, licensing, vehicle**
16 **registration, or forced insurances.**" *Chicago Coach Co. v. City of*
17 *Chicago*, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22.
- 18 15. The fundamental **Right** to travel is NOT a Privilege, it's a gift granted
19 by your Creator and restated by our founding fathers as Unalienable
20 and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made Law or color of
21 law known as a private "Code" (secret) or a "Statute."
- 22 16. "**Traveling** is passing from place to place--act of **performing journey;**
23 and **traveler is person who travels.**" *In Re Archy* (1858), 9 C. 47.
- 24 17. "**Right** of transit through each state, with every species of property
25 known to constitution of United States, and recognized by that
26 paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each citizen, and does
27 not depend upon uncertain and changeable ground of mere comity." *In*
28 *Re Archy* (1858), 9 C. 47.

1 18. Freedom to **travel** is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's "liberty".

2 We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has
3 authorized its curtailment. (Road) **Kent v. Dulles**, 357 U.S. 116, 127.

4 19. The **right** to **travel** is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be
5 deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much
6 is conceded by the solicitor general. In Anglo Saxon law that right was
7 emerging at least as early as Magna Carta. **Kent v. Dulles**, 357 U.S. 116, 125.

8 20. "Even the legislature **has no power** to deny to a citizen the **right** to travel
9 upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his
10 business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with
11 public interest and convenience. *Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago*, 337
12 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, 206.

13 21. "... It is now universally recognized that the state does possess such power
14 [to impose such burdens and limitations upon private carriers when using
15 the public highways for the transaction of their business] with respect to
16 common carriers using the public highways for the transaction of their
17 business in the transportation of persons or property for hire. That rule is
18 stated as follows by the **supreme court of the United States**: 'A citizen may
19 have, under the fourteenth amendment, the **right** to travel and transport his
20 property upon them (the public highways) by **auto vehicle**, but **he has no**
21 **right to make the highways his place of business by using them as a**
22 **common carrier for hire**. Such use is a privilege which may be granted or
23 withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due
24 process clause or the equal protection clause.' (*Buck v. Kuykendall*, 267 U. S.
25 307 [38 A. L. R. 286, 69 L. Ed. 623, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324].

26 22. "The **right** of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property
27 thereon in the ordinary course of life and business **differs radically an**
28 **obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business**

1 and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The
2 former is the usual and ordinary **right** of a citizen, a **right** common to all;
3 while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the
4 extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the latter its power
5 is broader; the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some
6 and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction,
7 elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the
8 authorities.”

9 23. “Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the **right** to travel
10 upon the highway and transport his/her property in the ordinary course of
11 his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance
12 with the public interest and convenience.” [“regulated” means traffic safety
13 enforcement, stop lights, signs etc.]— Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169
14 NE 22.

15 24. “The claim and exercise of a constitutional **right** cannot be converted into a
16 crime.”— Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.

17 25. “There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
18 exercise of constitutional **rights**.” — Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945

19 26. The **right** of the citizen to **travel** upon the highway and to transport his
20 property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically
21 and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business
22 for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus.” — State vs. City
23 of Spokane, 186 P. 864.

24 27. “The **right** of the citizen to **travel** upon the public highways and to transport
25 his/her property thereon either by carriage or automobile, is **not** a mere
26 privilege which a city [or State] may prohibit or permit at will, but a common
27 right which he/she has under the **right** to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
28 happiness.” — Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.

- 1 28. "The **right** of the Citizen to **travel** upon the public highways and to
2 transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and
3 business, is a common **right** which he has under the **right** to enjoy life
4 and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness
5 and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and
6 usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of **travel**,
7 includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or
8 to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose
9 of life and business." — Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs.
10 Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784.
- 11 29. "The use of the highways for the purpose of **travel** and transportation
12 is not a mere **privilege**, but a common and fundamental **Right** of which
13 the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived." — Chicago
14 Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE
15 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am. Jur. (1st) Highways Sect. 163.
- 16 30. "The **right** to b is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived
17 without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right
18 was emerging as early as the Magna Carta." — Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US
19 116 (1958).
- 20 31. "The state **cannot** diminish **Rights** of the people." — Hurtado vs.
21 California, 110 US 516.
- 22 32. "Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where
23 and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may
24 make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The **Right** of the
25 Citizen to **travel** upon the public highways and to transport his property
26 thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere
27 **privilege** which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the
28 common **Right** which he has under his **Right** to life, liberty, and the pursuit

1 of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under
2 normal conditions, **travel** at his inclination along the public highways or in
3 public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent
4 manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be
5 protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." — II Am.Jur. (1st
6 Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.

7 33. Where **rights secured** by the Constitution are involved, **there can be no rule**
8 **making or legislation** which would abrogate them." — Miranda v. Arizona,
9 384 U.S.

10 34. "The state **cannot** diminish **Rights** of the **people**." — Hurtado vs. California,
11 110 US 516.

12 **NO QUALIFIED OR LIMITED IMMUNITY**

13 35. "When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially (and
14 thus are not protected by "qualified" or "limited immunity," - SEE: Owen v.
15 City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404) - - "but merely act as an
16 extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a "ministerial"
17 and not a "discretionary capacity..." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583;
18 Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.

19 36."Public officials are **not** immune from suit when they transcend their lawful
20 authority by invading constitutional **rights**." — AFLCIO v. Woodward, 406
21 F2d 137 t.

22 37. "Immunity **fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility** while liability
23 promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the
24 government to its people." (Civil Rights) **Rabon vs Rowen Memorial**
25 **Hospital, Inc.** 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.

26 38. "Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held **liable**
27 **for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees.**" **Lezama v. Justice**
28 **Court**, A025829.

- 1 39. "Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a
2 sworn officer of the law." **In re McCowan** (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.
- 3 40. "All are presumed to know the law." **San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel**
4 (1882), 62 C. 641; **Dore v. Southern Pacific Co.** (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817;
5 **People v. Flanagan** (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; **Lincoln v. Superior**
6 **Court** (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107; **San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard**
7 (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.
- 8 41. "It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of
9 the law excuses no one." **Daniels v. Dean** (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.
- 10 42. "the people, not the States, are sovereign." — Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall.
11 419, 2 U.S. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793).
- 12 43. **ALL ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW.** (God's Law - Moral and
13 Natural Law). Exodus 21:23-25; Lev. 24: 17-21; Deut. 1; 17, 19:21; Mat.
14 22:36-40; Luke 10:17; Col. 3:25. "No one is above the law".
- 15 44. **IN COMMERCE FOR ANY MATTER TO BE RESOLVED MUST BE**
16 **EXPRESSED.** (Heb. 4:16; Phil. 4:6; Eph. 6:19-21). -- **Legal maxim:** "To lie
17 is to go against the mind."
- 18 45. **IN COMMERCE TRUTH IS SOVEREIGN.** (Exodus 20:16; Ps. 117:2;
19 John 8:32; II Cor. 13:8) Truth is sovereign -- and the Sovereign tells only
20 the truth.
- 21 46. **TRUTH IS EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT.** (Lev.
22 5:4-5; Lev. 6:3-5; Lev. 19:11-13; Num. 30:2; Mat. 5:33; James 5: 12).
- 23 47. **AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN**
24 **COMMERCE.** (12 Pet. 1:25; Heb. 6:13-15); "He who does not deny,
25 admits."
- 26 48. **AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGEMENT IN**
27 **COMMERCE.** (Heb. 6:16-17); "There is nothing left to resolve.

28 //

1 XXIV. At no point in time were Defendants/Respondents presented with a
2 CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S LICENSE (COMMERCIAL CONTRACT), and any
3 information added to the CITATION/CONTRACT was done so in fraud,
4 without consent, full disclosure, and thus is *void ab initio*.

5 49. **WORKMAN IS WORTHY OF HIS HIRE.** The first of these is
6 expressed in Exodus 20:15; Lev. 19:13; Mat. 10:10; Luke 10"7; II Tim. 2:6.

7 **Legal maxim:** "It is against equity for freemen not to have the free
8 disposal of their own property."

9 50. **HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST **LOSES BY****

10 **DEFAULT.** (Book of Job; Mat. 10:22) -- **Legal maxim:** "He who does not
11 repel a wrong when he can occasions it."

12 //

13 Executed "*without the United States*" in compliance with **28 USC § 1746.**

14 **FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.**

15 //

16 ***Some Relevant U.C.C. Sections and Application***

17 **1. U.C.C. § 1-308 - Reservation of Rights:**

18 This section ensures that acceptance of an offer under duress or coercion does
19 not waive any rights or defenses. By invoking U.C.C. § 1-308, Claimant(s)/
20 Plaintiff(s) asserts that any compliance with your offer is made with *explicit*
21 *reservation of rights*, preserving all legal remedies.

22 **2. U.C.C. § 2-204 - Formation in General:**

23 This section establishes that a contract can be formed in any manner sufficient
24 to show agreement, including conduct. By issuing the citation (an implied offer
25 to contract), You/Dedenfant(s)/Respondent(s), have initiated a contractual
26 relationship, which has been conditionally accepted with new terms herein.

27 **3. U.C.C. § 2-206 - Offer and Acceptance in Formation of **Contract:****

28 Under this section, an offer can be accepted in any reasonable manner. By

1 conditionally accepting the citation and dispatching this notice via USPS
2 Certified, Registered, and/or Express mail, Claimant(s)/Plaintiff(s) has/have
3 created a binding contract agreement and obligation which You/Defendant(s)/
4 Respondent(s) are **contractually bound and obligated to**.

5 **4. U.C.C. § 2-202 - Final Written Expression:**

6 This provision ensures that the terms of this conditional acceptance supplement
7 the original terms of the citation. By including these conditions, the issuing
8 authority is bound to provide proof of their validity, failing which the
9 conditional acceptance will be expressly stipulated as the **final** agreement.

10 **5. U.C.C. § 1-103 - Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable:**

11 This section allows common law principles to supplement the UCC. Under the
12 doctrine of **equity** and **fair dealing**, failure to provide the requested proof
13 constitutes bad faith and silent acquiescence, tacit agreement, and tacit
14 procuration to all of the the **fact and terms stipulated** in this Affidavit Notice
15 and Self-Executing Contract and Security Agreement.

16 **Legal and Procedural Basis**

17 **1. Mailbox/Postal Rule:**

18 Under the mailbox rule, this notice of conditional acceptance is effective and
19 considered **accepted** by You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) upon dispatch via
20 Registered Mail, and/or Express Mail, and/or Certified Mail. The agreement
21 becomes binding when the notice **is sent, not** when received. This binds the
22 issuing authority to the terms outlined in this notice unless rebutted within the
23 specified timeframe.

24 **2. Offer and Acceptance:**

25 Your citation constitutes an offer under contract law. This notice self-
26 executing Contract and Security Agreement conditionally accepts your
27 contract OFFER and supplements its terms under U.C.C. § 2-202. Failure
28 to fulfill the new and final terms and conditions within the specified **three**

1 **(3) day** timeframe constitutes **silent acquiescence, tacit agreement, and**
2 **tacit procurement.**

3 **RESPONSE DEADLINE: REQUIRED WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS:**

4 A response and/or compensation and/or restitution payment must be
5 received within a deadline of **three (3) days**. At the “**Deadline**” is defined as
6 5:00 p.m. on the third (3rd) day after your receipt of this affidavit. “**Failure to**
7 **respond**” is defined as a blank denial, unsupported denial, inapposite denial,
8 such as, “not applicable” or equivalent, statements of counsel and other
9 declarations by third parties that lack first-hand knowledge of the facts, and/
10 or responses lacking verification, all such responses being legally insufficient
11 to controvert the verified statements herewith. See *Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc* and
12 *Beasley, Supra*. Failure to respond can result in **your acceptance of personal**
13 **liability** external to qualified immunity and waiver of any decision rights of
14 remedy.

15 **FAILURE TO RESPOND AND/OR PERFORM, REMEDY, AND**
16 **SETTLEMENT**

17 If You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) fail to respond and perform **within**
18 **three (3) days** of receiving this Affidavit Notice and Self- Executing Contract
19 and Security Agreement and **CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE**, with verified
20 evidence of the above accompanied by an affidavit, **sworn under the penalty**
21 **of perjury, as required by law**, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s), Gregory D
22 Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell,
23 GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT,
24 GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS
25 DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100*, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) *individually*
26 *and collectively fully agree* that you must **act in good faith** and accordance
27 with the Law, cease all conspiracy, fraud, identity theft, embezzlement,
28 deprivation under the color of law, extortion, embezzlement, bank fraud,

1 harassment, conspiracy to deprive, and other violations of the law, and
2 **TERMINATE these proceeding immediately**, and pay the below mentioned
3 Three Hundred Million Dollar Restitution and Settlement payment, and
4 releasing all special deposit funds and/or Credits due to Affiant and/or
5 Complainant(s)/Plaintiff(s).

6 **Three Hundred Million (\$300,000,000.00 USD) Restitution**
7 **Settlement Payment REQUIRED**

8 Furthermore, if You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) fail to respond and
9 perform **within three (3) days** from the date of receipt of this communication by
10 providing **verified evidence and proof** of the facts and conditions set forth herein,
11 accompanied by **affidavits sworn under penalty of perjury as required by law**,
12 Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert
13 Gell, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT,
14 GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFFS
15 DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100*, hereby agree that, within three (3) days of receipt of
16 this contract offer, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) shall issue restitution payment
17 in the total sum certain of **Three Hundred Million U.S. Dollars (\$300,000,000.00**
18 **USD)**, which shall become **immediately** due and payable to TMWG EXPRESS
19 TRUST©, TMKEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, and/or
20 TMKEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST: Complainant(s)/Plaintiff(s).

21 **One Trillion Dollar (\$1,000,000,000,000.00 USD)**
22 **Default Judgement and Lien**

23 If You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) fail to respond and perform **within**
24 **three (3) days** from the date of receipt of this communication, as **contractually**
25 **required**, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) hereby individually and collectively,
26 fully agree, that the entire amount evidenced and itemized in Invoice
27 **#RIVSHERTREAS12312024**, totaling **One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000.00)**,
28 **shall** become **immediately** due and payable in full.

1 **Furthermore**, if You/Respondent(s)/Defendant(s), fail to respond and
2 perform **within three (3) days** from the date of receipt of this communication, You/
3 Defendant(s)/Respondent(s), **individually and collectively**, admit the statements
4 and claims by **TACIT PROCURATION**, and completely agree that you/they
5 individually and collectively are guilty of **fraud, racketeering, indentity theft,**
6 **treason, breach of trust and fiduciary duties, extortion, coercion, deprivation of**
7 **rights under the color of law, conspiracy to deprive of rights under the color of law,**
8 **monopolization of trade and commerce, forced peonage, obstruction of**
9 **enforcement, extortion of a national/internationally protected person, false**
10 **imprisonment, torture, creating trusts in restraint of trade dereliction of fiduciary**
11 **duties, bank fraud, breach of trust, treason, tax evasion, bad faith actions, dishonor,**
12 **injury and damage to Affiant.**

13 **JUDGEMENT AND COMMERCIAL LIEN** 14 **AUTHORIZATION**

15 Moreover, if You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s), fail to respond **within three (3)**
16 **days** from the date of receipt of this communication, you/they **individually and**
17 **collectively, fully and unequivocally Decree, Accept, fully Authorize** (in accord with
18 **UCC section 9), indorse, support, and advocate for a judgement, and/or SUMMARY**
19 **JUDGEMENT, and/or commercial lien of One Trillion Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000.00)**
20 **against** You/Respondent(s)/Defendant(s), Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman,
21 George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, GREGORY D EASTWOOD, ROBERT C V
22 BOWMAN, WILLIAM PRATT, GEORGE REYES, ROBERT GELL, RIVERSIDE COUNTY
23 SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, *Does 1-100*, **in favor of**, TMWG EXPRESS TRUST©, TMKEVIN
24 WALKER© ESTATE, TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, and/or TMKEVIN WALKER© IRR
25 TRUST, and/or their lawfully designated ASSIGNEE(S).

26 **Finally**, If You/Respondent(s)/Defendant(s), fail to respond **within three (3) days**
27 from the date of receipt of this communication, You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s)
28 **individually and collectively, EXPRESSLY, FULLY, and unequivocally Authorize,**

1 **indorse, support and advocate for** ™WG EXPRESS TRUST©, ™KEVIN WALKER©
2 ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, and/or ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST, and/or
3 their lawfully designated ASSIGNEE(S) to formally notify the United States Treasury,
4 Internal Revenue Service, the respective Congress (wo)man, U.S. Attorney General, and/
5 or any person, individual, legal fiction, and/or person, or ens legis Affiant deems
6 necessary, including but not limited to submitting the requisite form(s) 1099-A, 1099-OID,
7 1099-C, 1096, 1040, 1041, 1041-V, 1040-V, 3949-A, with the **One Trillion Dollars**
8 **(\$1,000,000,000,000.00 USD)** as the **income to You/Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) and lost**
9 **revenue and/or income to** Affiant, and/or ™WG EXPRESS TRUST©, ™KEVIN
10 WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS WALKER©, and/or ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR
11 TRUST, and/or their lawfully designated ASSIGNEE(S).

12 //

13 **SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, U.C.C. 3-505 PRESUMED**
14 **DISHONOR**

15 Said income is **to be assessed and claimed as income** by/to You/
16 Defendant(s)/Respondent(s), **and/or by filing a lawsuit** followed by a
17 DEMAND or similar for **SUMMARY JUDGEMENT** as **a matter of law**, in
18 accordance with **California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(c)** and **Federal**
19 **Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)**, and/or executing an **Affidavit Certificate of**
20 **Non-Response, Dishonor, Judgement, and Lien Authorization**, in
21 accordance with **U.C.C. § 3-505**, and/or issue an ORDER TO PAY or BILL OF
22 EXCHANGE to the U.S. Treasury and IRS, said sum certain of **One Trillion**
23 **U.S. Dollars (\$1,000,000,000,000.00 USD)**, for **immediate credit to** Affiant,
24 and/or ™WG EXPRESS TRUST©, ™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN
25 LEWIS WALKER©, and/or ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST, and/or their
26 lawfully designated ASSIGNEE(S), with this Self-Executing Contract and
27 Security Agreement servings as **prima facie evidence** of You/Respondent(s)/
28 Defendant(s)'s **Verified INDEBTEDNESS** to Affiant, Affiant, and/or ™WG

1 EXPRESS TRUST©, ™KEVIN WALKER© ESTATE, ™KEVIN LEWIS
2 WALKER©, and/or ™KEVIN WALKER© IRR TRUST, and/or their lawfully
3 designated ASSIGNEE(S).

4 Should it be deemed necessary, the Claimant(s)/Plaintiff(s) are **fully**
5 **Authorized (in accord with U.C.C § 9-509)** to file a UCC commercial **LIEN**
6 **and/or UCC1 Financing Statement** to perfect interest and/or secure full
7 satisfaction of the adjudged sum of **One Trillion Dollars**
8 **(\$1,000,000,000,000.00 USD)**.

9 //

10 ***** SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT*** :**

11 Again for the record, this **contract, received and accepted per the mailbox rule, is**
12 **self-executing and serves as a SECURITY AGREEMENT, and establishes a lien,**
13 **Authorized by You/They/the DEBTOR(S). Acceptance of this contract is deemed to**
14 **occur at the moment it is dispatched via mail, in accordance with the mailbox rule**
15 **established in common law. Under this rule, an acceptance becomes effective and**
16 **binding** once it is properly addressed, stamped, and placed in the control of the postal
17 service, as supported by **Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 ER 250. Furthermore, as a self-**
18 **executing agreement, this contract creates immediate and enforceable obligations**
19 **without the need for further action, functioning also as a SECURITY AGREEMENT under**
20 **Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).**

21 ***** SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT*** :**

22 //

23 **ESTOPPEL BY ACQUIESCENCE:**

24 If the addressee(s) or an intended recipient of this notice fail to respond
25 addressing **each point, on a point by point basis, they individually and**
26 **collectively accept all of the statements, declaration, stipulations, facts, and**
27 **claims as TRUTH and fact by TACIT PROCURATION, all issues are deemed**
28 **settled RES JUDICATA, STARE DECISIS and by COLLATERAL**

1 **ESTOPPEL.** You may **not** argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the finality of
2 the administrative findings in any subsequent process, whether administrative or
3 judicial. (See Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Ed. for any terms you do not “understand”).

4 **Your failure to completely answer and respond will result in your agreeing**
5 **not to argue, controvert or otherwise protest the finality of the administrative**
6 **findings in any process, whether administrative or judicial, as certified by**
7 **Notary or Witness Acceptor in an Affidavit Certificate of Non Response and/or**
8 **Judgement, or similar.**

9 Should YOU **fail** to respond, provide partial, unsworn, or incomplete
10 answers, such are not acceptable to me or to any court of law. See, *Sieb's*
11 *Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley*, 13 F.R.D. 113 (1952)., “Defendant(s) made no request for
12 an extension of time in which to answer the request for admission of facts and filed
13 only an unsworn response within the time permitted,” thus, under the specific
14 provisions of Ark. and *Fed. R. Civ. P. 36*, the facts in question were **deemed**
15 **admitted as true. Failure to answer is well established in the court.** *Beasley v. U.*
16 *S.*, 81 F. Supp. 518 (1948)., “I, therefore, hold that the requests **will be considered as**
17 **having been admitted.**” Also as previously referenced, “Statements of fact
18 contained in affidavits which are **not** rebutted by the opposing party's **affidavit or**
19 **pleadings may** be accepted as **true** by the trial court.” --*Winsett v. Donaldson*, 244
20 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1976).

21 **COPY of this ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE sent to the following**
22 **WITNESSES by way of Registered Mail with Misprision of Felony Obligations:**

23 **To/Cc:** Rob Bonta, Fiduciary(ies),
24 C/o Office of the Attorney General
1300 "I" Street
25 Sacramento, California [95814-2919]
Registered Mail # **RF775820670US.**

To/Cc: Issa, Darrel
C/o U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, District of Colombia [20515]
Registered Mail # **RF775820666US.**

26 **To/Cc:** Michael Hestrin, Fiduciary(ies),
27 C/o Office of the District Attorney
3960 Orange Street
28 Riverside California [92501]
Registered Mail # **RF775820652US.**

To/cc: Merrick Garland
C/o OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
950 Pennsylvania Avenue Nw
Washington, District of Colombia, [20530]
Registered Mail # **RF775820649US**

EXHIBITS/ATTACHMENTS:

- 1
- 2 **1.Exhibit A: Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact'**
- 3 **2. Exhibit B: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC1 filing #2024385925-4.**
- 4 **3. Exhibit C: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC3 filing ##2024402990-2 .**
- 5 **4. Exhibit D: Affidavit Right of Travel CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND**
- 6 **REVOCAION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT**
- 7 **and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND # B6735991**
- 8 **5. Exhibit E: Revocation Termination and Cancelation of Franchise.**
- 9 **6. Exhibit F: CITATION/BOND #TE464702, accepted under threat, duress, and**
- 10 **coercion: AS EVIDENCED BY SIGNATURE LINE.**
- 11 **7. Exhibit G: Automobile's PRIVATE PLATE displayed on the automobile**
- 12 **8. Exhibit H: Screenshot of "Automobile" and "commercial vehicle" from DMV**
- 13 **website**
- 14 **9. Exhibit I: Screenshot of CA CODE § 260 from <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov>**
- 15 **10. Exhibit J: Photo(s) of Defendant/Respondent Gregory D Eastwood.**
- 16 **11. Exhibit K: Photo(s) of Defendant/Respondent Robert C V Bowman.**
- 17 **12. Exhibit L: Photo(s) of Defendant/Respondent Willam Pratt.**
- 18 **13. Exhibit M: AFFIDAVIT CERTIFICATE of STATUS, ASSETS, RIGHTS,**
- 19 **JURISDICTION, AND PROTECTIONS as national/non-citizen national, foreign**
- 20 **government, foreign official, internationally protected person, international**
- 21 **organization, secured party/secured creditor, and/or national of the United**
- 22 **States, #RF661448964US.**
- 23 **14. Exhibit N: national/non-citizen national passport card #C35510079.**
- 24 **15. Exhibit O: national/non-citizen national passport book #A39235161.**
- 25 **16.Exhibit P: TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER© Copyright and Trademark Agreement.**
- 26 **17. Exhibit Q:**
- 27 **//**
- 28 **//**

WORDS DEFINED GLOSSARY OF TERMS:

As used in this Affidavit, the following words and terms are as defined in this section, non-obstante:

1. **automobile**: a passenger vehicle that does not transport persons for hire. This includes station wagons, sedans, vans, and sport utility vehicles. See, California Vehicle Code (CVC) §465.
2. **commercial vehicle**: A “**commercial vehicle**” is a vehicle which is used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property (for example, trucks and pickups). See CVC §260.
3. **motor vehicle**: The term “**motor vehicle**” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power **and** used for **commercial purposes** on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. See 18 U.S. Code § 31 - Definitions.
4. **financial institution**: a **person**, an **individual**, a **private banker**, a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales, persons involved in real estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal Service, a commercial bank or trust company, any credit union, an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this paragraph, a broker or dealer in securities or commodities, a currency exchange, or a business engaged in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency or funds, financial agency, a loan or finance company, an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers’ checks, checks, money orders, or similar instruments, an operator of a credit card system, an insurance company, a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. Ref, 31 U.S. Code § 5312 - Definitions and application.
5. **individual**: As a noun, this term denotes a single **person** as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it **may**, in proper cases, include **artificial persons**. As an adjective: Existing as an indivisible entity.

1 Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group. — See Black’s Law Dictionary 4th, 7th,
2 and 8th Edition pages 913, 777, and 2263 respectively.

3 6. **person:** Term may include artificial beings, as corporations. The term means an **individual, corporation,**
4 **business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture,**
5 **government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other**
6 **legal or commercial entity.** The term “person” shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a
7 trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation. **The term “person” means a natural**
8 **person or an organization. -Artificial persons.** Such as are created and devised by law for the purposes
9 of society and government, called "corporations" or bodies politic." **-Natural persons.** Such as are
10 formed by nature, as distinguished from artificial persons, or corporations. **-Private person.** An
11 individual who is not the incumbent of an office. Persons are divided by law into natural and **artificial.**
12 Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; **artificial** are such as are created and devised
13 by **human laws**, for the purposes of society and government, which are called "corporations" or "bodies
14 politic." — See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-201, Black’s Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 4th
15 edition pages 892, 895, and 1299, respectively, 27 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 72.11 - Meaning
16 of terms, and 26 United States Code (U.S. Code) § 7701 - Definitions.

17 7. **bank:** a **person** engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan
18 association, credit union, and **trust company.** The terms “banks”, “national bank”, “national banking
19 association”, “member bank”, “board”, “district”, and “reserve bank” shall have the meanings assigned
20 to them in section 221 of this title. An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered
21 to receive deposits of money, to make loans. and to issue its promissory notes, (designed to circulate as
22 money, and commonly called "bank-notes" or "bank-bills") or to perform any one or more of these
23 functions. The term "bank" is usually restricted in its application to an incorporated body; while a
24 **private individual** making it his business to conduct banking operations is denominated a “banker.”
25 Banks in a commercial sense are of three kinds, to wit; (1) Of deposit; (2) of discount; (3) of circulation.
26 Strictly speaking, the term "bank" implies a place for the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious
27 purpose of such an institution. — See, UCC 1-201, 4-105, 12 U.S. Code § 221a, Black’s Law Dictionary
28 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th, pages 117-118, 116-117, 183-184, 139-140, and 437-439.

- 1 8. **discharge:** To cancel or unloose the obligation of a contract; to make an agreement or contract null and
2 inoperative. Its principal species are rescission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance,
3 judgement, composition, bankruptcy, merger. As applied to demands claims, right of action,
4 incumbrances, etc., to discharge the debt or claim is to extinguish it, to annul its obligatory force, to
5 satisfy it. And here also the term is generic; thus a dent , a mortgage. As a noun, the word means the act
6 or instrument by which the binding force of a contract is terminated, irrespective of whether the
7 contract is carried out to the full extent contemplated (in which case the discharge is the result of
8 performance) or is broken off before complete execution. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, page
- 9 9. **pay:** To discharge a debt; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in
10 money or in goods, for his acceptance. To pay is to deliver to a creditor the
11 value of a debt, either in money or In goods, for his acceptance, by which the
12 debt is discharged. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st, 2nd, and 3rd edition, pages
13 880, 883, and 1339 respectively.
- 14 10. **payment:** The performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability. by the
15 delivery of money or other value. Also the money or thing so delivered. Performance of an obligation
16 by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the
17 obligation. [Cases: Payment 1. C.J.S. Payment § 2.] 2. The money or other valuable thing so delivered in
18 satisfaction of an obligation. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1st and 8th edition, pages 880-811 and
19 3576-3577, respectively.
- 20 11. **driver:** The term "driver" (i.e: "driver's license") means One **employed** in conducting a coach, carriage,
21 wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.
- 22 12. **may:** An auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing ability, competency,
23 liberty, permission, probability or contingency. — Regardless of the instrument, however, whether
24 constitution, statute, deed, contract or whatnot, **courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or**
25 **"must".** — See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition page 1131.
- 26 13. **extortion:** The term "**extortion**" means the obtaining of property from another, **with his consent,**
27 **induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official**
28 **right.** — See 18 U.S. Code § 1951 - Interference with commerce by threats or violence.

1 14. **national:** “foreign government”, “foreign official”, “internationally protected person”, “international
2 organization”, “national of the United States”, “official guest,” and/or “non-citizen national.” **They all**
3 **have the same meaning.** See Title 18 U.S. Code § 112 - Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and
4 internationally protected persons.

5 15. **United States:** For the purposes of this Affidavit, the terms "United States" and "U.S."
6 *mean only the Federal Legislative Democracy of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S.*
7 *Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other Territory within the "United*
8 *States," which entity has its origin and jurisdiction from Article 1, Section 8, Clause*
9 *17-18 and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution for the United States of*
10 *America. The terms "United States" and "U.S." are NOT to be construed to mean or include*
11 *the sovereign, united 50 states of America.*

12 16. **fraud:** deceitful practice or Willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in
13 some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional.
14 as applied to contracts is the cause of an error bearing on material part of the contract, created or
15 continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an
16 inconvenience or loss to the other. in the sense of court of equity, properly includes all acts, omissions,
17 and concealments which involved a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
18 reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
19 another. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 1st and 2nd Edition, pages 521-522 and 517 respectively.

20 17. **color:** appearance, semblance. or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or
21 apparent right. Hence, a deceptive appearance; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of
22 reality; a a disguise or pretext. See, Black’s Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 222.

23 18. **colorable:** That which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be. See, Black’s Law
24 Dictionary 1st Edition, page 2223.


25 //
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COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION:

1 County of Riverside)
2)
3) Commercial Oath and Verification
4 The State of California)


5 I, KEVIN WALKER, under my unlimited liability and Commercial Oath proceeding
6 in good faith being of sound mind states that the facts contained herein are true,
7 correct, complete and not misleading to the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief
8 under penalty of International Commercial Law and state this to be HIS Affidavit of
9 Truth regarding same signed and sealed this 1ST day of JANUARY in the year of
10 Our Lord two thousand and twenty five:

11 proceeding sui juris, In Propria Persona, by *Special Limited Appearance*,
12 **All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.**

13 By: 
14 **Kevin Walker**, Attorney In Fact, Secured Party,
15 Executor, national, private bank(er) EIN # 9x-xxxxxxx

16 Let this document stand as truth before the Almighty Supreme Creator and let it be
17 established before men according as the scriptures saith: "But if they will not listen,
18 take one or two others along, so that every matter may be established by the testimony of two
19 or three witnesses." Matthew 18:16. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall every
20 word be established" 2 Corinthians 13:1.

21 Sui juris, By *Special Limited Appearance*,
22 By: 
23 **Donnabelle Mortel** (WITNESS)

24 Sui juris, By *Special Limited Appearance*,
25 By: 
26 **Corey Walker** (WITNESS)

27 //
28 //

NOTICE:

Using a notary on this document does *not* constitute any adhesion, *nor does it alter my status in any manner*. The purpose for notary is verification and identification **only** and **not** for entrance into **any** foreign jurisdiction.

JURAT:

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of Riverside)
) ss.
County of California)

Subscribed and ~~sworn~~ to (or affirmed) before me on this 2nd day of January, 2025 by Kevin Walker proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) who appeared before me.

Jayleen Isabel Castillo Notary public
print

Jayleen Castillo Seal:

